Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The plaintiff, a resident of Missoula, Montana, alleged wrongful discharge from employment by a geological consulting company that had originally been organized under Montana law but later domesticated in Wyoming and terminated its Montana registration. The plaintiff worked for the company both in Montana and Wyoming, including specific projects in Montana, and his employment documents reflected Montana tax withholding. In June 2024, the company terminated his employment, citing a failed drug test conducted at a drilling rig in Wyoming. The plaintiff filed a wrongful discharge complaint under Montana law, seeking lost wages and other relief.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, reviewed the complaint and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District Court found that the company’s Montana contacts—such as previous organization under Montana law, Montana employment, and tax withholding—did not establish general personal jurisdiction, as the company was not “at home” in Montana at the time of the discharge. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument for specific jurisdiction under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1)(F), concluding that the company was neither organized under Montana law nor had its principal place of business in Montana when the discharge occurred. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied requests for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the District Court’s ruling that personal jurisdiction was lacking, based solely on the grounds developed by the plaintiff on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction should not have been with prejudice, as such a ruling is not a determination on the merits, and remanded for entry of a dismissal without prejudice. The Court also denied the defendant’s request for appellate sanctions. View "Witmer v. Mojo Geological Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law

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A father owned a tract of land in Carbon County, Montana, called Lot 9, which was about six and three-quarters acres. In 1969 and again in 2001, he had portions of the property surveyed, ultimately creating a one-acre parcel designated in a document known as COS 491A. In 2003, after being charged with aggravated assault and fearing potential civil liability, the father executed a warranty deed transferring “Lot 9 of Plat 474” to his daughter. An exhibit attached to the deed included a metes and bounds description of the one-acre parcel from COS 491A. The daughter later deeded the one-acre parcel to her brother in 2007. The father was found incapacitated in 2005 and died in 2015, leaving no probate estate. In 2022, the daughter sold another portion of the land.The brother sued in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County, claiming the 2003 deed conveyed only the one-acre parcel, not all of Lot 9, or that, alternately, a constructive trust or fraudulent transfer occurred, or that he was entitled under a 2010 will. The District Court granted summary judgment to the sister, holding that the deed transferred all of Lot 9, that the brother lacked standing to assert a constructive trust or claim under the fraudulent transfer statute, and that the will had not been probated.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and determined that, as a matter of law, the 2003 deed was ambiguous because it could reasonably be interpreted as transferring either all of Lot 9 or just the one-acre parcel. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the ambiguity issue and remanded for further proceedings to consider extrinsic evidence about the parties’ intent. The Court affirmed the lower court’s rulings on standing regarding the constructive trust and fraudulent transfer claims. View "Barrett v. Jesperson" on Justia Law

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The defendant pleaded guilty to several charges, including felony DUI, criminal endangerment, theft, and misdemeanor assault, for conduct in Mineral County, Montana. He was sentenced to concurrent terms involving the Department of Corrections and probation. After his release, he failed to comply with probation requirements, resulting in multiple alleged violations. He was arrested on July 3, 2024, in Great Falls on probation warrants, remained in custody, and appeared before a judge in Cascade County on July 5, 2024, for bail setting on the probation hold. The Mineral County Attorney filed a petition to revoke his suspended sentence on July 11, 2024, but he was not served that warrant until October 28, 2024, and did not make an initial appearance on the revocation petition until November 6, 2024—127 days after his arrest.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Montana presided over the revocation proceedings. The defendant moved to dismiss the revocation petition, arguing that the delay between his arrest and the initial appearance violated Montana Code Annotated § 46-18-203(4), which requires a probationer to be brought before a judge within 60 days of arrest. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that the July 5 hearing satisfied statutory requirements even though the revocation petition had not yet been filed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s interpretation and application of § 46-18-203(4). The Supreme Court held that the statute requires an initial appearance on the revocation petition within 60 days of arrest, and that such an appearance cannot occur before the petition is filed. Because the defendant’s first appearance on the revocation petition was more than 60 days after arrest, his statutory rights were violated. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded for dismissal of the revocation petition without prejudice. View "State v. Close" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A Montana-based workers’ compensation insurer was sued by a Texas company in federal court, with the suit alleging breach of contract and seeking over $8 million in damages. The litigation was settled confidentially, but before settlement, the insurer filed its annual financial statement with the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance, failing to specifically disclose the existence of the federal lawsuit. The Commissioner repeatedly directed the insurer to amend its statement to include the ongoing litigation, but the insurer declined to do so.After the insurer refused to comply, the Commissioner initiated administrative proceedings, seeking both a supplement to the annual statement and a $25,000 fine. A Hearing Examiner partially granted summary judgment, permitting the Commissioner to supplement the statement with the existence of the litigation but not the settlement, since the settlement occurred outside the reporting period. The Special Deputy Insurance Commissioner adopted these findings and imposed the maximum fine. The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, reviewed the agency’s final decision and affirmed it fully, holding that the Commissioner was empowered to impose the fine without explanation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower courts’ and agency’s finding that the insurer violated the Insurance Code by failing to disclose the federal lawsuit in its annual statement. The Court held that the Commissioner’s orders to supplement the statement were lawful and within statutory authority. However, the Court reversed the imposition of the $25,000 fine, concluding that the agency’s failure to explain its exercise of discretion in setting the fine amount was arbitrary and capricious. The case was remanded for the agency to provide a cogent explanation before imposing any fine. View "Victory Insurance v. State Auditor" on Justia Law

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The defendant was cited for driving under the influence of alcohol, driving without proof of insurance, and driving without valid registration outside Big Timber in December 2022. A bench trial was held in Sweet Grass County Justice Court in October 2023, resulting in convictions for all three offenses. As first-time offenses, the defendant received a suspended custodial sentence, mandatory treatment, and fines. She appealed to the Sixth Judicial District Court for a trial de novo.After the appeal, the District Court issued multiple scheduling orders requiring the defendant’s personal appearance at jury trial verification hearings, warning that failure to appear could result in vacating the trial or other consequences. The defendant missed the first hearing but appeared at the second after a continuance, explaining she had been out of state and unaware of the hearing. Her trial was rescheduled along with another verification hearing, but she failed to appear again. With no explanation for her absence provided by counsel, the State moved to dismiss the appeal, and the District Court granted the motion.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion and considered whether counsel’s performance was ineffective. The Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion under § 46-17-311(5), MCA, because the defendant was ordered to personally appear, failed to do so without explanation, and had repeated opportunities to show good cause. Statutory notice was deemed sufficient to inform her of the consequences. The Court further found the record insufficient to resolve the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A county attorney in Montana advised local officials not to provide confidential criminal justice information (CCJI) to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for civil purposes without a court order, citing Montana law. The Montana Attorney General disagreed, asserting that ICE is a “criminal justice agency” entitled to access such information and ordered the county attorney to change her policy. When the county attorney requested a formal opinion, the Attorney General refused, then formally asserted supervisory control, requiring the county attorney to issue a memo permitting full disclosure of CCJI to ICE. The county attorney complied under protest and filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Montana seeking a declaratory judgment on the matter.The Attorney General claimed the dispute was nonjusticiable, arguing it was a political question, that the county attorney lacked standing, and that any opinion would be advisory. The Supreme Court of Montana found these arguments unpersuasive. The Court determined that the county attorney had standing because she is an independently elected official with statutory duties, including advising county officials, and the Attorney General’s supervisory authority does not extend to this advisory function. The Court also concluded that the dispute did not present a political question or an advisory opinion and thus was justiciable.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the county attorney’s petition is properly before the Court and that the Attorney General exceeded his authority by attempting to direct the county attorney’s legal advice to county officials. The Court declared the Attorney General’s order unenforceable. The Court did not decide whether ICE is a “criminal justice agency” under Montana law but ordered further briefing on that issue and whether such agencies are automatically entitled to CCJI solely by virtue of their status. View "Cromwell v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

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A married couple with two minor children separated, and the wife initiated dissolution proceedings. They reached agreements on parenting and property, specifying that child support would be calculated under Montana Child Support Guidelines via the Child Support Services Division (CSSD). The husband was to maintain health insurance for the children if available at a reasonable cost, and the parties would split tax exemptions. CSSD issued a temporary support order, but the wife later challenged the calculation, arguing it contained errors regarding parenting days, incomes, and health-insurance credits, and she requested recalculation and back support.After the Office of Administrative Hearings denied her request for review as untimely, the wife sought recalculation in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court. The parties eventually agreed on key financial inputs, and several support calculations were considered. The District Court initially ordered support based on a worksheet not admitted into evidence, modified the tax and insurance provisions from the parties’ agreement, and declined to award retroactive support. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court remanded for more detailed findings.Following remand, the District Court clarified income, parenting days, and tax allocations, and maintained that the wife should enroll the children in Healthy Montana Kids rather than private insurance. However, the adopted support calculation continued to credit the husband for private insurance premiums, contradicting the findings. The court again declined to award retroactive support, finding both parents had met the children’s needs and had received family assistance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court’s child-support calculation did not implement its findings regarding health insurance and reversed that portion of the order, remanding for a corrected calculation consistent with the findings. The denial of earlier retroactive support was affirmed. The husband’s request for sanctions was denied. View "In re Marriage of Christofferson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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A Montana Highway Patrol officer stopped the defendant for a vehicle malfunction and observed signs of marijuana use. After the defendant admitted to smoking marijuana and submitted to field sobriety tests, he was arrested for driving under the influence. The officer transported him to a hospital, where a certified phlebotomist drew his blood. The State charged the defendant with felony operation of a vehicle with a THC concentration of 5 ng/ml or more, based on the blood toxicology report, and related misdemeanors. The defendant contested the foundational requirements for admitting the blood test, specifically the statutory requirement that the phlebotomist be supervised by a physician or registered nurse, and challenged the use of his certified driving record to establish prior DUI convictions for felony sentencing.The District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, Ravalli County, admitted the blood test evidence, overruling the defense’s objection and finding hospital employment sufficient to imply supervision. The court also relied on the defendant’s certified driving record to find at least three prior DUI convictions, sentencing him as a fourth or subsequent DUI offender. The defense appealed, arguing both the blood test admission and the sentencing enhancement lacked proper foundation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court abused its discretion by treating hospital employment as sufficient to establish the statutory supervision requirement for blood draws. However, the Supreme Court found the defendant waived his objection by failing to make it in a timely manner before the evidence was introduced. Regarding sentencing, the Supreme Court held that the certified driving record constituted competent evidence of at least three prior DUI convictions and affirmed the sentencing enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A property once owned by the Vinings in Ravalli County, Montana, had two groundwater wells historically used for commercial beaver pens, with statements of claim filed in 1982. The property also included a pond not originally specified in the water rights claims. After the mid-1990s, the Vinings discontinued use of the wells for beaver pens, instead using the water for irrigation and livestock, without obtaining the required authorization to change the beneficial use. In 2020, YC Properties, LLC acquired the property and associated water rights. In 2023, YC Properties sought to amend the claims to include the historic pond, prompting objections from neighboring landowners who argued the water rights had been abandoned.The Montana Water Court consolidated the claims and, after motions from both sides, granted summary judgment to the objectors. The Water Court determined that use of the water for irrigation and livestock by the Vinings and YC Properties, instead of the claimed commercial beaver pen use, constituted unauthorized use. The Water Court concluded that the long period of unauthorized use was the functional equivalent of non-use and intent to abandon, thus triggering a presumption of abandonment. The court found YC Properties failed to rebut this presumption and dismissed the water rights claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the Water Court erred in its abandonment analysis. The Supreme Court held that while post-1973 conduct could be considered in abandonment determinations, unauthorized water use is not per se equivalent to intent to abandon under Montana’s common law. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding that abandonment is a factual question requiring consideration of all circumstances, including whether water was continuously put to beneficial use, even if unauthorized. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. View "YC Properties v. Connolly" on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged with deliberate homicide following an arrest in March 2021. Initially released on bond, he was later taken into custody after missing a required hearing. At a pretrial release revocation hearing, the State was represented by then-Deputy County Attorney Brett Linneweber. Over time, the defendant changed attorneys multiple times, displaying distrust toward counsel and initially refusing to accept any plea agreement. Ultimately, after negotiations, he agreed to plead guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide in exchange for a binding sentencing recommendation and dismissal of other charges. Before the plea hearing, Judge Linneweber, who had since been appointed to the bench, was assigned to the case. Although he had previously appeared for the State in a related proceeding, he determined his involvement was minimal and did not recuse himself, accepting the defendant’s guilty plea.After his plea, the defendant filed a motion for Judge Linneweber’s disqualification, which was referred to the Montana Supreme Court. Judge Linneweber then recused himself, and the motion was denied as moot. The defendant later sought to withdraw his guilty plea, citing involuntariness, ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence, and pressure to accept the plea, but did not explicitly raise the disqualification issue as a basis for withdrawal. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court denied the motion, finding no evidence that the plea was not knowing or voluntary and that the new evidence could have been discovered earlier.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the failure to recuse constituted good cause for plea withdrawal. The Court held that Judge Linneweber’s prior involvement as counsel required disqualification by statute and rule. The failure to recuse was a due process violation and constituted good cause to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Notafraid" on Justia Law