Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Grizzly Security Armored Express, which provides security and armored services in Montana, filed suit against The Armored Group (TAG), which sells armored vehicles statewide and internationally, to recover damages from a sale of an allegedly defective vehicle. TAG failed to file a timely answer, and Grizzly moved for entry of default. The district court entered a default judgment against TAG, and the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the district court granted TAG's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Grizzly appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had personal jurisdiction over TAG because (1) TAG transacted sufficient business in Montana to support the extension of long-arm jurisdiction over TAG under Mont. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(a), and (2) the Montana court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over TAG through long-arm provisions does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Reversed and remanded.

In a previous landlord/tenant action in 2007, attorney Kevin Brown filed suit against Ronald Fick in district court on behalf of two tenants who alleged that Fick had unlawfully evicted them from a unit he manages. The district court found for Fick. Fick filed the present action in 2010, arguing that Brown had fraudulently brought the prior action in district court rather than in justice's court. The district court granted Brown's motion to dismiss, and Fick appealed. At issue was whether Mont. Code Ann. 3-10-302 confers concurrent jurisdiction on justices' and district courts for actions arising under the Landlord and Tenant Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the clear terms of Montana law provide that justices' courts share concurrent jurisdiction with district courts; and (2) Fick's arguments were not made in good faith, Fick's appeal is frivolous and vexatious and filed for purposes of harassment, and sanctions are warranted. Remanded.

In 2000, Dick Anderson Construction (DAC) entered into a contract with Monroe Construction to do construction work on Paws Up Ranch, which was owned by Monroe Property. When each phase of the construction was completed, Monroe Construction sold that phase to Monroe Property. When DAC was not paid for the last $800,000 of its billings, it filed a construction lien to secure its claim. In 2001, DAC sued Monroe Property to foreclose the lien. On remand to the district court, Monroe Property argued since it was not a party to the construction contract with DAC, it was not a contracting owner against whom the lien could be foreclosed under the construction lien statutes. The district court granted Monroe Property's motion for summary judgment, and DAC appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the facts of the case demonstrated that Monroe Construction was the actual agent of Monroe Property for the purpose of engaging DAC to complete construction work on the ranch. Therefore, under the statutes, Monroe Property, acting through its agent Monroe Construction, was a contracting owner with regard to the construction contract with DAC.

Petitioner appealed an order of the district court declining transfer of jurisdiction over the parties' child custody proceeding in Kentucky where the couple were married in Montana, petitioner resided in Kentucky, and respondent resided in Montana. The principal issue was whether the district court correctly determined that Montana had continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), KRS 403.820 and MCA 40-7-140. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Montana was the child's home state under the UCCJEA and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the child had a significant connection to Montana or that Kentucky would not be a more convenient forum for conducting further child custody proceedings.

Defendant appealed from his convictions of felony incest, involving his fourteen-year-old son and six-year-old daughter, and his conviction of felony tampering with evidence. At issue was whether the district court erred when it allowed the six-year-old alleged incest victim to testify via a two-way electronic audio-video communication rather than in the presence of defendant and the jury. Also at issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it prohibited defendant from conducting a forensic interview with, and calling as a trial witness, the four-year-old sibling of the two alleged incest victims. Further at issue was whether the district court erred in allowing the State to present evidence and summary testimony regarding pornographic images obtained from defendant's computer under 26-1-103, MCA, the transaction rule. The court held that defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was not violated when the 6-year-old testified via two-way electronic audio-video communication and that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings that the child would be traumatized by testifying in open court and in front of defendant. The court also held that it was entirely reasonable for the court to conclude that the four-year-old did not have relevant testimony to offer, was incompetent to testify, and would be psychologically harmed if required to testify. The court further held that defendant failed to preserve any possible error arising out of the admission of the summary evidence description of the photographic images for appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's rulings.

Defendant appealed from the denial of her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503 and -504, MCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that defendant's charges did not fall within the meaning of the "same transaction" under 46-1-202(23)(a), MCA, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-504, MCA. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503, MCA, where the plain meaning of the statute required "two or more offenses are knowing to the prosecutor..." and where the prosecutor did not know what the substances were until testing was conducted later.

A jury in the district court concluded that plaintiff did not breach its homeowners insurance policy with defendants and that one defendant had committed fraud when applying for the policy. Defendants appealed a district court order denying their motion for summary judgment and motions in limine and granting plaintiff's motion that defendants order and pay for additional transcripts on appeal. The court held that defendants were not entitled to estopp plaintiff from defending itself because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the one defendant applied for the policy in good faith. The court held that the district court appropriately permitted plaintiff's customer service representative to testify as to her recollection of the defendant's statements. The court further held that the district court acted within its discretion in permitting plaintiff to defend itself via section 33-15-403, MCA, by allowing the customer service representative to testify about the defendant's alleged fraudulent statements. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion in limine. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering additional transcripts under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(3)(b).

Appellant appealed from the sentence imposed by the district court where appellant was charged with aggravated assault of his two-month-old daughter and found guilty after a jury trial. At issue was whether the district court sentenced appellant illegally by inappropriately enhancing his sentence because he refused to admit guilt. The court held that the district court imposed the sentence because of the gravity of the offense, the lifelong consequences that appellant's actions would have on his daughter, not because he refused to admit guilt. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence where appellant's continued minimization of what actually occurred caused the child's medical treatment to be delayed and where appellant's sentence resulted from the combination of numerous factors.

Appellant appealed from an order of the district court dismissing its complaint for condemnation and entering judgment in favor of appellee. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing an order concluding that appellant did not possess the power of eminent domain, either express or implied, and it had no authority to take the private property of a nonconsenting landowner. The court concluded that HB 198 provided appellant authority to pursue eminent domain proceedings and that HB 198 explicitly codified eminent domain authority into the Major Facility Siting Act ("Act"), Title 75, chapter 20. The court held that HB 198 retroactively applied to appellant's certificate issued pursuant to the Act and the explicit language of HB 198 was in conflict with the district court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the order dismissing appellant's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant appealed from the district court's order declining to hold appellee in contempt and directing her to clear title to his vehicle or face entry of a judgment against her. At issue was whether the district court erred when it failed to hold appellee accountable for violating the economic restraining order and when it allowed her to repossess the vehicle. Also at issue was whether appellant's due process rights were violated because he did not receive notice of two hearings. The court held that the district court had broad discretion to determine whether or not to hold appellee in contempt for non-compliance with the decree. The court also held that, although the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order, the court did not have authority to modify the redistribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard, and erred in doing so. The court held, however, that appellant was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, which was in his favor, and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.