Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A pedestrian was struck by a vehicle while crossing an intersection in Bozeman, Montana, at night. The intersection was adjacent to a university and had high pedestrian and vehicular traffic, but lacked painted crosswalk markings, had inadequate signage, and was insufficiently illuminated due to an inoperative streetlight. The pedestrian brought suit for her injuries, alleging that the combination of these factors made the intersection unreasonably dangerous. She named the driver, the City of Bozeman, and NorthWestern Energy (owner of the streetlight) as defendants.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court previously granted summary judgment to NorthWestern Energy, finding no evidence that the plaintiff had relied on the company’s maintenance of the streetlight under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. Before trial, the District Court ruled that, because the streetlight was owned by NorthWestern Energy, evidence relating to its condition could not be introduced against the City. The court concluded that the public duty doctrine (PDD) shielded the City from liability regarding the streetlight. The jury ultimately found the driver primarily at fault and awarded damages to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff appealed, arguing that she had been wrongly prevented from introducing evidence about the inoperative streetlight.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. It held that the PDD does not categorically bar premises liability claims against governmental entities when the claim is based on the condition of city property, even if a hazard (like an inoperative streetlight) is owned by a third party. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s exclusion of streetlight evidence, holding that a jury should be permitted to consider whether the inoperative streetlight, as part of the intersection’s overall condition, contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Sara Da' v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

A woman in Great Falls, Montana, made a frantic 9-1-1 call pleading for help because her former partner had locked her out of their residence, and had “our” baby inside. The call abruptly ended, and police responding to the scene were unable to reestablish contact. Officers spoke to a neighbor who referenced a disturbance, and then encountered loud, indiscernible screaming from the involved apartment. Upon identifying themselves and requesting entry, the occupant, Phillip Friscia, responded angrily, repeatedly opening and closing the door, sometimes holding the child, and stated he had the right to defend himself from people in his house. Officers, concerned for the safety of those inside, forcibly entered the residence, apprehended Friscia, and found the woman and child unharmed.The State charged Friscia with felony threatening an officer and misdemeanor destruction of a communication device. Friscia moved to suppress evidence, arguing the entry was unlawful and not justified by exigent circumstances, and challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denied both motions, finding the police entry justified by exigent circumstances based on the totality of evidence and the statute constitutionally valid. Friscia entered an Alford plea, reserving his right to appeal these decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the appeal. It held that the District Court’s factual findings regarding exigent circumstances and probable cause were not clearly erroneous and properly supported the denial of the suppression motion. The Supreme Court further held that Montana’s statute, requiring a subjective mental state, was not facially unconstitutional or overbroad, and did not violate the First Amendment under Counterman v. Colorado. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s rulings and Friscia’s conviction. View "State v. Friscia" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury in 2011 on multiple charges related to a fatal vehicular incident and sentenced to forty years in prison. She challenged her convictions through direct appeal and postconviction proceedings in Montana state courts, arguing issues related to the confrontation of witnesses, undisclosed expert testimony, ineffective assistance of counsel, and alleged evidence suppression. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed her convictions and rejected her postconviction claims, finding no constitutional violations.After exhausting state remedies, the appellant sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court for the District of Montana granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to hire an accident reconstructionist, and ordered the state to either retry the appellant or release her. The state moved to renew proceedings in state court, at which point the appellant moved to substitute the presiding judge. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the federal district court’s grant of habeas relief and upheld the original convictions, determining there was no ineffective assistance of counsel or Brady violation.Following the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, the Fourth Judicial District Court in Missoula County reinstated the appellant’s convictions and ordered her return to custody. The Montana Supreme Court reviewed whether the District Court erred in reinstating the convictions in light of the appellant’s pending motion for judicial substitution. The Montana Supreme Court held that, because the federal habeas relief was reversed and there was no new criminal action or trial, the statutory requirements for substitution of a judge were not triggered and the appellant was not entitled to substitution. However, the Court found the appellant is entitled to respond to the State’s motion to reinstate her conviction. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Garding" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the development of a parenting plan for a minor child, following years of litigation between the parents. As part of the proceedings, both parties agreed to appoint a parenting evaluator, who was to receive all relevant mental health treatment records from the mother’s providers within ten days. Despite this stipulation, the mother's long-term counselor refused to provide updated treatment records to the evaluator, citing personal distrust, and the mother did not take steps to supplement discovery or seek a protective order. The absence of these records prevented the evaluator from obtaining current information about the mother's mental health status, which was a central issue in determining the child’s best interests.The Ninth Judicial District Court of Pondera County found that both the mother and her counselor had intentionally violated discovery rules and the court-approved stipulation by failing to produce the requested records. As a sanction, the District Court precluded the counselor from testifying about any treatment or records created after the evaluator’s report date. The court allowed testimony regarding earlier treatment but limited further testimony to address the scope of the violation, prevent prejudice, and maintain the integrity of the proceedings.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in imposing this sanction. Applying the standards for discovery sanctions under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 37, the Supreme Court found that the violation was intentional and prejudicial, and that the sanction was proportional and carefully tailored. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the exclusion of the counselor’s testimony about undisclosed treatment was proper and within the lower court’s broad discretion. View "In re Parenting of C.R.J." on Justia Law

A young child, P.P., suffered severe injuries including brain trauma, rib and femur fractures, and other physical harm between June and October 2021 while under the care of Katherine Anne Proctor, her mother. Medical personnel observed bruising and abrasions on multiple occasions, and expert analysis concluded that P.P.'s injuries were consistent with non-accidental trauma (NAT), including abusive head trauma. Medical testimony established that the injuries resulted from acceleration/deceleration forces, such as shaking, and that they could not be explained by ordinary accidents or underlying medical conditions. The timeline of injury suggested that Proctor had exclusive control of P.P. during the critical period when the most acute injury occurred.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis & Clark County presided over Proctor’s trial. The court admitted expert testimony related to NAT, denied a motion to suppress cell phone evidence acquired under a broad warrant, and allowed certain prosecutorial statements regarding Proctor’s character and internet searches. After a jury verdict finding Proctor guilty of felony assault on a minor, Proctor’s motion for a new trial was denied, and she was sentenced to twenty years in prison.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed four issues: the admissibility of expert NAT testimony, the denial of suppression of evidence from a general warrant, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court held that admitting expert testimony on NAT was proper under Montana law, which does not require general scientific acceptance for admissibility. The Court found the cell phone search warrant overbroad and unparticularized but determined the admission of related evidence was harmless error and did not contribute to the conviction. Prosecutorial comments during closing were improper but did not prejudice Proctor’s right to a fair trial. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Proctor" on Justia Law

A woman petitioned to dissolve her fifteen-year marriage, during which both parties engaged in mediation and, represented by counsel, executed a Marital and Property Distribution Agreement (MPSA). The agreement outlined the division of various assets, including retirement accounts, with both parties explicitly acknowledging receipt of financial disclosures and waiving any further disclosures or hearings. Following mediation, the petitioner retained new counsel and moved to rescind the MPSA, claiming her former attorney failed to inform her of her spouse’s retirement assets, resulting in an inequitable distribution. She asserted she was unaware of the full extent of assets at the time of signing and that the agreement was unconscionable.The Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, denied the petitioner’s motion to rescind, citing the MPSA’s explicit language showing she was aware of, and agreed to, the asset division. Subsequently, the petitioner executed a joint affidavit affirming the agreement as fair and equitable and requesting its incorporation into the final decree. The court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree of Dissolution accordingly. Over four months later, the petitioner filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) seeking relief from the judgment, again alleging her former counsel’s gross neglect deprived her of a fair settlement. The District Court did not rule on this motion, resulting in a deemed denial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered only the timely appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The court held that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was improper because the motion merely sought to relitigate issues previously resolved and did not present extraordinary circumstances or blamelessness by the movant. Additionally, the petitioner affirmed the fairness of the agreement post-judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial. View "In re Marriage of DeCock" on Justia Law

This case centers on a dispute over property rights in a 38.2-acre tract in Flathead County, Montana. In 1992, the original owners leased part of the land to a tenant under a long-term, non-residential lease, which included an option to purchase the leased premises or, if legal restrictions prevented subdivision, to obtain an undivided tenancy-in-common interest in the larger tract. The lease was amended several times, and by 2018, Adam and Amber Britt acquired the leasehold interest through a transaction formalized in a Second Lease Amendment. The Amendment contained language stating “Paragraph 5. ‘Option to purchase’ is hereby removed,” but also referenced that the Britts had “paid in full” for their interest. In 2020, George and Irene Tuma purchased the parent tract, believing the Britts held only a leasehold interest, and later initiated litigation over property rights and use.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, addressed whether the 2018 Second Lease Amendment eliminated only the option to purchase the leased premises outright or also extinguished the tenancy-in-common purchase option. The court found the amendment ambiguous and allowed extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. After reviewing declarations and testimony from the parties and drafting attorney, the court concluded that the Britts retained a vested right to acquire an undivided tenancy-in-common interest in the parent tract with exclusive use of their leasehold, and ordered the Tumas to convey a 27.5% interest to the Britts. The court rejected the Tumas’ argument that the parol evidence rule barred such evidence, finding no genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the Second Lease Amendment is ambiguous, that extrinsic evidence was properly considered to determine intent, and that the Britts have a vested tenancy-in-common interest in the property as outlined in the original lease. View "Tuma v. Britt" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple felony charges related to sexual abuse, including three counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault, based on allegations by a minor, I.A., that he had abused her using a game called "Truth or Dare." His defense asserted that I.A. fabricated the allegations by accusing him of the same conduct that another man, Cody Hill, had perpetrated against her two weeks earlier. The defendant argued that I.A. disliked him for providing drugs to her mother and sought to protect her mother by removing him from her life. Expert testimony was presented during the trial regarding victim selection and the increased likelihood of revictimization for children previously abused.After the initial conviction in the District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, Ravalli County, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana. The Supreme Court previously reversed the conviction in State v. Twardoski, 2021 MT 179, finding that the defendant was wrongly barred from presenting evidence about I.A.’s prior abuse by another person, violating his right to confront his accuser and present a complete defense. The case was remanded for a new trial before a different judge. At retrial, the sexual abuse of children charge was dropped, but the defendant was again convicted of the remaining charges. He received concurrent 50-year sentences with no time suspended and a 25-year parole restriction.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant raised two issues: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to statistical expert testimony, and whether the more severe sentence imposed after retrial violated his right to due process. The Supreme Court declined to review the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, finding plausible tactical reasons for counsel’s lack of objection. The Court held that the increased sentence was not the result of judicial vindictiveness, as there were legitimate, nonvindictive reasons for the parole restriction. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "State v. Twardoski" on Justia Law

The case involved a dispute over a residential property in Trego, Montana, formerly owned by Florence Tosch. Tosch had divorced her husband Jack McCafferty and, per their decree, was given the right to occupy the property, with the agreement that it would be sold and proceeds divided. Tosch rented the home to Edward and Catherine Kahle under a one-year lease in 2017, which converted to a month-to-month tenancy. After Tosch’s death in 2021, her estate, managed by her daughter Korrie, sought to sell the property. The Kahles remained as tenants and, when faced with eviction proceedings, produced a purported 2019 lease with an option to purchase, allegedly signed by Tosch.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court in Lincoln County held an evidentiary hearing and found that the 2019 lease/option was a forgery. Expert testimony showed the document was not authentic, and the court found the Kahles’ explanations unconvincing while crediting testimony from the estate’s representatives. The court concluded that the Kahles had engaged in actual fraud and slander of title by recording a subsequent document with Jack’s signature to cloud the estate’s title. The court granted possession to the estate, awarded damages for lost opportunity and costs, and found the estate properly followed Montana’s landlord-tenant statutes in handling the Kahles’ abandoned property. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the estate.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the estate proved by clear and convincing evidence the Kahles committed actual fraud under Montana law by forging the lease/option and slandering the estate’s title. The Court found the estate acted lawfully under the Montana Residential Landlord Tenant Act, the damages determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the award of attorney’s fees was proper and not an abuse of discretion. The judgment was affirmed. View "Estate of Tosch v. Kahle" on Justia Law

Dennis and Jeannette Burton own property along the Flathead River near Kalispell, Montana. Their land contains a pond, historically a “scour feature” of the river, which has existed for decades and was enhanced by a man-made channel connecting it to the river, likely predating their ownership. The property frequently experiences flooding in a pole barn during high river flows. In 2024, the Burtons applied to the Flathead Conservation District (FCD) for a permit under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act to dredge the pond and channel and to use the dredged material to build a berm to protect the pole barn from flooding.The FCD conducted a site visit and, based on findings that the project could cause erosion, alter river flows, and have negative impacts on aquatic habitat, denied the permit. The FCD reasoned that the project conflicted with its rules, which discourage or prohibit dredging connected artificial or in-stream ponds. The Burtons sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, arguing that the FCD’s decision was unsupported and that its rules did not apply to their project. The District Court upheld the FCD’s denial, finding the FCD had jurisdiction because the pond and channel were connected to the river and that the project fit the definition of a regulated off-stream pond. The court also concluded that the FCD’s consideration of prior applications for the property was not improper.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the FCD had jurisdiction, that its rules applied to the project, and that there were sufficient legal grounds for the permit denial. The Court further concluded that any deficiencies in the FCD’s explanation were harmless given the record support for the decision. View "Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist." on Justia Law