Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Janice Graham died in a car accident after Michael Howell, driving a vehicle he jointly owned with his wife Victoria Howell, crossed the centerline and collided with the Grahams’ car. Witnesses described the road as icy and slushy, and Michael’s blood test showed marijuana levels roughly three times the legal limit. Earlier that day, Victoria and Michael discussed the weather and road conditions. After Michael left, Victoria texted him while he was driving. The Estate of Janice Graham sued Victoria for negligence, alleging she was aware Michael was under the influence and should not have entrusted him with the vehicle or texted him while he was driving.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court in Ravalli County granted summary judgment to Victoria Howell. The court found that, under the Estate’s theories of negligence, Victoria did not owe a duty of care to Janice Graham. It concluded Victoria lacked exclusive or superior control over the vehicle as Michael was a joint owner, and therefore, she could not negligently entrust it to him. Additionally, the court determined that Victoria’s act of texting Michael did not create a foreseeable risk or impose a duty to refrain from remote communication.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that negligent entrustment liability requires a defendant to have superior control or an exclusive legal right to the vehicle, which Victoria did not possess. The Court also held that sending a text to a person known to be driving does not, by itself, create a legal duty unless the sender knows or has reason to know their message is likely to distract the driver. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Victoria Howell. View "Est. of Graham v. Howell" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding access across a roadway known as Forgotten Lane, which traverses land owned by the Tompkins and provides access to two parcels owned by Christine Brock as co-trustee of a family trust. All parcels derived from a common 1940s title, but complex conveyances and subdivision actions followed over the decades. Brock asserted she had the right to use Forgotten Lane, citing several legal theories, while the Tompkins contested any private easement and at times blocked the road.Ravalli County District Court initially denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on Brock’s original express-easement claim, instead inviting Brock to amend her complaint to include implied, prescriptive, and public easement theories. After amendment, the court bifurcated the proceedings, assigning Brock’s express, implied, and public easement claims to itself and reserving prescriptive easement and trespass counterclaims for a jury. Following a bench trial, the court found in Brock’s favor on the implied easement by preexisting use, issued a permanent injunction, and dismissed the remaining claims as moot. Brock’s requests for costs and attorney fees were denied as untimely.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court should have granted summary judgment to the Tompkins on the original express-easement theory, but this error did not prejudice further proceedings after Brock amended her complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on implied easement, finding that Brock had not established, by clear and convincing evidence, an implied easement benefiting either parcel. The permanent injunction and mootness dismissals were vacated, and any preserved alternative easement theory not addressed on the merits was remanded. The Court also reversed the denial of Brock’s request for costs and attorney fees as untimely, remanding for further determination after final judgment. Other procedural and bifurcation orders were affirmed. View "Brock v. Tompkins" on Justia Law

The case concerns a youth, W.D., who was adjudicated as a delinquent in the First Judicial District Youth Court, Lewis and Clark County, after admitting to sexual assault in 2019. Following unsuccessful residential placements and a probation revocation, the Youth Court committed W.D. to the Department of Corrections (DOC) until age 18, with probationary conditions to remain until age 21 and deferred sex offender registration. Upon release from Pine Hills at age 18, W.D. returned to community supervision. The State later sought a hearing under § 41-5-208, MCA, to transfer jurisdiction to the district court and supervisory responsibility to adult probation, alleging multiple violations of the previous order but without filing a formal petition to revoke probation under § 41-5-1431, MCA.After the hearing, the Youth Court found transfer appropriate and ordered jurisdiction and supervisory responsibility transferred to the district court and adult probation until W.D. reached age 25. Additionally, the Youth Court committed W.D. to the DOC until age 25, recommended placement at the Missoula Assessment and Sanction Center for sex-offender treatment, and required him to register as a Tier II sexual offender during non-incarceration periods. W.D. appealed, arguing that the Youth Court exceeded its authority under § 41-5-208, MCA, by imposing new custodial and registration requirements without proper procedural protections.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the Youth Court’s interpretation and application of the Montana Youth Court Act de novo. It held that § 41-5-208, MCA, only authorizes transfer of jurisdiction and supervisory responsibility and does not permit a youth court to impose a new custodial disposition or additional conditions, such as sex-offender registration, at a transfer hearing without following procedures for probation revocation under § 41-5-1431, MCA. The Supreme Court reversed the Youth Court’s order and remanded for amendment to strike the added DOC commitment, extended supervision, and registration requirement. View "In re W.D." on Justia Law

A state employee was involved in a fatal car accident while driving a state-owned vehicle in the course of employment, resulting in the deaths of both himself and another driver, Haley Wilson. Haley was survived by her minor daughter, for whom Thomas Wilson acted as both personal representative of Haley’s estate and as conservator. After the accident, Thomas submitted claims to the state on behalf of the estate and the minor for wrongful death, survivorship, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The state offered to settle all claims for $750,000, referencing a statutory damages cap, but Thomas declined.Following the rejected settlement and before any lawsuit was filed by Thomas, the State of Montana filed a petition in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, seeking to interplead the $750,000 and obtain a release from further liability. The state’s petition did not specifically invoke Montana’s interpleader rule or the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the state, authorized the deposit of $750,000 into the court registry, discharged the state and the state employee from further liability, and dismissed the state from the interpleader action with prejudice. Thomas appealed, challenging both the use of interpleader and the constitutionality of the statutory damages cap.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred in permitting the state to proceed via interpleader, because the state was the alleged tortfeasor and not a disinterested stakeholder, and the claims asserted were not adverse in the manner required for interpleader. The court further held that any discussion of the constitutionality of the damages cap would be speculative and advisory given the absence of a filed lawsuit, a determination of liability, or a verdict exceeding the statutory limit. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the state’s petition. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A father was accused of sexually abusing his minor daughter over a period of years, with a specific incident occurring on April 15, 2020, when the daughter, J.V., was 14 years old. The next day, J.V. disclosed the abuse to her mother via text message, and a sexual assault examination was performed at a hospital, where J.V. provided a narrative statement detailing the incident. Physical evidence, including J.V.’s blood on the father’s penile swab and the father’s semen on J.V.’s bedding, was collected. The father was charged with multiple counts of incest, and at trial, both J.V. and her mother testified about the events and the disclosure. The State introduced J.V.’s narrative from the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) Report and the text messages as evidence.In the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, the defendant objected to the admission of J.V.’s statements in the SANE Report and the text messages, arguing they were inadmissible hearsay. The District Court overruled these objections, admitting both as evidence, and allowed the jury to review the SANE Report during deliberations. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts of incest and acquitted him on a third. He was sentenced to two consecutive 100-year prison terms.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the admission of the SANE Report and text messages, and allowing the jury to examine the SANE Report during deliberations, constituted reversible error. The Court held that it was error to admit the SANE Report under the medical diagnosis exception and to provide it to the jury during deliberations, but these errors were harmless because other properly admitted evidence proved the same facts. The Court also found the text messages were properly admitted as relevant evidence. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Veltkamp" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who, after drinking alcohol at a public lake with his family, drove away with his wife and children, attracting the attention of other beachgoers who reported his behavior to law enforcement. When an officer found the vehicle on the roadside, the defendant was outside, agitated and armed, and engaged in a heated argument with his wife. The officer attempted to intervene, deploying a TASER, but the defendant remained combative until backup arrived and detained him. While in the back of the patrol car, the defendant spat throughout the vehicle. He was charged with several offenses, including three counts of felony criminal child endangerment, one felony count of criminal endangerment, one misdemeanor count of criminal mischief for spitting in the patrol car, and one misdemeanor count of disorderly conduct.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, presided over a jury trial where the jury convicted the defendant of all counts except the felony criminal endangerment. At sentencing, the court imposed prison terms and fines, including a fine for the misdemeanor criminal mischief. The defendant requested suspension of fines and fees, citing his incarceration and lack of future earning ability. The district court nonetheless found the defendant able to pay and imposed the financial obligations.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported the misdemeanor criminal mischief conviction and whether the lower court properly inquired into the defendant’s ability to pay fines and fees. The Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the criminal mischief conviction, as no evidence showed that the spitting caused damage or pecuniary loss to the vehicle. The Court also determined that the district court had not conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court reversed the criminal mischief conviction and remanded for further proceedings regarding the imposition of fines and fees. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on property owners in the Keck Acres subdivision in Butte, Montana. The defendants own Lot 4, while the plaintiffs own adjacent Lots 1A/3 and 2. The subdivision plats, recorded in 1998 and 2003, depict a 60-foot-wide private road easement (“Kelsey Lane”) running through the properties, including a loop that provides access to Lot 4. In 2018, the plaintiffs constructed a fence along the boundary between Lot 1A/3 and Lots 5 and 4, blocking access via the loop to Lot 4. Efforts to negotiate an alternative arrangement failed. In 2021, all property owners except the defendants signed a new Easement Agreement, purporting to reduce the easement to a 30-foot width along a paved portion and to extinguish the loop, but the defendants did not sign.The plaintiffs filed suit in Montana’s Second Judicial District Court, seeking a declaration that the loop portion of the easement had been extinguished by abandonment or by the 2021 Easement Agreement. The defendants counterclaimed, asserting their rights under the original 60-foot easement and seeking removal of the obstructing fence. After extensive summary judgment proceedings and the appointment of a Special Master, the District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the 60-foot easement remained in effect, the fence obstructed the easement, and ordering its removal. The court awarded attorney fees to the defendants under subdivision covenants.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the existence and scope of the 60-foot-wide easement benefiting Lot 4, holding it was not extinguished by abandonment or by the 2021 Easement Agreement, since that agreement did not bind non-signatories. The Court affirmed the order to remove the specifically identified section of fence blocking Lot 4, but reversed the broader directive to remove all obstructions within five years as unsupported by the record. The award of attorney fees to the defendants was also affirmed, and the case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment and determination of reasonable appellate attorney fees. View "Vicevich v. Kultgen" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with three counts of felony sexual assault based on allegations made by his niece, S.M. The incidents occurred at the defendant’s mother’s house in Laurel, Montana, between 2015 and 2017, during the defendant’s annual summer visits. S.M. disclosed the assaults in 2020 after a school assembly on sexual assault, leading to a police investigation. At trial, S.M. described three incidents, including one where she was standing and the defendant’s hand touched the same area as during a previous assault. The State presented expert testimony on the delayed disclosure and memory issues common among child victims. No physical evidence was collected.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, presided over the jury trial. After the State’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on Count I, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove knowing or purposeful sexual contact for that incident. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that a rational juror could find the essential elements of the offense, and submitted all three counts to the jury. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the motion to dismiss Count I. Applying a de novo standard, the Court held that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on Count I. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling and the defendant’s conviction on all three counts. View "State v. Morrissey" on Justia Law

A pedestrian was struck by a vehicle while crossing an intersection in Bozeman, Montana, at night. The intersection was adjacent to a university and had high pedestrian and vehicular traffic, but lacked painted crosswalk markings, had inadequate signage, and was insufficiently illuminated due to an inoperative streetlight. The pedestrian brought suit for her injuries, alleging that the combination of these factors made the intersection unreasonably dangerous. She named the driver, the City of Bozeman, and NorthWestern Energy (owner of the streetlight) as defendants.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court previously granted summary judgment to NorthWestern Energy, finding no evidence that the plaintiff had relied on the company’s maintenance of the streetlight under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. Before trial, the District Court ruled that, because the streetlight was owned by NorthWestern Energy, evidence relating to its condition could not be introduced against the City. The court concluded that the public duty doctrine (PDD) shielded the City from liability regarding the streetlight. The jury ultimately found the driver primarily at fault and awarded damages to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff appealed, arguing that she had been wrongly prevented from introducing evidence about the inoperative streetlight.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. It held that the PDD does not categorically bar premises liability claims against governmental entities when the claim is based on the condition of city property, even if a hazard (like an inoperative streetlight) is owned by a third party. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s exclusion of streetlight evidence, holding that a jury should be permitted to consider whether the inoperative streetlight, as part of the intersection’s overall condition, contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Sara Da' v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

A woman in Great Falls, Montana, made a frantic 9-1-1 call pleading for help because her former partner had locked her out of their residence, and had “our” baby inside. The call abruptly ended, and police responding to the scene were unable to reestablish contact. Officers spoke to a neighbor who referenced a disturbance, and then encountered loud, indiscernible screaming from the involved apartment. Upon identifying themselves and requesting entry, the occupant, Phillip Friscia, responded angrily, repeatedly opening and closing the door, sometimes holding the child, and stated he had the right to defend himself from people in his house. Officers, concerned for the safety of those inside, forcibly entered the residence, apprehended Friscia, and found the woman and child unharmed.The State charged Friscia with felony threatening an officer and misdemeanor destruction of a communication device. Friscia moved to suppress evidence, arguing the entry was unlawful and not justified by exigent circumstances, and challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denied both motions, finding the police entry justified by exigent circumstances based on the totality of evidence and the statute constitutionally valid. Friscia entered an Alford plea, reserving his right to appeal these decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the appeal. It held that the District Court’s factual findings regarding exigent circumstances and probable cause were not clearly erroneous and properly supported the denial of the suppression motion. The Supreme Court further held that Montana’s statute, requiring a subjective mental state, was not facially unconstitutional or overbroad, and did not violate the First Amendment under Counterman v. Colorado. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s rulings and Friscia’s conviction. View "State v. Friscia" on Justia Law