Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in November, 2014
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On May 4, 2010, Defendant was arrested and cited with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), driving while license suspended, and traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. On September 18, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the six-month limit of Mont. Code Ann. 46-13-401(2) had not been violated because most of the delay was attributable to Defendant. After a trial at which Defendant failed to appear, the justice court found Defendant guilty of DUI per se and driving the wrong direction on a one-way street. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court affirmed, concluding that Defendant had disengaged from the process, and therefore, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly refused to reverse the justice court’s decision, as Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "State v. Hodge" on Justia Law

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The State charged Appellant, a forty-year-old developmentally disabled man, with three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent and one count of felony sexual assault. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault, and the district court accepted the plea. The district court subsequently sentenced Appellant to forty years imprisonment. Nearly one year after issuance of an amended judgment, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court concluded that Appellant’s motion was timely brought but refused to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, finding it had been entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s motion to withdraw plea was not time-barred; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that Appellant’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. View "State v. Garner" on Justia Law

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Section 11-41-2 of the Helena City Code (the Ordinance) places limitations on roofing materials used on structures located within the wildland-urban interface (WUI) district. The City filed suit against homeowners whose property was situated within the WUI zoning district (Homeowners), alleging violation of the Ordinance. Homeowners answered the complaint and petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was invalid on statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court granted summary judgment for Homeowners, concluding that the Ordinance was a building regulation, and the City was not authorized to adopt building regulations under the guise of a zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by determining that the Ordinance was an impermissible building code and not a zoning ordinance; (2) erred by concluding that Homeowners were ineligible for an award of attorney fees; and (3) did not err by denying and dismissing Homeowners' constitutional arguments. View "City of Helena v. Svee" on Justia Law

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After Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle owned by Defendant, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, claiming negligence. Plaintiff alleged that the accident had caused a traumatic brain injury and prevented her from securing employment. Plaintiff sought $3,000,000 in damages. A jury awarded $65,000 to Plaintiff. Defendant filed a bill of costs within five business days of the verdict, but the district court rejected the bill, concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-501 required a bill of costs to be filed within five calendar days. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Plaintiff’s prior trauma and depression; (2) did not err by failing to dismiss two jurors Plaintiff challenged for cause; and (3) did not err by denying Defendant’s bill of costs as untimely under section 25-10-501. View "Peterson-Tuell v. First Student Transp., LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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After the City decided to undertake road improvements along South Avenue in Missoula, Montana, Plaintiffs, a group of landowners who owned property along South Avenue, contested the City’s assessment of the width of the right-of-way on a section of the street. The district court concluded that the City’s actions constituted a taking. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a redetermination of damages. Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing asking the Court to award both attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition. On remand, Plaintiffs agreed to reduce their “taken property” value and asked the district court to assess both attorney’s fees and costs against the City for the appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal and awarded them appellate attorney’s fees and costs. The City appealed, arguing that the Court’s refusal to award fees in its order on rehearing constituted “law of the case.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs had a constitutional right to be made whole through an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

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The State filed a petition for the involuntary commitment of S.M., who suffers from bipolar disorder. After a hearing, the district court concluded that S.M.’s condition required commitment because she was substantially unable to care for her own health and safety and because her condition would predictably deteriorate to the point that she would become a danger to herself if she did not receive treatment. The court then ordered S.M. committed to the Montana State Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that S.M. was, at the time of the hearings, unable to provide for her basic needs, including her health and safety; and (2) did not err in concluding that, under the circumstances of this case, the Montana State Hospital was the least restrictive alternative for S.M.’s treatment. View "In re S.M." on Justia Law

Posted in: Health Law
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In 2003, a child (Child) was born to Tracy Cumber. Steven Higgins was found to be the birth father and was designated the primary residential parent. Steven subsequently married Karen Higgins. Steven died in 2009. Tracy was subsequently granted primary residential custody of the Child, and the Child started living with Tracy and her husband, Randy Cumber. In 2011, Randy adopted the Child. In the meantime, Karen filed a petition requesting visitation with the Child. The district court granted the petition, and the Cumbers appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not apply the correct analysis when it determined that visitation was in the best interests of the Child. View "Higgins v. Cumber" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Matthew Tubaugh, a police officer with the City of Livingston, was discharged from the police force after a series of incidents. Tubaugh protested his discharge pursuant to his rights under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then in effect between the City and the Montana Public Employees Association. An arbitrator determined that there was just cause to discipline Tubaugh but that the proper disciplinary action was a three-month suspension without pay. The district court vacated the arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award, holding that the district court (1) incorrectly determined that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in her interpretation of the CBA; (2) erred in holding that the arbitrator violated public policy by requiring the City to reinstate Tubaugh to his previous position or to one of comparable pay; (3) erred by determining that the arbitrator’s award should be vacated because of its findings related to a fitness for duty examination; and (4) erred by holding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by directing removal of the fitness for duty examination from Tubaugh’s personnel file. View "Livingston v. Mont. Pub. Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law

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Defendant pled guilty to criminal endangerment, driving under the influence, and being a habitual traffic offender operating a motor vehicle. The district court sentenced Defendant to a three-year suspended sentence, a fine, and participation in Adult Impaired Driving Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s felony criminal endangerment charge did not qualify as an exception to the prior felony conviction rule, and therefore, Defendant did not qualify for a deferred sentence; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the original plea agreement that recommended a three-year deferred sentence because he had a prior felony conviction that was not discovered until after the plea agreement was executed. View "State v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was charged with aggravated assault or, in the alternative, criminal endangerment. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence, arguing that the State had not met its burden of proving that Defendant was not justified in his use of force. The district court denied the motion. A jury found Defendant guilty of criminal endangerment and not guilty of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant was not justified in his use of force, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury an “aggressor” instruction pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-3-105(2)(a). View "State v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law