Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Scott Adams was charged in three separate proceedings in Ravalli County: (1) felony operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, fourth or subsequent offense, and a related misdemeanor; (2) forgery and two counts of misdemeanor theft; and (3) operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, fourth or subsequent offense, and several other offenses. Defendant posted bail following his arrest for the first driving under the influence charge, but bail was revoked following the filing of the second. The District Court then set a higher bail amount for his release. Unable to post bail a second time, Defendant remained incarcerated until a combined sentencing hearing in all three proceedings was conducted; Defendant ultimately served 66 days. Defendant appealed each of the three cases, and the Supreme Court consolidated them for this opinion. On appeal, Defendant argued multiple errors in the district court's decisions, ranging from miscalculation of his sentence and credit for time served. The State conceded that the District Court should not have ordered the revocation sentences to run consecutively to and requested that this provision be vacated. Upon the State's concession, the Supreme Court vacated the provision ordering the revocation sentences to run consecutively to one of the DUI sentences and remanded the case for correction. Otherwise, the Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Montana v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant John Dilley appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee City of Missoula. The district court concluded the City acted within its legal authority when it purchased the Missoula Civic Stadium with tax increment financing (TIF) funds designated for urban renewal. The stadium was originally planned and developed by Play Ball Missoula, Inc. (Play Ball), a volunteer, non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of bringing a minor league baseball team to Missoula. In 2000, Play Ball and the City entered a development agreement that permitted Play Ball to finance and construct a stadium on blighted City property and later convey the facility to the City. Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed suit prior to the City's acquisition of the stadium, alleging the planned purchase using TIF funds was an "illegal payoff of private enterprise debt." On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously failed to specify which provision under Title 7, Chapter 15, Part 42 of the Montana Code that permitted the "payoff." He also argued that the City could not make such an expenditure of TIF funds simply because the practice was not prohibited by statute. Finding that the City's use of TIF money to acquire the stadium was a proper exercise of its urban renewal posers, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the City's favor. View "Dilley v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

R.T. was born in 2009; his mother was killed in a car accident a year later. R.T.'s biological father was a minor at the time of the mother's death, and was living in a halfway house. R.T.'s maternal grandfather petitioned for guardianship/conservatorship of R.T. A year after the guardianship/conservatorship was granted, R.T.'s maternal grandmother (then living in Hawai'i) petitioned to be substituted as R.T.'s guardian/conservator, claiming it was not in R.T.'s best interest to remain in the grandfather's care because he was exposed to second-hand cigarette and marijuana smoke within the grandfather's home. She further alleged that R.T.'s developmental needs were not being met because the child was always left with babysitters. A hearing was held on the grandmother's petition, and the district court eventually granted the grandmother's petition. The grandfather appealed, arguing that R.T.'s father's parental rights were not terminated and therefore the district court ruled in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's decision and found the record supported the court's conclusion. View "In re R.T. a Minor" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dustin Robison appealed a district court order which reversed the findings of the State Tax Appeals Board (STAB) and reinstated the findings of the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR). This case concerned whether Petitioner was allowed to claim a deduction on his Montana income taxes for certain mileage as a business travel expense. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department of Revenue's decision. View "Robison v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioner Billie L. Redding asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, and to conclude it was error for the District Court to grant partial summary judgment to Defendants Timothy Janiak; Anderson ZurMuehlen & Co., P.C.; Ray E. Petersen; and Rick Ahmann. Petitioner's case arose from a series of real estate transactions by which she sold her property to Defendants for which she would receive payments from them which would serve as her monthly income. The scheme by which Defendants paid Petitioner and their other real estate clients collapsed in 2008 (as a Ponzi scheme), and they filed for bankruptcy. Petitioner sued, alleging: (1) unlawful sale of securities; (2) negligence; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) breach of contract; and (6) tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Petitioner sought damages in the amount of $4,635,485.51, plus additional amounts for punitive damages, emotional distress, loss of established course of life, and consequential damages. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on several issues, the only issue before the Court was whether the "investments" Petitioner made with Defendants qualified as "securities" under the state Securities Act. The district court found that Petitioner "did not engage in a common enterprise," an essential element of an investment contract (i.e. a security), because she "did not share the risks of the investment with other investors because she agreed upon a contractually set return on her investment." Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that supervisory control was appropriate in this case and that the real estate transactions in question here were indeed securities. Accordingly the Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control. View "Redding v. Montana 1st Jud. District" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Helena Division certified the following question to this Court: "Is obesity that is not the symptom of a physiological condition a 'physical or mental impairment' as it is used in Montana Code Annotated 49-2-101(19)(a)?" Respondent Eric Feit filed an administrative complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry (Department) alleging that Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) illegally discriminated against him because of perceived disability. A hearing officer for the Department entered summary disposition in favor of Respondent, concluding that "BNSF engaged in and is liable for a discriminatory refusal to hire Feit because it regarded him as disabled" and awarded damages for lost wages and benefits, prejudgment interest, and emotional distress. BNSF filed an unsuccessful appeal with the Montana Human Rights Commission, which was then presented to the U.S. District Court. Upon review, the Montana Supreme Court accepted the certified question and answered it "yes." View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Feit" on Justia Law

Respondent-Appellant Chad Cringle appealed a district court order that remanded his case to the Montana Human Rights Commission for further proceedings in his discrimination complaint against Petitioner-Appellee BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). The issue on appeal was whether BNSF demonstrated sufficient grounds to excuse its noncompliance with a fourteen-day filing deadline. In 2008, Respondent filed a complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry charging that BNSF had illegally discriminated against him in employment. Following proceedings on the issues of damages and affirmative relief, the hearing officer issued a final decision in Respondent's favor. That same day, the hearing officer issued notice of his decision by mail to the parties. BNSF received the decision the next day. A legal secretary discovered the decision under papers on her desk nineteen days after it was received. By that time, the decision had become final and "not appealable." BNSF filed a notice of appeal, asking for an extension of time in which to file its notice of appeal. Respondent objected to the request. The Commission denied BNSF's appeal. BNSF sought judicial review; The Commission and Respondent filed separate motions to dismiss BNSF's petition. BNSF then appealed the district court's dismissal of its petition, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the fourteen-day filing deadline as "jurisdictional" and asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Commission had authority to extend the deadline to file the appeal. The case came before the Supreme Court a second time, the last issue to decide was whether BNSF had shown good cause for its untimely filing. Upon review, the Court concluded BNSF failed to justify relief from the deadline. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Cringle" on Justia Law

The Medical Marijuana Growers Association, Inc., Courier 1, Courier 2, Caregiver 1, Caregiver 2, and Caregiver 3 (collectively referred to as Plaintiffs) appealed an Order and Rationale on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Order), entered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County, Montana. The Order determined that caregivers, as providers of medical marijuana to qualifying patients under Montana’s 2009 Medical Marijuana Act, were not permitted to engage in marijuana transactions with or provide cultivation services to other caregivers or their agents or contractors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the plain language of the statute clear and unambiguous: "A caregiver is authorized to provide marijuana to qualifying patients only. The 2009 MMA does not provide for the transfer of marijuana or paraphernalia from caregiver to caregiver or among their agents, nor is there a provision allowing for a caregiver to cultivate marijuana for other caregivers or for their agents or contractors." Therefore, the Court affirmed the determination of the District Court that the 2009 MMA does not permit the exchange of marijuana among caregivers, nor does it permit a caregiver to cultivate or manufacture marijuana for another caregiver. View "Medical Marijuana Growers Association, Inc. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

Mary and David W. Johnson were married on June 12, 1993. In May 2003, David filed a petition for dissolution and in June 2003 the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, which distributed the marital estate. Mary was served and defaulted. A decree of dissolution was entered on June 23, 2003, incorporating the provisions of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and finding it was not unconscionable. The decree stated that “there are no minor children of the parties hereto, and [Mary] is not pregnant at this time.” In 2007, Mary filed an action to set aside the decree, alleging that David had failed to disclose and list properties in the Settlement Agreement, and requesting that the marital estate be re-distributed. On November 25, 2008, in response to Mary’s motion for summary judgment, the district court entered an order setting aside the marital property division. The court concluded that David “knowingly failed to disclose material items of property and assets” and made affirmative misrepresentations to Mary to induce an uncontested judgment, which “constitute[d] extrinsic fraud sufficient to warrant setting aside of the resulting void property rights judgment as a matter of equity in order to fairly and properly account for, value, characterize, and equitably distribute the undisclosed property and assets in consideration of the parties’ prior settlement agreement.” The court ultimately determined that Mary was entitled to a total payment in the sum of $69,948.65 for the value of undisclosed assets, with interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from June 23, 2003. The court ordered each party to bear his or her own attorney fees and costs. The court gave brief mention to frozen embryos the parties had prepared for purposes of in vitro fertilization, stating that Mary testified that she should receive the embryos and that David testified that he objected to Mary receiving the embryos and requested they be donated to science. The court ordered that they be donated to science. On appeal, Mary challenged the District Court’s property distribution and assessment of attorney fees. David cross-appealed the court's grant of some of his pre-marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mary failed in various respects to carry her burden of proof on many property issues and the attendant issue of attorney fees. Further, the Court concluded the district court did not err in awarding some of David’s pre-marital property to Mary. With regard to the embryos, the Court concluded that the issue was not properly before the courts within this proceeding. The Court reversed the district court's order donating the embryos to science and left the issue to be addressed in the appropriate proceeding. View "Marriage of Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Robert Shipley appealed a district court order which granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee BNSF Railway Company. BNSF leased commercial property in Miles City, Montana, to Shipley. The lease provided that either party could terminate the lease upon 30 days written notice. Shipley failed to pay rent to BNSF for a number of years. This failure by Shipley resulted in overdue rent payments of $17,700. BNSF notified Shipley on January 7, 2011, that the Lease Agreement would be cancelled and terminated in 30 days, effective on February 10, 2011. The Lease Agreement also required that Shipley remove all improvements and personal property from the leased premises within the 30 days of the lease termination. Shipley failed to remove the items. BNSF provided Shipley with a 60 day extension to remove the items. Shipley again refused to remove the items. Shipley’s refusal prompted BNSF to file a complaint to quiet title to the improvements and personal property, a declaratory judgment that BNSF had terminated the lease validly, trespass, unlawful detainer, and claim for reasonable rent. Shipley acknowledged that he owed $17,700 in rent. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment. View "BNSF v. Shipley" on Justia Law