Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gregory Ternes purchased a residential property from Keith and Sue Eberhard. The Eberhards were insured by State Farm when the house received water damage. Sue reported the damage, and State Form listed the claim on a website report. The Ternes purchased the home without being aware of the website report. The Ternes later attempted to sell the property to the Giardinos, who backed out of the deal. Afterwards, Ternes learned of the website report. Ternes filed a complaint with the state commissioner of insurance, alleging that State Farm put false information on the website, causing the sale of the residence to the Giardinos to fall through. The commissioner advised Ternes that State Farm had not submitted a false report as per State Farm's understanding at the time of the loss. Ternes then filed an action in the district court against State Farm and the Eberhards. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for State Farm and the Eberhards because there were no genuine issues of material fact and both defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Defendant Wesley Couture was charged with a DUI. During trial, defense counsel attempted to introduce redacted versions of a video from the arresting officer's patrol car even though counsel had not listed the video as an exhibit pursuant to an omnibus order, nor had he provided a copy to the state. The court refused to admit the redacted video. Couture was convicted of the charges and designated a persistent felony offender (PFO). Couture filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that his trial was unfair because the court refused to allow him to admit the redacted video. The court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Couture's offered video evidence at trial; (2) the district court did not err in sentencing Couture as a PFO; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Couture's motion for a new trial.

Russell and Melissa Levens and Al Ballard, neighboring property owners, entered into an agreement defining the location of the boundaries of their properties. The agreement provided that Ballard would not excavate on his property within thirty feet of the Levens' property. After Ballard occupied the area between the two properties and refused to sign a certificate of survey pursuant to the agreement, Levens brought an action against Ballard to enforce the agreement and for an injunction. The district court enjoined Ballard from excavating on the disputed property and later granted Levens' motion for summary judgment. Levens later filed a motion for contempt against Ballard for failure to abide by the judgment. The district court denied the motion and entered an order awarding attorney fees to Ballard. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the orders, holding that the judgment must be construed to prevent Ballard from excavating in such a way that the pit intrudes into the thirty-foot buffer strip at the edge of Levens' property.

In the fall of 2008 William Hartford, a high school science teacher, was fired after his Montana teaching certificate expired by his inadvertence in failing to renew it. Hartford sought to file a grievance, alleging that he had been terminated without just cause in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into between Kalispell School District (District) and the Kalispell Education Association (KEA). The district superintendent, and later the board of trustees, denied Hartford's request, claiming the matter did not constitute a valid grievance under the CBA on grounds that Hartford was not a member of the bargaining unit at any point during his employment in the fall of 2008 and that he was not a "teacher" as defined under Montana law during his employment in the fall of 2008. Hartford and the KEA filed a petition in the district court to compel arbitration as provided in the CBA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hartford and the KEA and ordered the matter submitted to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the questions raised by the matter were properly submitted to arbitration.

After a petition seeking to transfer territory from Dutton/Brady K-12 School District to Conrad High School and Elementary Districts was refused by the county superintendent of schools, the petition was referred to a three-member panel of county superintendents. The panel denied the petition, and the district court affirmed. Conrad Schools appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding the panel of superintendents abused its discretion in denying the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record demonstrated that the panel carefully evaluated the effects of the proposed transfer and made its decision based upon the best and collective interests of all students involved.

Plaintiff Leonard Brown entered into an employment agreement with the Yellowstone Club that employed Brown for a term of three years and provided that Brown's employment could be terminated at any time without cause. After six months, the Club terminated Brown's employment without cause. Brown brought an action for damages against the Club under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. The district court granted the Club's motion to dismiss the action based upon Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-912(2), which exempts from the Act an employee covered by a "written contract of employment for a specified term." The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that if an employment contract for a specific term also allows the employer to terminate at will, it is not a "written contract for a specific term" under Section 39-2-912. Therefore, a discharged employee covered by such a contract is not excluded by the statute from bringing a claim under the Act.

Montana Trout Unlimited (MTU) appealed from an order of the water court dismissing its objections to water right claims by claimants Beaverhead Water Company, et al. Those claims were contained in the water court's temporary preliminary decree for the Big Hole River Basin. At issue in the appeal was whether the water court erred in holding (1) that only the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks may represent the public recreational and conservation interests in water adjudication proceedings, and (2) that only water right claimants may request a hearing on their objections in water adjudication proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) there is no statutory or regulatory restriction on who is entitled to file an objection to a claim of water right contained in a temporary preliminary decree, and (2) based on the state's ownership of the waters of Montana which it holds in public trust and the undisputed specific interests of the members of MTU in the Big Hole River basin, MTU has a sufficient ownership interest in water or its use to demonstrate good cause to require the water court to hold a hearing on its objections under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-223.

The Montana Department of Revenue (Department) issued final ad valorem assessments of Puget Sound Energy (Puget) for several tax years, after which Puget petitioned the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) for review of the Department's assessments. STAB determined the Department inaccurately assessed Puget's value and assessed Puget's value in excess of the Department's original assessment. Puget petitioned the district court for review, and the court concluded that STAB could not adopt an assessment value exceeding the Department's original assessment. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly concluded that STAB may not assess Puget's market value in an amount that exceeds the Department's original assessment. The Court held that STAB has the constitutional and statutory duty to hear Puget's appeal and make an independent determination of Puget's market value even if STAB's assessment exceeds the Department's original assessment. Remanded.

Montana resident Robin Jordan petitioned for a temporary protective order in a Montana county court against Ohio resident Mark Kalin. The court issued the temporary protective order, and Kalin appealed. In the district court, Kalin moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court did not rule on the motion but found it had jurisdiction in its findings issued after the substantive hearing. The district court then adopted a permanent order of protection prohibiting Kalin from having any contact with Jordan or her husband. Kalin appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to grant Kalin's motion to dismiss as the allegations of the petition were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the district court; (2) the evidence was sufficient for the district court to issue a permanent order of protection; and (3) the district court's order of protection did not punish Kalin for exercising his constitutional right to defend himself in court.

Appellees John and Janet Ethen sought declaratory relief in district court to resolve a boundary dispute with neighbors River Resource Outfitters and Christine Fischer. The district court declared that the common boundary line between the parties' properties runs in a meander line along the west bank of Flint Creek and declined to award the Ethens' request for attorney fees. The neighbors appealed and the Ethens cross-appealed on the issue of attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not improperly rely upon extrinsic evidence to determine legal title to the disputed property; (2) the district court correctly determined that the boundary line between the parties' properties meanders along Flint Creek; (3) the Ethens filed a timely claim for declaratory relief; (4) the district court correctly determined that it could grant meaningful relief without joining other landowners along Flint Creek; (5) the district court correctly determined that the neighbors did not gain title to the disputed property through adverse possession; and (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to award attorneys fees to the Ethens.