Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants and Bank entered a loan agreement in which Bank agreed to lend Appellants $5 million. After Bank refused to disburse further funds under the loan, Appellants sued Bank. Bank was represented by the Crowley Fleck law firm (Crowley). During the ensuing litigation, an attorney that was working with the law firm representing Appellants (Lawyer) joined Crowley as an attorney. Appellants subsequently filed motions to disqualify Crowley from representing Bank in the case and to permanently enjoin Crowley from proceeding in the litigation. The trial court denied Appellants' motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellants' motions where (1) Lawyer, who was engaged in concrete discussions of future employment with the adversary's law firm, did not promptly inform Appellant, terminate all further discussions concerning the employment, or withdraw from representing Appellant; (2) the conflict was concurrent and thus imputed to Crowley; and (3) the measures Crowley took were inadequate to preserve Appellants' confidences. View "Krutzfeldt Ranch, LLC v. Pinnacle Bank" on Justia Law

Phil and Valerie married in 2003 and commenced dissolution proceedings in 2005. After five years of litigation, the district court held bifurcated bench trials to address three separate aspects of the dissolution: the parenting plan, child support obligations, and division of the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining and distributing the marital estate; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the couple's children would reside primarily with Valerie under the final parenting plan; and (3) the district court did not err in calculating Phil's child support payments. View "In re Marriage of Tummarello" on Justia Law

Kevin and June Funk were married in 1990. In 1996, Kevin inherited several acres of lakefront and non-lakefront property, several vehicles, and an undisclosed amount of cash. June filed for dissolution in 2009. In distributing the marital assets upon dissolution, the district court included Kevin's inherited real property in the marital assets and awarded a portion to June. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's award of one of the vehicles to June and its valuation of Kevin's lakefront property; and (2) remanded for the district court to assess the factors set forth in Mont. Code Ann. 202(1) in determining the legal basis for an award to June of a portion of the value of the lakefront property. View "In re Marriage of Funk" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Rhonda Hall was sentenced on her conviction of charges of obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, and assault with a bodily fluid. At the conclusion of the City's case, the district court judge expressed her concern that the City had not presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof. Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion that the case be dismissed for insufficient evidence, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that inasmuch as the court dismissed the City's case against Hall for insufficient evidence, Hall stood acquitted and could not be retried, and the City had no appeal from the district court's decision. View "City of Cut Bank v. Hall" on Justia Law

The City of Dillon filed a civil action against George Warner seeking to recover the costs of installation of a water meter. Judge Gregory Mohr ruled on several motions filed by the city and conducted a scheduling conference. Warner subsequently filed an affidavit of disqualification against Mohr. The judge that presided over the disqualification proceeding (1) found Warner's affidavit of disqualification was insufficient as a matter of law and was therefore void; and (2) ordered that Mohr would maintain jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Warner's appeal, finding that the city court order concerning Warner's attempt to disqualify Mohr was an interim order and was therefore not appealable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Warner's appeal, as it was from an interim order and not a final judgment; and (2) the district court's orders dismissing the appeal were interim orders and thus not appealable to the Court. View "City of Dillon v. Warner" on Justia Law