Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife had been married for almost seventeen years when Wife petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage. A temporary order of protection was issued against Husband to protect Wife and the couple's three children. The district court subsequently issued a final order of protection (FOP) requiring that Husband stay 300 feet away from Wife at all times and that he have only telephonic and supervised in-person contact with the children. The marriage was then dissolved. Husband later filed a motion to dissolve the FOP. The district court left the FOP in effect, reasoning that under Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-204(5), it did not have the legal authority to terminate the FOP without Wife's request for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court misinterpreted the law as set forth in section 40-15-204(5), as a district court has the authority to continue or terminate an order of protection notwithstanding the petitioner's desires. Remanded. View "Albrecht v. Albrecht" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's parental rights to their children were terminated by the district court. Before the district court's judgment, Mother had moved to transfer to the case to a tribal court as allowed under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). However, the case was never transferred. The district court maintained jurisdiction and denied Mother's request to continue the termination hearing and appoint counsel for the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not comply with the jurisdictional ICWA transfer requirements where the court misinterpreted the ICWA requirement to require an affirmative acceptance of the transfer by the tribe; and (2) because there was an apparent conflict between the children's wishes and what the guardian ad litem concluded to be in the children's best interests, counsel for children should be appointed on remand. Remanded. View "In re J.W.C." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved in Mississippi. The decree awarded Husband custody of Son and Wife custody of Daughter. Subsequently, Husband and Son moved to Montana, and Wife and Daughter moved to Arizona. Husband petitioned the district court in Montana to modify the child support award for Son. The district court denied the petition and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum because Husband and Son had moved back to Mississippi and Wife and Daughter were residing in Arizona. The court then relinquished jurisdiction of Son to the Arizona. Husband and Son later moved back to Montana, and Husband petitioned the district court to reduce accrued child support to a money judgment. The district court noted jurisdiction had been relinquished to the Arizona court and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly applied the Montana Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because the UCCJEA applies to child custody matters, not child support matters. Remanded. View "Ervin v. Ervin" on Justia Law

Marjorie Ward established a trust that devised $100,000 to her stepdaughter, Joan, and provided that the trust residue be distributed in equal shares to Ward's sons, Jack and James. Ward also instructed that before Jack would receive any distributions from the trust, his share would be decreased, and Joan's increased, by any amount he owed Joan. After Ward died, the district court concluded Jack's share would be reduced by $298,356, the amount he owed Joan on the date of Ward's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court complied with the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 52(a) by orally stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (2) the district court did not err in ordering that Jack's share of the trust be reduced by the amount he owed his stepsister, pursuant to Ward's instructions contained in the trust, even though that debt was previously discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. View "Ward v. Ward" on Justia Law

Defendant crashed into a car driven by a seventeen-year-old. The victim suffered several injuries, including a shattered ankle. Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea to felony criminal endangerment and was sentenced to ten years' incarceration with all but 180 days suspended. The district court also ordered Defendant to pay restitution for the victim's summer wages, the victim's father's lost wages, and unpaid medical expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly imposed restitution for lost wages, and (2) the district court did not exceed the bounds of reason or act arbitrarily under the circumstances in imposing the maximum length sentence allowed under statute. View "State v. Dodson" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's rights to her two minor children after determining that Mother had willfully surrendered custody of her children for a period of six months and that Mother had abandoned her children in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1). Mother appealed, contending that she could not surrender custody because she never possessed custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mother abandoned her children under the circumstances where (1) Mother had physical custody of her children until 2006, and (2) Mother made no manifestation of an intent to resume custody of the children. View "In re E.M.S." on Justia Law

Riley Styren's vehicle was struck by Sherry Roos's vehicle. Styren and the owner of her vehicle (collectively, Styren) filed a complaint against Roos, Roos's mother, Julia, and Curtis Stordahl, who together owned the car Roos was driving. The complaint alleged claims of negligence against Roos and negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine against Julia and Stordahl. The district court granted summary judgment for Julia and Stordahl. A jury then found Roos was not negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly (1) granted summary judgment to Julia on the negligent entrustment claim as there was no evidence that Julia knew that Roos was an incompetent driver or that Roos would drive in a manner that created an unreasonable risk to others; (2) granted summary judgment to Julia on the family purpose doctrine claim where Styren did not meet her burden to raise genuine issues of material fact in opposition to Julia's motion; and (3) denied Styren's motion for a new trial where Styren did not meet her burden on appeal to demonstrate that the district court erred and the jury's verdict was legal and supported by substantial evidence. View "Styren Farms v. Roos" on Justia Law

The State charged Michael Hass with three offenses, one of which was a DUI. The Stated alleged that Hass had three prior DUI convictions, making the DUI a felony. Hass filed a motion challenging the validity of one of his prior DUI convictions, arguing that his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process were violated when the trial judge in that case allowed Hass's counsel to withdraw on the day of trial and then proceeded to try and convict Hass in absentia. In the instant case, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hass pleaded guilty to fourth-offense DUI, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision denying Hass's motion challenging the validity of his earlier DUI conviction and vacated the felony DUI sentence imposed by the district court, holding that the prior DUI conviction was constitutionally infirm and could not be used for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded with instructions to resentence Hass for misdemeanor DUI. View "State v. Hass" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by a decree that included a settlement agreement and parenting plan. The agreement provided that the parties would share joint parenting of the children but that Wife would be the primary residential parent. The agreement was later amended to provide for alternating custody between Wife and Husband on a weekly basis. Husband subsequently filed a motion to modify child support, alleging that there had been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances as to make the existing terms unconscionable. The district court (1) granted Husband's motion, (2) denied Wife's motion to amend the parenting plan, and (3) ordered that Wife pay Husband's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting Husband's motion to modify child support where the court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and its determination that the changes in circumstances in this case met the statutory requirements; (2) awarding Husband attorney's fees where the parties' agreement specifically provided for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in subsequent proceedings; and (3) determining the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fees awarded. View "In re Marriage of Damschen" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) pursuant to their divorce in which Wife transferred all of her interest in two corporations the parties owned to Husband in exchange for Husband's payment to Wife of $250,000. The parties subsequently agreed that Wife would assume managerial and operational control of the businesses. The district court ordered Husband to provide Wife with access to the businesses' accounts and financial information and to return possession of the business records. Because of Husband's noncompliance with the court order, Wife ultimately was forced to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The district court subsequently (1) found Husband to be in contempt, (2) awarded Wife sole possession of one of the businesses, (3) ordered Husband to pay Wife the receiver fees he had accumulated during his operation of the business, and (4) ordered Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not (1) err by refusing to send the dispute to arbitration and by holding Husband in contempt; (2) deny Husband due process; and (3) err in awarding attorney's fees to Wife. Remanded for a determination of Wife's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Cini" on Justia Law