Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner ("husband") and respondent ("wife") divorced in May 1993 and entered into a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement ("settlement agreement") where, pursuant to the settlement agreement, husband and wife's two children would live primarily with wife and husband would pay wife child support payments each month plus half the cost of the children's uninsured medical expenses. At issue was whether the district court erred when it concluded that wife's statements filed with the court indicating that husband was current on his child support obligations as of September 2001 constituted judicial admissions and thus precluded an award of back child support; when it determined that wife had filed inconsistent pleadings and imposed sanctions against her; and when it held that husband did not owe wife for back child support. Also at issue was whether the district court erred by failing to award husband his attorney fees pursuant to a "prevailing party" contractual provision when the sanctions imposed on wife covered only a portion of husband's attorney fees. The court held that the district court did not err when it assumed that wife's written statements were true and concluded that the statements were judicial admissions where both documents that contained wife's statements were signed by her attorney at the time and neither were superseded or withdrawn at any point. The court also held that, without knowing the legal basis for sanctions, it was impossible to ascertain whether the award constituted an abuse of discretion and concluded that it was unnecessary to remand in light of the court's disposition of the last issue. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that husband did not owe wife back child support where the record established that wife was overpaid child support. The court finally held that the district court erred when it granted husband only a portion of his attorney fees and costs as sanctions against wife where, by the terms of the settlement, husband should have been awarded all of his costs and attorney fees expended in defense of wife's claims because husband was the prevailing party.

Petitioner and respondent had one child together, never married, and split up shortly after respondent became pregnant with the child in 2000. At issue was whether the district court wrongly named petitioner as the primary residential parent, properly calculated respondent's child support obligation, and afforded respondent a fair trial. The court held that the district court properly held that it was in the best interest of the child to reside primarily with petitioner where he provided more continuity and stability of care for the child. The court also held that the district court made several errors in calculating respondent's income for purposes of child support and therefore reversed and remanded for recalculation. The court further held that the district court offered respondent a fair trial where it interviewed the child in chambers to determined the child's preference for primary residential parent.

The Montana Department of Revenue ("Department") appealed a judgment reversing the State Tax Appeal Board's ("STAB") conclusion that the Department had applied a "commonly accepted" method to assess the value of PacificCorp's Montana properties. At issue was whether substantial evidence demonstrated common acceptance of the Department's direct capitalization method that derived earnings-to-price ratios from an industry-wide analysis. Also at issue was whether substantial evidence supported STAB's conclusion that additional obsolescence did not exist to warrant consideration of further adjustments to PacifiCorp's taxable value. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Department's use of earnings-to-price ratios in its direct capitalization approach; that additional depreciation deductions were not warranted; and that the Department did not overvalue PacifiCorp's property. The court also held that MCA 15-8-111(2)(b) did not require the Department to conduct a separate, additional obsolescence study when no evidence suggested that obsolescence existed that has not been accounted for in the taxpayer's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Form 1 filing. The court further held that STAB correctly determined that the actual $9.4 billion sales price of PacifiCorp verified that the Department's $7.1 billion assessment had not overvalued PacifiCorp's properties.

Defendant appealed her misdemeanor convictions of driving while the privilege to do so was suspended, failing to carry proof of insurance, and driving under the influence. At issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when her counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss on grounds that she did not receive a speedy trial. The court held that defendant's attorney provided ineffective assistance where the attorney's failure to move for dismissal after six months following mistrial was deficient performance and did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness. The court also held that defendant suffered extreme prejudice as a consequence of her attorney's ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss and vacate defendant's charges.

The Missoula City Counsel, the City of Missoula, and the Mayor, (collectively "City") and Muth-Hilberry, LLC ("developer") appealed a district court determination that found that the City was arbitrary and capricious in approving a zoning and preliminary plat for a subdivision known as Sonata Park located in Rattlesnake Valley, Montana. At issue was whether neighbors, several parties opposed to the subdivision, and the North Duncan Drive Neighborhood Association, Inc. ("Association") had standing. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in striking affidavits filed by the developer and the City in connection with their motions for summary judgment. Further at issue was whether the 1989 Sunshine Agreement between the City and the developer's predecessor in interest superseded the City's growth policy. Finally at issue was whether the City's decision in Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. The court held that the neighbors had standing to sue in their own right and that the Association had associational standing to proceed on behalf of its members. The court also held that any error made by the district court in granting the neighbor's motion to strike the developer's affidavit was harmless. The court further held that the Sunlight Agreement did not supersede the City's growth policy where the Sunlight Agreement could be void ab initio and did not appear to guarantee certain density. The court finally held that substantial compliance was still valid and that a government body must substantially comply with its growth policy in making zoning decisions and that the City's decision to approve Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.

Defendant appealed a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") where the DUI was charged as a felony because he had three prior DUI convictions. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor where he claimed that his 1997 conviction was constitutionally infirm because he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed and held that defendant had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 1997 conviction was constitutionally infirm due to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel where defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable care and where, even assuming that it did, defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.

Defendant appealed a conviction of sexual intercourse without consent. At issue was whether defendant's due process rights were violated by false and misleading DNA evidence. Also at issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed and held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his right to due process was violated where defendant failed to demonstrate that the DNA evidence was actually false, that there was no evidence that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony, and that that the false testimony was material and where there was no reasonable likelihood that the allegedly false testimony could have affected the jury's judgment where the prosecutor relied on DNA and non-DNA evidence. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where the record did not reveal why trial counsel failed to undertake actions that he alleged she should have taken.