Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in October, 2014
by
The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda’s sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot. View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

by
In 2012, L.S.P. filed a petition in Flathead County seeking appointment as the guardian and conservator of her father, H.O., who was a resident of Flathead County at the time of the petition. H.O. subsequently moved to an assisted living facility in Missoula County. The district court appointed L.S.P. and her brother, J.O., temporary guardians and conservators of H.O. In 2014, L.S.P. filed a motion to transfer venue to Missoula County. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order transferring venue to Missoula County was a final order and was reviewable by the Court; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that venue be transferred to Missoula County. View "In re Guardianship of H.O." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
by
In 2012, Defendant pleaded guilty to bad check and bail jumping charges. The State thereafter charged Defendant with two new offenses of bail jumping for failing to appear at two sentencing proceedings in 2010 and 2011. Defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, alleging that they constituted vindictive prosecution. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the subsequent bail jumping offenses, which had been discussed in prior plea negotiations, fell within the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Defendant pled guilty to the new bail jumping charges but reserved his right to appeal the vindictive prosecution issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no support for a finding of vindictive prosecution. View "State v. Ridge" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
In 2007, Plaintiff was convicted of several sex-related crimes. In 2008, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se claim against Defendant, the attorney who defended him during his criminal trial, claiming that Defendant failed to meet the appropriate standard of care for legal representation by failing to secure certain testimony at trial. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claim was time barred by Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-206. View "Passmore v. Watson" on Justia Law

by
After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual assault. Appellant moved that the district court sentence him to the misdemeanor penalty of a first conviction of sexual assault under Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-502(2)(a) rather than the felony penalty in section 45-5-502(3). The district court granted the motion, concluding that the misdemeanor penalty provided by section 45-5-502(2)(a) was the maximum sentence that could be imposed. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts found by the jury constituted felony sexual assault under section 45-5-502(3), and therefore, the district court may proceed to sentencing under that provision. View "State v. Ghostbear" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Plaintiff, who operated a nail salon, used a liquid acrylic nail product repackaged and distributed by Premium Nail Concepts, Inc. (PNC). After Plaintiff was diagnosed with a sensitization to ethyl methacrylate, a chemical ingredient contained in the PNC nail product Plaintiff used, Plaintiff filed a products liability claim against PNC. The jury ruled in favor of PNC, determining that PNC’s nail product was not in a defective condition because of a manufacturing defect, design defect, or inadequate warning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in (1) allowing PNC to present expert testimony that its product was “safe as used” when skin contact is avoided; (2) denying Plaintiff the right to cross-examine the expert witness who proffered this evidence; (3) instructing the jury on the meaning of “safe as used”; and (4) refusing to instruct the jury that skin contact with the PNC product is common in the nail industry. View "Kenser v. Premium Nail Concepts, Inc." on Justia Law

by
After a jury trial, Carri Robertson and Joseph Robertson were found guilty of criminal trespass and theft. The Supreme Court affirmed the theft convictions, vacated the trespass convictions, and remanded the written judgments to the district court for amendment, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict the Robertsons of theft, but there was insufficient evidence to support the trespass convictions; (2) the Robertsons’ failure to preserve certain issues with a timely objection at trial was fatal to their claims; and (3) the written judgments did not conform to the oral pronouncement of sentences. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Appellant petitioned for release of certain documents under the Right to Know provision of Mont. Const. art. II, 9 from the Cascade County Attorney relating to the termination of a county detention officer, Jason Carroll. The district court granted summary judgment against Appellant. Appellant moved for reconsideration in light of the recently decided Schoof v. Nesbit. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant's situation was distinguishable from Schoof because Appellant, who was neither a resident nor subject to the jurisdiction of Cascade County, lacked standing to request the documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Article II, Section 9 grants a right to judicial relief to a Montana citizen alleging denial of access to a document of a Montana public body; and (2) as a Montana citizen, Appellant had standing to bring his claim. View "Shockley v. Cascade County" on Justia Law

by
After Senate Bill 140 was enacted in 2011, Billings Yellow Cab, LLC applied to the Public Service Commission (PSC) for issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity (PCN certificate) as a grandfathered entity. The PSC denied the application. Yellow Cab subsequently filed a second application for a PCN certificate as a Class B carrier. After a hearing, the PSC issued a final order denying the application, concluding that Yellow Cab failed to demonstrate that public convenience and necessity required authorization of the proposed service. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) concluding that Yellow Cab’s claims that the PSC’s denial of a PCN certificate constituted an unconstitutional taking and violated equal protection were procedurally barred; (2) affirming the PSC’s denial of Yellow Cab’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity; and (3) affirming the PSC’s exclusion of Yellow Cab’s Exhibit 2. View "Billings Yellow Cab, LLC v. State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

by
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Defendant appealed, arguing that the municipal court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigative stop. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the ordinances of the City of Missoula that impose a $500 fine for refusing to give a breath sample were invalid and that the arresting officer unlawfully administered a breath test despite her initial refusal. The district court affirmed the decision of the municipal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Missoula has authority to enact ordinances creating a misdemeanor penalty for the refusal to submit to a requested breath test; (2) the arresting officer did not violate statutory procedures by administering a post-arrest breath test with Defendant’s consent; and (3) the Missoula ordinances criminalizing the refusal to submit to a breath test do not unconstitutionally impair Defendant’s freedom of speech. View "City of Missoula v. Armitage" on Justia Law