Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman petitioned to dissolve her fifteen-year marriage, during which both parties engaged in mediation and, represented by counsel, executed a Marital and Property Distribution Agreement (MPSA). The agreement outlined the division of various assets, including retirement accounts, with both parties explicitly acknowledging receipt of financial disclosures and waiving any further disclosures or hearings. Following mediation, the petitioner retained new counsel and moved to rescind the MPSA, claiming her former attorney failed to inform her of her spouse’s retirement assets, resulting in an inequitable distribution. She asserted she was unaware of the full extent of assets at the time of signing and that the agreement was unconscionable.The Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, denied the petitioner’s motion to rescind, citing the MPSA’s explicit language showing she was aware of, and agreed to, the asset division. Subsequently, the petitioner executed a joint affidavit affirming the agreement as fair and equitable and requesting its incorporation into the final decree. The court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree of Dissolution accordingly. Over four months later, the petitioner filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) seeking relief from the judgment, again alleging her former counsel’s gross neglect deprived her of a fair settlement. The District Court did not rule on this motion, resulting in a deemed denial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered only the timely appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The court held that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was improper because the motion merely sought to relitigate issues previously resolved and did not present extraordinary circumstances or blamelessness by the movant. Additionally, the petitioner affirmed the fairness of the agreement post-judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial. View "In re Marriage of DeCock" on Justia Law

This case centers on a dispute over property rights in a 38.2-acre tract in Flathead County, Montana. In 1992, the original owners leased part of the land to a tenant under a long-term, non-residential lease, which included an option to purchase the leased premises or, if legal restrictions prevented subdivision, to obtain an undivided tenancy-in-common interest in the larger tract. The lease was amended several times, and by 2018, Adam and Amber Britt acquired the leasehold interest through a transaction formalized in a Second Lease Amendment. The Amendment contained language stating “Paragraph 5. ‘Option to purchase’ is hereby removed,” but also referenced that the Britts had “paid in full” for their interest. In 2020, George and Irene Tuma purchased the parent tract, believing the Britts held only a leasehold interest, and later initiated litigation over property rights and use.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, addressed whether the 2018 Second Lease Amendment eliminated only the option to purchase the leased premises outright or also extinguished the tenancy-in-common purchase option. The court found the amendment ambiguous and allowed extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. After reviewing declarations and testimony from the parties and drafting attorney, the court concluded that the Britts retained a vested right to acquire an undivided tenancy-in-common interest in the parent tract with exclusive use of their leasehold, and ordered the Tumas to convey a 27.5% interest to the Britts. The court rejected the Tumas’ argument that the parol evidence rule barred such evidence, finding no genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the Second Lease Amendment is ambiguous, that extrinsic evidence was properly considered to determine intent, and that the Britts have a vested tenancy-in-common interest in the property as outlined in the original lease. View "Tuma v. Britt" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple felony charges related to sexual abuse, including three counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault, based on allegations by a minor, I.A., that he had abused her using a game called "Truth or Dare." His defense asserted that I.A. fabricated the allegations by accusing him of the same conduct that another man, Cody Hill, had perpetrated against her two weeks earlier. The defendant argued that I.A. disliked him for providing drugs to her mother and sought to protect her mother by removing him from her life. Expert testimony was presented during the trial regarding victim selection and the increased likelihood of revictimization for children previously abused.After the initial conviction in the District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, Ravalli County, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana. The Supreme Court previously reversed the conviction in State v. Twardoski, 2021 MT 179, finding that the defendant was wrongly barred from presenting evidence about I.A.’s prior abuse by another person, violating his right to confront his accuser and present a complete defense. The case was remanded for a new trial before a different judge. At retrial, the sexual abuse of children charge was dropped, but the defendant was again convicted of the remaining charges. He received concurrent 50-year sentences with no time suspended and a 25-year parole restriction.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant raised two issues: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to statistical expert testimony, and whether the more severe sentence imposed after retrial violated his right to due process. The Supreme Court declined to review the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, finding plausible tactical reasons for counsel’s lack of objection. The Court held that the increased sentence was not the result of judicial vindictiveness, as there were legitimate, nonvindictive reasons for the parole restriction. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "State v. Twardoski" on Justia Law

The case involved a dispute over a residential property in Trego, Montana, formerly owned by Florence Tosch. Tosch had divorced her husband Jack McCafferty and, per their decree, was given the right to occupy the property, with the agreement that it would be sold and proceeds divided. Tosch rented the home to Edward and Catherine Kahle under a one-year lease in 2017, which converted to a month-to-month tenancy. After Tosch’s death in 2021, her estate, managed by her daughter Korrie, sought to sell the property. The Kahles remained as tenants and, when faced with eviction proceedings, produced a purported 2019 lease with an option to purchase, allegedly signed by Tosch.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court in Lincoln County held an evidentiary hearing and found that the 2019 lease/option was a forgery. Expert testimony showed the document was not authentic, and the court found the Kahles’ explanations unconvincing while crediting testimony from the estate’s representatives. The court concluded that the Kahles had engaged in actual fraud and slander of title by recording a subsequent document with Jack’s signature to cloud the estate’s title. The court granted possession to the estate, awarded damages for lost opportunity and costs, and found the estate properly followed Montana’s landlord-tenant statutes in handling the Kahles’ abandoned property. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the estate.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the estate proved by clear and convincing evidence the Kahles committed actual fraud under Montana law by forging the lease/option and slandering the estate’s title. The Court found the estate acted lawfully under the Montana Residential Landlord Tenant Act, the damages determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the award of attorney’s fees was proper and not an abuse of discretion. The judgment was affirmed. View "Estate of Tosch v. Kahle" on Justia Law

Dennis and Jeannette Burton own property along the Flathead River near Kalispell, Montana. Their land contains a pond, historically a “scour feature” of the river, which has existed for decades and was enhanced by a man-made channel connecting it to the river, likely predating their ownership. The property frequently experiences flooding in a pole barn during high river flows. In 2024, the Burtons applied to the Flathead Conservation District (FCD) for a permit under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act to dredge the pond and channel and to use the dredged material to build a berm to protect the pole barn from flooding.The FCD conducted a site visit and, based on findings that the project could cause erosion, alter river flows, and have negative impacts on aquatic habitat, denied the permit. The FCD reasoned that the project conflicted with its rules, which discourage or prohibit dredging connected artificial or in-stream ponds. The Burtons sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, arguing that the FCD’s decision was unsupported and that its rules did not apply to their project. The District Court upheld the FCD’s denial, finding the FCD had jurisdiction because the pond and channel were connected to the river and that the project fit the definition of a regulated off-stream pond. The court also concluded that the FCD’s consideration of prior applications for the property was not improper.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the FCD had jurisdiction, that its rules applied to the project, and that there were sufficient legal grounds for the permit denial. The Court further concluded that any deficiencies in the FCD’s explanation were harmless given the record support for the decision. View "Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent and Solicitation of Tampering with Physical Evidence after living with the victim, her husband, and their children. The offense occurred when the victim, BB, alleged that the defendant raped her while they were alone in the apartment. BB initially confided in her ex-husband and later her husband before reporting the incident to the police, leading to a recorded interview in which the defendant admitted to intercourse but claimed it was consensual. The case involved text messages referencing BB’s past experiences and issues of credibility.Prior to trial, the State moved to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history under Montana’s rape shield law. The defendant sought to introduce text messages and statements suggesting BB had previously made false rape accusations and been unfaithful during a prior marriage, arguing these were relevant to her credibility and motive. The Eighth Judicial District Court granted the State’s motion in limine, finding the defendant’s offers speculative and unsupported, and excluded this evidence. During trial, the court allowed the introduction of some text messages but maintained the exclusion of evidence regarding prior false allegations and infidelity due to the lack of a proper offer of proof. The court also imposed a discovery sanction when the defendant attempted to introduce undisclosed investigator notes about the victim’s alleged infidelity. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced, with several probation conditions restricting contact with minors.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the exclusion of evidence about the victim’s past sexual history and prior rape allegations, holding there was no abuse of discretion because the defendant failed to provide the required evidentiary foundation. The court also upheld the discovery sanction for failure to disclose evidence. However, it reversed and remanded probation conditions restricting contact with minors, finding no nexus between the crime and those restrictions, and required further findings if such conditions are reimposed. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "State v. Morris" on Justia Law

The dispute centered on farmland in Chouteau County, Montana, inherited by Linda Reynolds and Gerald Cook, who formed the Cook-Reynolds Partnership to lease and operate the land. Gerald and his wife, Karin Cook, became involved in probate proceedings in Idaho, where Karin, as personal representative of the Estate of Ann Lafferty Pfeifer-Murphy, misappropriated funds to benefit herself, Gerald, and their company. Gerald executed promissory notes pledging land in Chouteau County as collateral, but these actions did not reference the Partnership. In Idaho, the Estate and its beneficiaries sought restraining orders against Gerald, Karin, their company Pneumex, Inc., and the Partnership, but only Gerald was served regarding the Partnership.Subsequently, Gerald and Karin entered into a settlement agreement confessing to a judgment exceeding $1 million, with Gerald purporting to bind the Partnership as a debtor. The Idaho court entered judgment against the Partnership and others. The Estate domesticated this judgment in Montana’s Twelfth Judicial District Court and sought to execute it against the Partnership. Linda, the managing partner, challenged the Idaho judgment, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and that she had no knowledge or authorization of Gerald’s actions on behalf of the Partnership. The District Court held a hearing but ultimately the Partnership’s motion for relief was deemed denied by operation of rule due to the court’s inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s denial de novo. It held that the Idaho court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Partnership because Gerald did not have authority to bind the Partnership in the proceedings, and Linda neither authorized nor ratified Gerald’s actions. The Montana Supreme Court also found the Partnership’s motion was made within a reasonable time. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial and vacated the Idaho judgment as to the Partnership, while leaving the judgment intact as to other debtors. View "In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy" on Justia Law

The defendant, a seventy-year-old man with a long history of alcohol use, was stopped by law enforcement after driving erratically and making multiple traffic violations. He was observed to be impaired, failed a field sobriety test, and later refused breath and blood tests, leading to a warrant for a blood draw that revealed a blood alcohol content over three times the legal limit. Investigation revealed he was driving with a suspended license and had three prior DUI convictions. He was charged with felony DUI (fourth or subsequent offense) and driving while suspended, but the latter charge was dismissed in exchange for his guilty plea to the DUI charge.The Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Court sentenced him to thirteen months with the Department of Corrections, recommended placement in an alcohol treatment program, and imposed a consecutive four-year suspended sentence. The court also imposed the statutory minimum fine of $5,000 but suspended half of it due to the defendant’s financial circumstances. The defendant appealed the imposition of the fine, arguing that the statute mandating the fine was unconstitutional based on recent case law. He maintained that the fine should not have been imposed without proper consideration of his ability to pay.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the defendant did not waive his right to appellate review of the fine by agreeing to it in the plea agreement, as subsequent case law developments questioned the constitutionality of the statute. The Court reaffirmed that the sentencing court must impose the mandatory fine under the statute, then determine the defendant’s ability to pay, and may suspend any portion of the fine accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the $5,000 fine but vacated the portion of the judgment relating to the fine and remanded to the District Court for explicit findings on the defendant’s ability to pay before determining how much of the fine should be suspended. View "State v. Hagberg" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute regarding the proper method for appraising three commercial condominium units in Kalispell, Montana, owned by the estate of Maxine O’Brien and the Hash Family Trust. The central issue was whether the Montana Department of Revenue (MDOR) should use the income approach or the cost approach to value the units for the 2023/24 tax cycle. O’Brien provided detailed income information from the subject property and a nearly identical adjacent property, contending this information was sufficient to mandate the income approach under Montana law. MDOR instead used the cost approach, arguing that the available data was insufficient for an income-based valuation, particularly due to limitations in its mass-appraisal data pool.After O’Brien condominiumized the property in 2021, MDOR switched from the income approach to the cost approach for the 2023/24 appraisal. CTAB accepted O’Brien’s income-based valuation and found that the basements of the units were not separately rentable and their value was reflected in the overall rents. MDOR appealed CTAB’s ruling to the Montana Tax Appeal Board (MTAB), which reversed CTAB, concluding that MDOR lacked sufficient income information and was justified in using the cost approach. O’Brien then sought judicial review in the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, which affirmed MTAB’s decision.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and held that MTAB erred by misinterpreting the statutory standard for sufficient, relevant income information. The Court found that O’Brien had provided adequate income information, triggering the requirement for MDOR to use the income approach. The Court reversed MTAB’s February 2025 merits decisions and reinstated CTAB’s April 2024 decisions, ordering MDOR to appraise the units using O’Brien’s income-approach valuations. View "O'Brien v. MT Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A resident of Treasure County, Montana, submitted a petition for a citizen initiative proposing a county ordinance to establish a permitting process and regulatory standards for wind energy conversion systems (WECS) exceeding certain size thresholds. The ordinance sought to regulate various aspects of WECS, including setbacks, noise, wildlife impacts, and penalties for non-compliance, and would have required the county commissioners to administer and enforce the permitting regime. After the petition’s form was approved, the petitioner made minor revisions and resubmitted it.Following these events, the Board of County Commissioners of Treasure County filed a complaint in the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposed ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional. The County argued that specific Montana statutes—namely, Title 76, chapter 2—set forth exclusive processes and requirements for county land-use and zoning regulation, with which the proposed ordinance did not comply. The petitioner responded, generally denying the allegations and seeking a declaration that the ordinance was valid, or that invalid provisions could be severed.The District Court construed the parties’ motions for summary judgment as addressing the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance. It concluded that the ordinance was invalid under § 7-5-135, MCA, because it purported to regulate land use under the county’s general powers when specific statutes governed such regulations, and its provisions exceeded the county’s legislative authority. The court did not reach the constitutional question.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed, holding that this particular proposed ordinance was invalid because it created a permitting and enforcement regime outside the authority delegated to the county by the Legislature. The court clarified that its holding was narrow and did not foreclose all citizen initiatives affecting land use, but only invalidated this ordinance as drafted. View "Treasure County v. Edlund" on Justia Law