Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case arose after the defendant was charged in July 2020 with felony driving under the influence (DUI) in Missoula County, Montana. He entered a plea agreement with the State, pleading guilty to the DUI charge in exchange for dismissal of another case. The parties jointly recommended a 13-month commitment to the Department of Corrections with specific placement and a subsequent suspended sentence. Although they agreed the court could impose the mandatory minimum $5,000 fine, the defendant’s financial circumstances showed he could not pay most of it, as he subsisted primarily on Social Security and had very limited resources.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, presided over sentencing. The defendant’s counsel requested the fine be stricken due to the defendant’s inability to pay. The court conducted an inquiry into his financial circumstances, then imposed the $5,000 fine but credited $100 for jail time and suspended the remaining $4,900, contingent on the defendant’s compliance with probation. The court’s judgment reflected an order for the defendant to pay $0 of the fine.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered whether the District Court legally imposed the mandatory minimum fine by suspending the portion the defendant could not pay. The Supreme Court overruled its prior holding in State v. Gibbons, which had found such mandatory minimum fines facially unconstitutional. The Court held that sentencing courts must impose the statutory minimum fine but are required, under the ability-to-pay statute, to suspend any portion the defendant is unable to pay. The Court concluded that, when the fine is imposed and suspended consistent with the defendant’s ability to pay, the statutory scheme is constitutional, and the sentence is legal. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "State v. Cole" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested on March 18, 2022, after leading police on a high-speed chase in a stolen vehicle while intoxicated. He was charged with several felonies, including felony driving under the influence, criminal endangerment, and theft. At the time of the incident, he was already subject to release conditions in other pending cases. Following his arrest, he was unable to post a substantial bond and was detained until he became a Department of Corrections inmate in November 2022 for an unrelated case. Over the following months, the scheduling of his trial was affected by continuances, plea negotiations, overlapping trial dates with his other pending cases, and court docket priorities.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial after approximately 476 days elapsed between his arrest and his no-contest plea. The District Court attributed a significant portion of the delay to institutional reasons but also found that the defendant was responsible for numerous delays, including his requests for continuances, his actions during plea negotiations, and his acquiescence in having multiple cases scheduled for trial on the same dates. The District Court concluded that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo, applying the four-factor test set out in State v. Ariegwe. The Supreme Court held that although the delay was lengthy and primarily institutional, the defendant was responsible for significant portions of it, and his conduct did not display a genuine desire for a speedy trial. The Court further found that the defendant suffered no actual prejudice from the delay. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. View "State v. Larson" on Justia Law

A group comprised of property owners from several Montana cities challenged the constitutionality of several zoning and land use laws enacted in 2023, including statutes requiring municipalities to permit accessory dwelling units and duplexes in single-family zones, and the Montana Land Use Planning Act (MLUPA), which imposed comprehensive planning requirements on larger cities. The group argued that these laws unfairly burdened single-family neighborhoods, undermined the right of citizens to participate in land-use decisions, and violated equal protection by creating arbitrary distinctions between citizens.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court initially granted partial relief to the challengers, enjoining certain statutory provisions it found violated the right to participate, and declared that the new laws could not supersede more restrictive private covenants. The court also held that the housing statutes did not violate equal protection. Parties on both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed these rulings. It first found that the public participation claims were justiciable, as a live controversy remained due to the likelihood of the challenged provisions recurring after temporary legislative amendments expired. The court held that the MLUPA’s public participation procedures did not, on their face, violate the Montana Constitution’s right to participate, as the statutes provided for notice and reasonable opportunity for public input, especially during the development of comprehensive plans, even if not at every stage of the process.The court also affirmed that the statutes did not violate equal protection, because the alleged classes—citizens in cities subject to MLUPA versus those outside, or those with versus without private covenants—were not similarly situated for constitutional purposes. Finally, the court vacated the lower court’s declaratory judgment regarding private covenants, finding it was an improper advisory opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the lower court’s judgment. View "M.A.I.D. v. State" on Justia Law

A vehicle reported stolen was located by police, who discovered Alejandro Flores-Reyes had been driving it and was in possession of its keys. Flores-Reyes stated he had purchased the car and that the items inside belonged to him. Police contacted the registered owner, who consented to a search of the vehicle. The officers, without Flores-Reyes’ consent, conducted a search, manipulated a concealed panel, and found a closed zippered pouch in a hidden compartment. Upon opening the pouch, they found pills suspected to contain fentanyl. The officers then obtained warrants based on this discovery and, during subsequent searches, seized additional narcotics from the vehicle and from Flores-Reyes’ motel room.After initial charges were filed in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, the case was dismissed to allow for federal prosecution, but was later reinstated at the State’s request when the federal case was abandoned. Flores-Reyes moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his constitutional rights and that the subsequent warrants were tainted by the prior unlawful search. The District Court denied the motion, ruling that Flores-Reyes had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle as he lacked a legitimate possessory interest, and convicted him of three counts of criminal possession with intent to distribute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the warrantless search of the closed pouch in the concealed compartment exceeded the scope of the owner’s consent because there was no mutual use or joint access to the pouch. The court held that the search violated both the Montana and United States Constitutions. As such, the court reversed the District Court’s order, vacated Flores-Reyes’ convictions, and remanded for suppression of all evidence obtained from the unlawful search and its fruits. View "State v. Flores-Reyes" on Justia Law

Andrew Emmings was subject to a permanent order of protection after repeated contact with a protected party. He was later charged with multiple violations of this order and pled guilty to several counts. While his case was pending, his release was revoked twice for new offenses, and he left Montana without completing required procedures. Emmings subsequently harassed other individuals, including a journalist and a lender, through threatening communications. He was sentenced to a net twelve-year term with ten years suspended, subject to various probation conditions, including restrictions on social media use.After serving his custodial sentence, Emmings was released on probation and later granted conditional discharge from supervision, with the court clarifying the discharge was subject to possible reimposition. Emmings moved to California, and after sending further threats, his conditional discharge was revoked, placing him back on probation. He did not appeal this order. Later, after failing to comply with supervision and communicate with his probation officer, the State petitioned to revoke his suspended sentence. A different district judge dismissed the petition, reasoning that Emmings’ move to California terminated his sentence and that the previous judge’s probation conditions were illegal and amounted to banishment from Montana.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Judge Halligan’s order reimposing probation became the law of the case when it was not appealed, and Judge Larson abused his discretion in striking it. The court also held that moving out of state under conditional discharge does not terminate the sentence; the sentence remains subject to revocation, and the statutory procedures for termination were not followed. The court further found that Emmings was not banished from Montana and had not shown that probation conditions were impossible to comply with. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and reinstated the prior revocation, remanding for further proceedings. View "State v. Emmings" on Justia Law

The case concerns criminal charges against a man arising from two separate incidents involving his estranged wife and their children at their home in Missoula County, Montana. The first incident, in June 2022, involved a domestic dispute in which the man was alleged to have yelled at and threatened his children and wife, resulting in a 911 call and subsequent police investigation. The second incident, in October 2022, occurred while the couple was separated and involved a physical altercation during a visit by the man to drop off dog food, which escalated to allegations of assault, strangulation, and injury to the wife. Law enforcement responded on both occasions, collecting statements and evidence from the family.After the second incident, the State amended its charges to include multiple felonies and misdemeanors. The defendant initially entered into a plea agreement, pleading no contest to certain charges in exchange for dismissal of others. However, the Fourth Judicial District Court, after reviewing a presentence report, rejected the plea agreement, expressing concerns regarding the defendant’s criminal history and risk to public safety. The defendant then withdrew his pleas, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found him guilty on all counts, including Partner or Family Member Assault, destruction/tampering with a communication device, aggravated assault, and strangulation.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant argued due process violations and cumulative error, including claims of police misconduct, judicial bias, and the State knowingly presenting false evidence. The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s claims were not preserved for appeal and declined to exercise plain error review. The Court further found no basis for cumulative error or denial of a fair trial, and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "State v. Stinger" on Justia Law

After a five-year marriage, a couple divorced and agreed on a parenting plan that divided time with their daughter, A.M. Following the divorce, Melissa, the mother, learned that her older daughter from a previous marriage accused Graham, her ex-husband, of sexually abusing her in 2019. Melissa then sought to modify the parenting plan to prevent Graham from having unsupervised visits with A.M., fearing for her safety. She also obtained a temporary order of protection barring Graham from contact with her older daughter and with A.M. for a limited period.The Fifth Judicial District Court initially granted Melissa’s request for a temporary supervised visitation arrangement. However, after a hearing at which key witnesses testified, including Melissa, Graham, and E.M. (another daughter), but not A.R.M. (the alleged victim), the District Court found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude by a preponderance that Graham had abused Melissa’s daughters or posed a danger to A.M. The court made minor amendments to the parenting plan, such as ordering counseling for A.M. and regulating exchanges and communications, but reinstated Graham’s right to unsupervised parenting time with A.M., vacating the interim supervised plan.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in finding insufficient evidence of risk to A.M. and in conducting the hearing with the judge appearing remotely via videoconference. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in determining that Melissa failed to meet her heavy burden for modifying the parenting plan. The Court further held that Melissa did not preserve her procedural objection to the judge’s remote appearance and that no manifest injustice or structural error occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. View "In re Marriage of Murphy" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury in 2018 of several offenses, including aggravated assault, sexual assault, assault on a peace officer, escape, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. After initially having court-appointed counsel, he retained private attorneys under a fixed-fee contract, with his grandmother paying $150,000 upfront. Ten months later, the relationship between the appellant and his retained counsel deteriorated to the point of a complete breakdown, leading counsel to seek withdrawal. The court held a hearing, found an irreconcilable breakdown, allowed withdrawal, and appointed new counsel. The appellant was then represented by court-appointed attorneys through his trial and sentencing. His conviction and subsequent claims of error, including those relating to ineffective assistance of counsel, were affirmed on direct appeal, and his petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.In postconviction proceedings before the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, the appellant asserted numerous grounds for relief, focusing on claims of ineffective assistance by retained trial counsel (for seeking withdrawal but keeping the fixed fee) and by appellate counsel (for not arguing that separate counsel should have been appointed at the withdrawal hearing). After a bench trial and extensive litigation, the District Court denied all claims, finding no constitutional violations. The court also noted that the appellant’s dispute over fees had been separately resolved through mediation and civil proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the circumstances did not demonstrate a structural denial of counsel warranting a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, nor did the fixed-fee contract create an actual conflict of interest resulting in ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The Court further found that appellate counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the claim regarding appointment of separate counsel at the withdrawal hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of postconviction relief. View "Briggs v. State" on Justia Law

After being stopped in a single traffic incident, the defendant was charged in the First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County, Montana, with four offenses: criminal possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine), criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, displaying fictitious license plates, and driving without a valid license. The charges stemmed from the discovery of a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue; the pipe itself was the basis for the paraphernalia charge, and the residue formed the basis for the felony drug possession charge.The defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor counts—possession of drug paraphernalia, displaying fictitious license plates, and driving without a license—but did not plead guilty to the felony drug possession charge. Immediately after his guilty pleas to the misdemeanors, he moved to dismiss the felony charge, arguing that Montana’s double jeopardy and same-transaction statutes—specifically § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA—barred further prosecution because all charges arose from the same transaction and shared the same objective. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the offenses, though related, were distinct under Montana law and that the defendant had not yet been subjected to multiple prosecutions. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the felony, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. It held that § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA, did not bar prosecution of the unresolved count because no conviction had been entered on the other counts at the time of the motion. The court also concluded that Montana law permits prosecution and conviction for both offenses arising from the same transaction unless one is a lesser-included offense of the other, which was not the case here. View "State v. Standifur" on Justia Law

The case centers on criminal charges against an individual who was accused of sexual intercourse without consent, aggravated kidnapping, and robbery. The complaining witness, Andrade, and the accused had a prior association within a homeless encampment. A series of events led to the accused suspecting Andrade of theft. Months later, an encounter in a tent resulted in Andrade alleging that the accused kept her against her will, threatened, assaulted, and forced her to perform oral sex, and stole her wallet. The accused admitted to receiving oral sex but maintained it was consensual and denied the other charges. Forensic evidence and multiple witness testimonies were presented at trial.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Missoula County presided over a jury trial, during which the prosecution and several witnesses repeatedly referred to Andrade as “the victim.” The defense objected to this terminology, arguing it undermined the presumption of innocence and prejudiced the jury, but the court overruled these objections. Additionally, over defense objections, the court permitted the prosecution to elicit testimony about the accused’s request to his girlfriend to “wipe” his phone, which the prosecution used to suggest consciousness of guilt and criminal propensity.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case on appeal. It held that the pervasive reference to Andrade as “victim” was improper in a case where the existence of a crime and the credibility of the complaining witness were central, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial. Further, the court found that admitting evidence about the phone-wiping request violated evidentiary rules, as it was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and constituted inadmissible character evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Sandberg" on Justia Law