Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
In 2019, Jesse Hubbell was hired to film a scuba-diving campaign advertisement. He and John Mues rented scuba gear from Gull Scuba Center. Gull’s instructor, Chris Hanson, asked for their diving certification cards. Mues provided his “Advanced Diver” certification, but Jesse did not have his card. Jesse claimed he was PADI certified, and Hanson either did not verify this or did not recall doing so. Jesse drowned three days later while using the rented gear.Ellen Hubbell, Jesse’s widow, sued several defendants, including Gull, alleging negligence for renting the equipment without verifying Jesse’s certification. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, granted summary judgment in favor of Gull, finding no dispute of material fact regarding Gull’s liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the PRA Membership Standards to establish Gull’s duty to Jesse, as both parties’ experts indicated these standards were generally accepted in the scuba rental industry. The court also upheld the exclusion of Ellen’s expert, Thomas Maddox’s, opinion on industry standards, as it differed substantively from the prior expert’s report, which was beyond the scope allowed by the District Court’s amended scheduling order.Finally, the court agreed with the District Court’s determination that Hanson’s failure to check Jesse’s certification did not cause his death. The court found that even if Hanson had checked Jesse’s certification, Mues, who was of legal age and held an Advanced Diver certification, could have rented the equipment for Jesse. Therefore, the failure to check the certification was not the cause-in-fact of Jesse’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of Gull. View "Hubbell v Gull Scuba Center" on Justia Law

by
The defendant, Michael Lee Marfuta, Jr., lived in a trailer park in Livingston, Montana, and worked there under an informal agreement. After the park was sold to a nonprofit corporation, Marfuta faced new employment requirements and was eventually served with an eviction notice for failing to pay rent. Marfuta responded with threatening emails, indicating he would resist eviction violently. On February 2, 2021, law enforcement attempted to serve an eviction notice, leading to a standoff where Marfuta fired multiple shots at officers. He was eventually arrested after a prolonged confrontation.The Sixth Judicial District Court of Park County initially charged Marfuta with several offenses, including Attempted Deliberate Homicide, but did not include a weapon enhancement. The State later amended the charges to include the weapon enhancement under § 46-18-221, MCA. Marfuta moved to dismiss the weapon enhancement, arguing the State did not properly seek pre-filing approval. The District Court denied the motion, stating it had granted leave to file the Amended Information, which included the weapon enhancement. The jury found Marfuta guilty of Attempted Deliberate Homicide and Assault on a Peace Officer, and the court sentenced him to 82 years in prison, including the weapon enhancement.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The Court held that the District Court properly denied Marfuta's motion to dismiss the weapon enhancement, as the State had provided sufficient probable cause and notice. The Court also found that the jury instructions on the mental state for Attempted Deliberate Homicide were adequate when considered as a whole. Additionally, the Court rejected Marfuta's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that his counsel's performance did not fall below the standard required by the Sixth Amendment. View "State v. Marfuta" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Johnathan Bertsch was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide and two counts of attempted deliberate homicide after shooting at a vehicle, killing one person and injuring two others, and subsequently shooting a highway patrol officer. He pleaded guilty to one count of deliberate homicide and three counts of attempted deliberate homicide. The State requested $34,728.14 in restitution based on payments made to the victims by Montana’s Crime Victim Compensation Program. Bertsch, who relied on Social Security payments and had not maintained employment, objected to the restitution due to his indigent status.The Fourth Judicial District Court sentenced Bertsch to four consecutive life terms without parole and imposed the requested restitution amount plus a 10% administrative fee. The court reasoned that any funds Bertsch earned through prison work should go towards restitution. Bertsch appealed the restitution order, arguing that it should be waived as unjust given his financial inability to pay.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the restitution statutes require courts to determine restitution amounts without considering an offender’s ability to pay. Bertsch did not adequately request a waiver or present sufficient evidence to show that restitution was unjust under § 46-18-246, MCA. The court found that a general objection based on indigence did not meet the burden of proof required to waive restitution. The court affirmed the District Court’s order, noting that Bertsch could petition for a waiver or adjustment of restitution if his circumstances changed. View "State v. Bertsch" on Justia Law

by
David Polkow rented a residential home from Frank Kahl under a written lease agreement that transitioned to a month-to-month basis after its initial term. In 2022, they signed a new three-year lease. Frank later transferred his interest in the property to the Frank J. Kahl Revocable Trust, with his son David Kahl managing the property as trustee after Frank's death. In January 2023, David Kahl filed an eviction action against Polkow, seeking possession of the property, damages for delinquent rent, and attorney fees.The Yellowstone County Justice Court awarded Kahl possession of the property and attorney fees but denied the request for delinquent rent. Kahl then sought additional damages for property damage, which led to a hearing where he claimed $128,644.07 in damages. The Justice Court awarded Kahl $58,753.73 in damages, plus interest and attorney fees, despite Polkow's objection that the amount exceeded the court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Polkow appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision, interpreting that the court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court for landlord-tenant disputes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to award damages exceeding the $15,000 limit imposed by § 3-10-301, MCA. The court clarified that the concurrent jurisdiction statutes did not override this limit. The case was remanded for the Justice Court to vacate the damages award and dismiss the claim for compensatory damages without prejudice, allowing Kahl to refile in District Court. The award of attorney fees and costs was affirmed. View "Kahl v. Polkow" on Justia Law

by
Jesse Beck died in a motorcycle accident in Carbon County, Montana. Four days before his death, Jesse sent his brother, Jason Beck, a phone video in which he expressed his wish to leave all his possessions to Jason, explicitly excluding Christina Fontineau. Jesse's only child, Alexia Beck, was appointed as the personal representative of his estate. Jason later sought to probate the video as Jesse's will, arguing it should be considered a valid testamentary document.The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court of Carbon County denied Jason's petition, ruling that the video did not qualify as a "document or writing upon a document" under Montana Code Annotated § 72-2-523. The court reasoned that the statute's language implied a physical or digital document capable of being written upon and signed, which a video recording could not satisfy. The court also noted that even if a video could be considered a document in a general sense, it did not fit within the statutory context requiring a document to be written on.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the video recording did not meet the statutory requirements for a will under § 72-2-523, MCA. The court emphasized that the statute's language and structure clearly implied that a "document" must be a physical or digital file capable of being signed and witnessed, which a video recording could not fulfill. The court also noted that there was no legislative or judicial precedent for recognizing nonwritten, video wills under the Uniform Probate Code. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of Jason's petition to probate the video as Jesse's will. View "In re Estate of Beck" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
Vernon K. Stensvad, the plaintiff, owns a small cattle herd and entered into a Grazing Lease Contract with Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. in July 2022. The contract stipulated that Stensvad would graze his cattle on Ayers Ranch's property for a fee, with higher winter rates to be determined. Stensvad paid the fees for July and August but later agreed orally to perform labor in exchange for reduced fees. Disputes arose over the quality of Stensvad's work and the amount owed. In October 2023, Ayers Ranch issued an agister’s lien for $78,662.50, seizing Stensvad’s herd. Stensvad sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of his cattle under the lien.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Prairie County granted Stensvad’s application for a preliminary injunction, ordering the cattle to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to consider all four factors required for a preliminary injunction under Montana law and that a preliminary injunction was not an appropriate remedy for challenging an agister’s lien.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by not addressing all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard. The Supreme Court clarified that under the revised standard, a party must satisfy all four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court adopted the "serious questions" test from the Ninth Circuit, allowing for flexibility in evaluating these factors. The case was remanded for the District Court to make supplemental findings consistent with this standard. The Supreme Court also held that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien and that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law. View "Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch" on Justia Law

by
Dr. Stephen D. Behlmer sought declaratory relief to establish his right to access his property in the Scratchgravel Hills via a road that crosses various parcels owned by multiple property owners within the Treasure Canyon Estates subdivision. Behlmer's property is surrounded by land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and is accessible by traveling through Treasure Canyon Drive, which runs through the Landowners' properties. Behlmer has a lease from the United States to access his property via BLM land, effective until 2037.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissed Behlmer's petition for failure to join the United States as a required party, as the Landowners argued that the petition would prejudice federal interests. Behlmer amended his petition to clarify that he only sought a declaration of his rights relative to the portion of Treasure Canyon Drive traversing the Landowners' private property, not any BLM land. Despite this, the District Court granted the Landowners' motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the United States was not a required party under Rule 19 because its absence would not frustrate complete relief to the parties nor prejudice the United States' interests. The court determined that Behlmer's petition pertained only to the Landowners' interests and did not affect any adjacent property holders, including the United States. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Behlmer's petition for failure to join a required party. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Behlmer v. Crum" on Justia Law

by
On December 12, 2022, Joseph Benton Flynn was convicted of misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence (DUI) in Helena Municipal Court after pleading no contest. Prior to his plea, Flynn's motions to suppress evidence due to lack of particularized suspicion for the initial stop and to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial were denied. Flynn appealed these denials to the First Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Municipal Court's decisions.Flynn's appeal to the Montana Supreme Court raised two issues: whether there was particularized suspicion to stop him for speeding and whether his right to a speedy trial was violated. The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo.The court found that Officer Jessica Cornell had particularized suspicion to stop Flynn based on her training, experience, and the RADAR sign indicating Flynn was speeding. The court also held that the RADAR sign did not constitute an automated enforcement system prohibited by Montana law. Therefore, the initial stop and subsequent DUI investigation were justified, and the motion to suppress was correctly denied.Regarding the speedy trial claim, the court applied the four-factor balancing test from State v. Ariegwe. The total delay was 742 days, with 480 days attributed to Flynn due to his motions for continuances and waivers of his right to a speedy trial. The court found Flynn's responses to the delays did not demonstrate a desire for a speedy trial, and he failed to show prejudice from the delay. Consequently, the court concluded that Flynn's right to a speedy trial was not violated.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, upholding Flynn's conviction. View "State v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (Philadelphia), a Pennsylvania-based insurer, brought claims of malpractice, indemnity, and contribution against Martin O’Leary, Kimberly Forrester, and the Sedgwick LLP Liquidating Trust (Sedgwick Defendants). The Sedgwick Defendants, former employees of the now-bankrupt Sedgwick LLP, had provided legal services to Philadelphia. The claims arose from a Montana class action lawsuit involving Gateway Hospitality, Inc. (Gateway), which Philadelphia had insured. Sedgwick advised Philadelphia to deny coverage to Gateway, leading to a settlement where Gateway paid approximately four million dollars to class members.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Missoula County granted the Sedgwick Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. The court found that Philadelphia failed to establish that the Sedgwick Defendants had sufficient contacts with Montana to warrant jurisdiction. Philadelphia appealed this decision, arguing that the Sedgwick Defendants' actions related to the Montana lawsuit should subject them to Montana's jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the Sedgwick Defendants did not have sufficient contacts with Montana to establish personal jurisdiction. The Sedgwick Defendants' actions, including providing legal advice and sending a denial letter from California to Ohio, did not constitute transacting business or committing a tort in Montana. The court concluded that the Sedgwick Defendants' conduct did not create a substantial connection with Montana, and thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction was not appropriate. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v O'Leary" on Justia Law

by
Dennis Schaub and Louise Schaub were married in 1980, divorced in 2010, and reunited in 2014, establishing a common law marriage. They separated again in 2017, and Louise filed for dissolution in 2018. During their first divorce, they had a property settlement agreement that heavily favored Dennis. After their second separation, the District Court awarded Dennis most of the marital assets, citing the short reconciliation period and Louise's lack of contribution to the marital estate.The Twelfth Judicial District Court initially awarded Dennis his bank accounts, real property, vehicles, and other personal property, while Louise received only her personal items. Louise appealed, and the Montana Supreme Court remanded the case, instructing the District Court to reconsider the equitable distribution of the marital estate, taking into account the factors in § 40-4-202, MCA, and the couple's long marital history.On remand, the District Court held a hearing and found that Dennis's estate was valued at $569,341.08, while Louise's was valued at $0. The court ordered Dennis to make equalization payments to Louise totaling $242,400 over fifteen years to achieve a more equitable distribution of the marital estate, with Dennis receiving 58% and Louise 42%. The court did not require Dennis to pay interest on these payments.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision to award equalization payments, finding it supported by substantial evidence. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision not to include interest on the payments, citing § 25-9-205, MCA, which mandates interest on judgments. The case was remanded to the District Court to amend the decree to include interest and correct a scrivener's error in the payment schedule. View "In re Marriage of Schaub" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law