Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A 16-year-old individual was criminally charged in Montana with several offenses, including aggravated burglary and assault on a peace officer. The prosecution filed an Information in the District Court, and a hearing was scheduled to decide whether the matter should be transferred to Youth Court, as permitted by Montana law for certain juvenile defendants. Before being arraigned, the defendant moved to substitute the presiding judge, arguing the motion was timely since arraignment had not yet occurred.The Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, denied the substitution motion without prejudice, reasoning that such motions are prohibited in Youth Court actions and would only be considered if the case remained in District Court following the transfer hearing. The court also issued an order for evaluation to assist in the transfer determination, but the order was initially filed under an incorrect cause number. The defendant then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control, claiming the denial of the substitution motion was erroneous because the case was pending in District Court as a criminal action, not a Youth Court matter.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that after the State files an Information in District Court, jurisdiction over the criminal matter rests with the District Court, and the action is not a Youth Court case at that stage. The court further clarified that under Montana law, a defendant’s right to substitute a judge in criminal cases may be exercised any time before arraignment, and that the 10-day window for substitution closes at arraignment rather than opening at that point. The Supreme Court granted the petition for supervisory control, set aside the District Court’s order denying substitution, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "S.L. v. 4th Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

A petitioner sought a declaratory judgment regarding the legal sufficiency of a proposed constitutional ballot initiative, known as Ballot Issue 4. This initiative aimed to amend the Montana Constitution to limit the powers and privileges of "artificial persons"—including corporations, nonprofit corporations, limited liability companies, unincorporated associations, and certain foreign entities—by expressly restricting their ability to engage in election and ballot issue activities. The initiative would revoke all powers previously granted to artificial persons under Montana law, regrant only those necessary for lawful business or charitable purposes, and specifically prohibit election-related activities except for certain political committees. The petitioner contended that all provisions of the initiative were integral to a unified purpose: preventing artificial persons from participating in political spending.The Montana Attorney General, supported by amici, determined that Ballot Issue 4 was legally insufficient because it violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. According to the Attorney General, the initiative encompassed multiple changes that were not closely related, including broad revocations and regrants of powers to artificial persons, and affected diverse areas of law beyond the stated intent. The petitioner challenged this determination, arguing that the initiative constituted a single, unified scheme and that none of its provisions could sensibly be considered separately.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana exercised original jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination. The Court held that Ballot Issue 4 violated the separate-vote requirement because it proposed more than one substantive constitutional change—specifically, both limiting artificial persons’ powers to those expressly provided and revoking and regranting powers in a manner that extended beyond election-related activities. The Court affirmed the Attorney General’s rejection of the initiative and denied the petitioner’s request to declare it legally sufficient. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Austin Knudsen, the Montana Attorney General, was charged with 41 counts of attorney misconduct by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) for actions taken while representing the Montana State Legislature in litigation before the Montana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. The underlying events involved Knudsen and his office’s response to subpoenas issued by the Legislature seeking judicial branch emails, and subsequent orders by the Montana Supreme Court to return those materials. During the litigation, Knudsen and his subordinates made critical statements about the Court and delayed compliance with a direct order to return subpoenaed documents.The Commission on Practice of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held a contested hearing, ultimately finding that Knudsen violated five provisions of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct and recommending a 90-day suspension from the practice of law. Knudsen objected, raising separation of powers arguments and claiming multiple due process violations during the disciplinary proceedings. The Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were brief, lacking detailed explanation for each alleged rule violation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana, exercising de novo review, found that Knudsen violated Rule 3.4(c) by knowingly failing to seek a stay or otherwise comply with the Court’s order to return subpoenaed materials, and Rule 5.1(c) by failing to ensure that his subordinates also complied. However, the Court determined that the Commission failed to prove violations of Rules 8.2(a), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a), finding that Knudsen’s critical statements about the Court were either opinions or facts not proven false, and that no prejudice to a specific proceeding was demonstrated. Due to significant due process violations in the Commission proceedings, the Supreme Court dismissed the case without imposing discipline. View "In re Knudsen" on Justia Law

Francisco Padilla-Canales, a Spanish-speaking undocumented immigrant, was arrested after breaking into a residence where his estranged wife was staying with another man, Lesman Escobar Andara. Upon discovering them together, Padilla-Canales stabbed Andara, who died at the scene. Padilla-Canales attempted to have his wife report the incident as a suicide and performed CPR until emergency services arrived. He was advised soon after arrest, in Spanish, that a conviction could lead to deportation, and signed documentation acknowledging this warning. More than a year later, he pled guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide under a nonbinding plea agreement.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County, Montana, accepted Padilla-Canales’s guilty plea after confirming he understood the charges and potential penalties, and that there were no communication barriers due to language. However, at the change-of-plea hearing, the court did not specifically advise Padilla-Canales of the immigration consequences of his plea or confirm his understanding of those consequences, as required by Montana law. Both the State and defense counsel referenced his immigration status during sentencing, discussing that deportation would likely follow his prison term. The District Court sentenced Padilla-Canales to forty years in prison without parole restrictions.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Padilla-Canales argued for the first time that his guilty plea was involuntary due to the District Court’s failure to properly advise him about potential deportation. The Supreme Court recognized the advisement failure but concluded that, in this case, Padilla-Canales was aware of the immigration consequences through discussions in open court and with counsel. The Court declined to exercise plain error review, holding that the record did not reveal a manifest miscarriage of justice or compromise the fairness of the proceedings, and affirmed the District Court’s sentencing order. View "State v. Padilla-Canales" on Justia Law

In this case, a woman was accused of participating in a staged burglary intended to facilitate an insurance fraud scheme. The orchestrator of the scheme, seeking funds to pay her son's legal fees, enlisted several individuals to help remove and conceal items from her home, including a refrigerator and a boat, while her husband was away. Law enforcement initiated an investigation after the orchestrator’s husband discovered the apparent burglary and contacted police. The accused woman was alleged to have assisted in disassembling and moving the refrigerator and in storing the stolen items at her own residence, knowing that an official investigation was imminent.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Richland County presided over the case. Before trial, the defendant requested that a witness be allowed to testify by video due to travel difficulties, but the court required in-person testimony. The defendant also requested an “accomplice instruction” for the jury, arguing that a key witness’s testimony should be viewed with distrust as that witness was allegedly an accomplice. The court denied both requests, finding the accomplice instruction inapplicable because the relevant charges had been amended. After hearing testimony from the orchestrator, other involved parties, and law enforcement, the jury acquitted the defendant of conspiracy to commit insurance fraud but convicted her of tampering with evidence. The defendant then appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions, witness testimony procedures, and sufficiency of corroborating evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not commit reversible error in denying the accomplice instruction, as it would have been inconsistent with the defendant’s claim of innocence on the tampering charge. The court further determined there was no abuse of discretion in denying the video testimony request and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for tampering with evidence. View "State v. Lord" on Justia Law

Three children were removed from their mother’s care after one of them, a one-month-old infant, presented at the hospital with unexplained bone fractures. Medical staff and Child Protective Services raised concerns about possible abuse and neglect, noting the family’s prior involvement with child welfare authorities. The Department of Public Health and Human Services placed the children with their maternal aunt and later with their mother’s former foster parent. Over the next three years, the Department developed and monitored treatment plans for the mother, who made some progress but struggled with consistent engagement, parenting skills, and ensuring safe environments for her children. The children exhibited significant behavioral challenges, and allegations of sexual abuse by the mother’s partner further complicated visitation and efforts at family reunification.The Department initiated proceedings in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, seeking emergency protective services, adjudication as youths in need of care, and temporary legal custody. The District Court extended the Department’s custody multiple times, citing ongoing concerns. While the mother completed aspects of her treatment plan, service providers testified about her ongoing difficulties in safely managing her children and prioritizing their needs. Ultimately, the Department changed its permanency plan from reunification to guardianship with the children’s previous caregiver, S.H. The mother objected, arguing the Department had not made reasonable reunification efforts and had failed to prove her unfit as a parent.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s order granting the Department’s petition for guardianship. The Montana Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that further efforts would likely be unproductive. The court clarified that the Department was not required to prove the mother’s parental “unfitness” under the guardianship statute and that a clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply. The District Court’s order granting guardianship was affirmed. View "In re L.D." on Justia Law

Parker Noland operated a construction debris removal business in Flathead County, Montana, but was ordered by the Montana Public Service Commission to cease operations due to lacking a required Class D motor carrier certificate. Noland formed PBN LLC and applied for the certificate, but withdrew his application after finding the administrative process—including requests for sensitive financial information by competitors—too burdensome. He then limited his business to activities not requiring the certificate. Subsequently, Noland filed suit in the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County, seeking a declaratory judgment that two provisions of the Montana Motor Carrier law, known as the public convenience and necessity (PCN) provisions, were unconstitutional under both the Montana and United States Constitutions.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Montana and Evergreen Disposal, Inc., which had intervened. The court held that Noland lacked standing to bring an as-applied constitutional challenge, reasoning he sought to vindicate only a future injury and had not shown how the statutes would be unconstitutionally applied to him. However, the court found Noland had standing to bring a facial challenge, but ruled against him, concluding the provisions were not facially unconstitutional because some applicants had previously received Class D certificates.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s rulings de novo. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision that Noland lacked standing for an as-applied challenge, holding that he failed to demonstrate a concrete injury or how the statutes were applied to him. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of Noland’s facial challenge, holding that he had standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality on its face, since the procedural requirements themselves could constitute injury regardless of outcome. The case was remanded for further consideration of the facial constitutional challenges. View "Noland v. State" on Justia Law

An individual was accused of sexually assaulting his fiancée’s seven-year-old niece while visiting the child’s home. The child reported the incident to her sibling, who then informed their mother. Law enforcement conducted interviews with the child, her family, and the accused, and collected physical evidence, including a blanket identified by the child. DNA analysis of the blanket matched the accused. The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent. At trial, the child, family members, law enforcement, and crime lab personnel testified. The defense focused on challenging the investigation rather than the child’s credibility. The accused was found guilty on both charges.After conviction, the accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Montana, raising several issues including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the conviction. The accused then sought postconviction relief in the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Fallon County, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective, particularly in the cross-examination of a law enforcement officer. The District Court denied the petition, finding the claims both procedurally barred and without merit. The defense attorney was later disbarred and did not participate in the postconviction proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the denial of postconviction relief. The Court held that the accused did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington. The Court found that the defense counsel’s cross-examination strategy fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and did not prejudice the outcome, given the strong physical evidence and the content presented to the jury. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court’s denial of postconviction relief. View "Kapps v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, a man was charged with multiple felony counts arising from sexual abuse allegations involving two victims: his adopted daughter, who disclosed in 2021 that she had been repeatedly molested by him from age 10 to 14, and his sister-in-law, who reported a 2009 incident in which he sexually assaulted her when she was 17. After investigations and forensic interviews, the defendant was charged with one count of felony sexual assault and three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent. The charges related to both victims were tried together before a jury.Prior to trial in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, neither party objected to the joinder of charges or moved to sever them. During voir dire, a Yellowstone County Undersheriff, whose office had investigated the case, was seated as a juror without objection or peremptory strike from either party. During trial, the State raised concerns about the Undersheriff’s impartiality, but the defendant’s counsel argued against removing him, and the District Court declined any implied motion to strike. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 100 years in prison.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant raised three issues: whether the presence of the Undersheriff as a juror or the joinder of charges should be reviewed under the plain error doctrine, and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to either issue. The Supreme Court held that neither issue merited plain error review because the defendant had affirmatively waived challenges below, and there was no manifest miscarriage of justice. The Court further determined that the record was insufficient to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, leaving that question for postconviction proceedings. The Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Soapes" on Justia Law

A convenience store employee in Plentywood, Montana, discovered a small bag containing methamphetamine on the store floor during her shift and called law enforcement. Surveillance footage was reviewed, and a deputy identified Shawn Andersen as a person who had been in the area where the bag was found. The deputy did not watch all of the footage but focused on the time around when the bag appeared. Later, another bag of methamphetamine was found in Andersen’s pocket when he was arrested at the county jail. Both baggies tested positive for methamphetamine. At trial, the State’s case relied heavily on the surveillance footage and related testimony to link Andersen to the drugs found at the store.The Fifteenth Judicial District Court in Sheridan County presided over Andersen’s jury trial. During deliberations, the jury asked to review the surveillance footage. While they watched, the State’s legal assistant audibly commented, “There it is,” as the video showed the disputed moment. Andersen’s counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, arguing that the comment could have improperly influenced the jury. The District Court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Andersen on all counts. Andersen was sentenced to a combination of suspended and consecutive sentences for possession of dangerous drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Andersen’s motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the legal assistant’s comment constituted improper third-party jury misconduct, creating a presumption of prejudice. Because the District Court neither declared a mistrial nor conducted an inquiry to rebut this presumption, the Supreme Court found this to be an abuse of discretion. The conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on all counts. View "State v. Andersen" on Justia Law