Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas Madsen, a sheriff's deputy, was charged with mistreating prisoners pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-204 for his behavior toward K.J., a female juvenile who was brought to the county law and justice center at the request of her parents for assistance in getting her transported to residential treatment. Madsen moved to dismiss the charge, contending that K.J. was not a prisoner under section 45-5-204. The district court agreed and dismissed the charge against Madsen because K.J. was a juvenile, had not been convicted of an offense, and was not being held in a State facility. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that, under the circumstances, K.J. was a prisoner under section 45-5-204(1), and the charging information filed in this case was adequate to state an offense. View "State v. Madsen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of omitting material facts relating to his offer and sale of a security. Defendant appealed, arguing that the multiple charges statute, Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410, precluded his convictions on two of the three counts with which he was charged. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment as to two of Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the State's assertion that "each count had a different element" was incorrect, as each count had the same statutory element, and the offenses arose from the same transaction; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion under section 46-11-410. Remanded. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

After Father's four children were removed from his care, the district court terminated Father's parental rights to the children, concluding that Father failed to complete several tasks in his treatment plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father failed to preserve for review the issue of his treatment plan's appropriateness when he did not timely object to the plan; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father's parental rights without also terminating Mother's parental rights; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the children's best interest. View "In re T.S." on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-6-218 grants tax exemption to intangible personal property and defines intangible personal property. The statute lists "goodwill" as the one non-exhaustive example of intangible property that lacks physical existence. The Department of Revenue implements the statute with Mont. Admin. R. 42.22.110. In 2010, the Department amended its definitions of intangible personal property and goodwill. The district court found that the new definitions of intangibles and goodwill imposed additional and contradictory requirements on state law and that the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported the Department's new rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Department's regulation defining goodwill was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(b); (2) the Department's regulation defining intangible personal property was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(a); and (3) the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported its new rules. View "Gold Creek Cellular of Mont. Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Revenue " on Justia Law

Keith Davies was run over by a tractor-trailer driven by Paul Tychsen, who worked for Dick Irvin, Inc. Davies, who worked for Great Falls Sand and Gravel (GFSG), was directing traffic when the truck struck him. The incident occurred during a project to construct a Flying J Travel Plaza. GFSG subcontracted for the road work and submitted a traffic control plan to the State, which approved of the plan. Davies filed a negligence action against Irvin. Irvin filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution from the State, alleging that the State negligently approved the traffic control plan. Irvin subsequently settled Davies' claims. In regard to Irvin's third-party claims against the State, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State did not owe any duty to Irvin or Davies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State had no statutory or common law duty to Irvin or Davies. View "Dick Irvin, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) Defendant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to evidence at trial; (3) the State did not violate Defendant's right to due process by using Defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings against him at trial, as the issue was raised during cross-examination of Defendant and focused on Defendant's alibi; and (4) Defendant failed to establish that his conviction should be reversed based upon cumulative error, as there was no error in his conviction. View "State v. Morsette" on Justia Law

In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of incest. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, and the sentencing court required that Petitioner register as a sexual offender. In 2012, Petitioner filed a petition requesting relief from his requirement to register as a sexual offender, filed pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-23-506(3)(b). After a hearing, the district court concluded that Petitioner failed to establish the statutory requirements necessary to be relieved from the requirements of registration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court exercised proper discretion in denying Petitioner's petition, as (1) the court correctly interpreted section 46-23-506(3)(b); and (2) the petition was not well founded. View "Langford v. State" on Justia Law

Dorothy Gopher, an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe, died intestate in 2008. Dorothy was survived by seven children (the siblings), and her estate consisted only of a ceremonial tribal flag. One of the siblings, filed an application for informal probate in the district court. As proceedings commenced in district court, several siblings filed a petition before the Blackfeet tribal court to name two other siblings as personal representatives in their parents' estates. The two siblings then filed consecutive motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in district court. The district court continued its proceedings and denied the motions to dismiss. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the estate to transfer the flag to co-trustees of a constructive trust on the estate. Meanwhile, the Blackfeet tribal court declined to assert jurisdiction over the estate property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it assumed jurisdiction over the probate of the estate. View "In re Estate of Gopher" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent before Judge Lympus. At sentencing, Judge Lympus imposed a forty-year sentence with twenty suspended, as requested by the State pursuant to the plea agreement, and also imposed a ten-year restriction on eligibility for parole among other requirements. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing (1) his sentence was unfair because the judge used personal feelings against him and did not adequately explain his reasons for imposing the ten-year parole restriction, and (2) his defense counsel was ineffective. The district court dismissed the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court, holding (1) Defendant's challenges the legality of his sentence were procedurally barred; and (2) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "Fletcher v. State" on Justia Law

After John Irvine died, the proceeds from three of his investment accounts were paid to his estate. John's mother, Va Va, sought a declaratory judgment that she was the sole beneficiary of all three accounts. John's stepson, Michael, opposed the action. Both Va Va and Michael filed summary judgment motions. Va Va argued that John intended to benefit his estate under the laws of intestacy, not under the terms of his 1983 will, which included Michael as a beneficiary, and that John intended for her to be the contingent beneficiary for all three accounts. To support her contention, Va Va offered testimony from John's financial planner, who testified that he erroneously believed that John did not have a will when he executed beneficiary designation forms for a number of accounts. Va Va argued that the written contracts should be reformed for mutual mistake. The district court concluded that Michael was entitled to summary judgment under the contract terms and that no legal basis existed to require reformation of the contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) the contracts could not be reformed; and (2) proceeds from John's investment accounts were properly paid to his estate. View "Estate of Irvine v. Oaas" on Justia Law