Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife divorced in 2003. A final parenting plan was incorporated into their divorce decree allocating parenting time in regard to Child. In 2011, Wife filed a motion to amend the parenting plan. The district court granted the motion, which resulted in allowing Child to determine future residential decisions annually. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the order amending the parenting plan and reinstated the original parenting plan, holding that the district court's findings were insufficient to establish the statutory standard for amendment of the parenting plan; and (2) reversed the district court's holding that Child would determine his own residential arrangements, concluding that the court erred in delegating to Child the power to modify the parenting plan in the future, as the determination of whether a parenting plan is appropriate is a legal conclusion that can only be made by a court. View "In re Marriage of Whyte " on Justia Law

M.W., a juvenile who admitted that he committed sexual assault, was adjudged as delinquent and placed on probation until the age of eighteen, subject to numerous conditions. After M.W. was unsuccessfully discharged from sexual offender treatment, the youth court required him to register as a sexual offender. The case was subsequently transferred to the district court, which later denied M.W.'s petition to be relieved of the registration requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly analyzed the issue by concluding that it did not have the statutory authority, at the present time, to relieve M.W. from the registration requirement. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

Patterson Enterprises hired Archie Johnson Contracting (AJC) to perform blasting on a road construction project. During the project, an entire section of rock above one of Patterson's excavators collapsed, crushing it. Patterson filed suit against AJC, asserting various claims, including negligence and strict liability. AJC asserted various affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. AJC also filed a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract. The jury (1) returned a verdict finding that AJC's blasting caused the damages sustained by Patterson and that Patterson and its employees assumed the risk of harm; (2) allocated fifty-one percent of the fault to AJC and forty-nine percent to Patterson, and awarded damages to Patterson in the amount of $50,000; and (3) returned a verdict in favor of AJC on its breach of contract claim, awarding damages to AJC in the amount of $19,255. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it permitted the defense of assumption of the risk to go to the jury; and (2) in failing to instruct the jury regarding the subjective knowledge requirement set forth in Lutz v. National Crane Corp. View "Patterson Enters., Inc. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Jimmy Booth was charged with, inter alia, felony criminal possession of precursors to dangerous drugs pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-107. Booth appealed, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of the charge and that his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move for dismissal at the close of the State's case. At issue was whether the plain language of section 45-9-107 required a showing that Booth possessed a combination of listed precursors set forth in the statute or whether possession of pseudoephedrine alone was sufficient for a conviction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) section 45-9-107(1)(a) requires possession of two or more of the statute's listed precursor chemicals as an element of the offense; and (2) therefore, the jury could not have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence seized from Booth met the statutory requirements of the statute. View "State v. Booth" on Justia Law

Appellants, a group of individuals, filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) against NorthWestern Energy (NWE) concerning NWE's provision of street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the four named complainants lacked standing under Mont. Code Ann. 69-3-321. Appellants then filed an amended complaint in which they named four additional complainants. The PSC concluded (1) Appellants were procedurally barred from amending their complaint, and (2) the court would not reconsider its earlier ruling on standing in any event. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the original complainants lacked standing to pursue their complaint in the PSC under section 69-3-321; but (2) the PSC's and district court's rationales for rejecting the amended complaint were incorrect as, in this case, there was not a categorical procedural bar to the filing of an amended complaint following an order of dismissal for lack of standing. View "Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After Susan Brady, who was driving, reported that another driver in a pickup truck had been engaging in illegal activity, a highway patrol trooper pulled over a pickup truck matching Brady's description. The driver of the truck, James Gill, later received citations for DUI and possession of alcohol while under the age of twenty-one. Gill filed a motion to suppress, arguing that law enforcement did not have a particularized suspicion to support an investigative stop of his vehicle. The justice court denied the motion. Gill subsequently entered a guilty plea of DUI and unlawful possession. The district court also denied Gill's motion to suppress and remanded the case to justice court for execution of sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the information provided to the trooper contained sufficient indicia of reliability to form the basis for the trooper's particularized suspicion that Gill's pickup was the same one that Brady observed engaged in criminal activity, thereby warranting further investigation. View "State v. Gill" on Justia Law

Rozell Cook pled guilty via an Alford plea to two charges of felony sexual assault. Cook was sentenced to two concurrent, twenty-year terms with ten years suspended. The State moved to revoke the suspended portion of Cook's sentence two days before he was scheduled to be released from custody. The district court revoked Cook's suspended sentence, sentenced him to two concurrent, ten-year commitments with five years suspended, and imposed new sentencing conditions. Cook appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's revocation of Cook's suspended sentence, but (2) reversed the district court's imposition of an illegal condition in the revocation order. Remanded to strike the illegal condition. View "State v. Cook" on Justia Law

Appellant Wesley Benn was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. Benn appealed and then died the following month. Counsel for Benn filed a notice advising that Benn had passed away, and the State moved for dismissal, arguing that Benn's death had mooted the appeal. Benn's counsel filed a response opposing the State's motion, suggesting that the Supreme Court's precedent was unclear about the effect of a defendant's death upon the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) abatement of the proceeding ab initio is an inappropriate resolution of a case when the defendant has died; (2) a criminal case is not moot if the appeal involves concrete interests which are not individual to the defendant and survive the defendant; and (3) in this case, Benn's appeal was moot because his challenge to his sexual assault conviction and his contention that his counsel was ineffective were individual to him, and therefore, the Court could not grant effective relief. View "State v. Benn" on Justia Law

Jerome Dubiel (Jerome) was traveling on a Montana highway during a high wind event that caused numerous trees to blow down. Jerome was stopped temporarily by a Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) employee who was clearing highway debris when a tree fell on Jerome's car, inflicting a fatal injury. Keevy, Jerome's wife (Dubiel), sued MDT, claiming it had negligently failed to close the highway prior to Jerome's death. Dubiel did not retain an expert to establish MDT's standard of care regarding highway safety under the circumstances leading to Jerome's death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MDT, finding that expert testimony was required in this case to establish the standard of care to which MDT was required to conform under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting MDT's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Dubiel could not prove the applicable standard of care and breach thereof without expert testimony. View "Dubiel v. Mont. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Richard Covington was convicted of robbery and deliberate homicide. The court issued a life sentence without the possibility of parole based on Covington's two previous robbery convictions pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 56-18-219(1)(b)(iv). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Covington failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court infringed on an enhanced right to a jury trial under the Montana Constitution in his argument that the existence of facts, including a prior conviction, that triggers the application of the sentence enhancement process of section 46-18-219(1)(b)(iv) must be submitted to the jury; and (2) the district court did not err by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from Convington's binder and notebooks. View "State v. Covington" on Justia Law