Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was a patron at the Crystal Bar when she was hit on the head by Jason Howard, a friend of the bouncer, causing him to fall and strike his head. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Crystal Bar, alleging, among other claims, negligence and liquor shop liability, or a "dram shop" claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the Crystal Bar on Plaintiff's negligence and dram shop claim, holding (1) there was no interaction between Plaintiff and Howard that should have alerted Crystal Bar employees that Howard posed any danger to plaintiff, and (2) it was uncontested that Howard was not intoxicated and had not been served at the Crystal Bar. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Crystal Bar on Plaintiff's dram shop claim, as there was no evidence Howard was served alcohol by the Crystal Bar prior to the altercation; but (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claims, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the Crystal Bar had knowledge of the conflict between Plaintiff and Howard and whether Crystal Bar satisfied its duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. Remanded. View "Harrington v. Crystal Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

Wife sustained injuries as a result of Husband's negligent driving. Wife and Husband (Plaintiffs) sought coverage from Insurer, which denied coverage due to a family member exclusion in the umbrella police Husband held with Insurer. The district court concluded that the exclusion was unconscionable and entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Insurer, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that the family member exclusion unconscionably favored State Farm, and the district court erred in so concluding; (2) the exclusion did not contravene and express statute, undermine the made-whole doctrine, or violate public policy in any other way; and (3) the policy unambiguously excluded Wife's claim from coverage, and the family member exclusion did not violate Plaintiffs' reasonable expectations. View "Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Employee contracted an occupational disease arising out of her employment with Employer. In 2006, Employee began seeking medical treatment. Employee received treatment periodically until 2011 when her doctor informed her that she had an occupational disease. Employee subsequently initiated a workers' compensation claim. Montana State Fund denied Employee's claim, asserting that the claim was not timely filed under the twelve-month statute of limitations. Employee appealed. The Workers' Compensation Court granted summary judgment for State Fund, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Employee knew or should have known that she was suffering from occupational disease as early as 2006. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a material question of fact existed as to when Employee should have known she was suffering from an occupational disease. Remanded for a trial to determine when Employee knew or should have known she was suffering from an occupational disease. View "Dvorak v. State Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dorothy Harris and Tedeen Holbert were injured in separate automobile accidents caused by third-party tortfeasors. Plaintiffs were treated at Billings Clinic and St. Vincent Healthcare (Providers) for their injuries. Both Harris and Holbert were members of health plans administered by Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), which entered into a preferred provider agreement (PPA) with the Providers pursuant to which Providers accepted payment from BCBS at a discounted reimbursement rate for certain medical services for BCBS insureds. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Billings Clinic, asserting breach of contract and constructive fraud claims and requesting compensatory damages equal to the difference between the amount the third-party insurers paid to the Providers and the reduced reimbursement rates under the PPA with BCBS. Harris also filed similar claims against St. Vincent Healthcare. The district courts dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the Providers were entitled to collect from third-party insurers payment for the full amount of the billed charges for the medical treatment provided to Plaintiffs. View "Harris v. St Vincent Healthcare" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony DUI offenses and associated offenses, including two misdemeanor offenses. After Defendant began serving his period of probation, the State filed a petition to revoke Defendant's probation based upon his violation of certain conditions of probation. The district court issued a bench warrant for Defendant's arrest, but Defendant had absconded from supervision. Eight years later, the State petitioned the district court to quash the original arrest warrant and to issue a new warrant for Defendant's arrest. Defendant was subsequently arrested and sentenced. Defendant appealed, arguing that the eight-year delay between the initial arrest warrant and his actual arrest violated his right to due process. The Supreme Court remanded for resentencing, as the district court may have imposed a longer period of imprisonment than allowed. View "State v. Sullivant" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute and was appointed counsel. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of criminal possession with intent to distribute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court's pre-trial inquiry into Defendant's complaint about his counsel was adequate, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to further consider Defendant's complaints in a hearing; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (3) the case was remanded so that the district court may conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement of sentence, which conditioned any assessment of fees upon Defendant's future ability to obtain work if released on parole. View "State v. Hammer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony DUI and driving without a valid driver's license. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate his convictions primarily on the grounds that he had not received a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of his arrest. The district court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived his right to complain that nineteen days was an unreasonable time for the State to initiate filing charges in the district court by failing to object or file a motion to dismiss before his trial. View "State v. Haller" on Justia Law

After Edwin and Linda divorced, Linda obtained a New Jersey judgment ordering Edwin to pay $695,477 in unpaid alimony, unpaid child support, medical expenses, and attorney fees and costs. Linda subsequently filed a motion seeking to satisfy the New Jersey judgment with Edwin's interest in a Nevada limited liability corporation (BMR) licensed to do business in Montana and with assets in Montana. A writ of execution was issued against Edwin, and thereafter, the district court issued a charging order and an order for the appointment of a receiver, for foreclosure of the lien, and for the sale of BMR's property. Edwin subsequently filed a motion for relief from the charging order and order for the appointment of the receiver foreclosure of the lien, which the district court denied after concluding that Edwin's arguments were waived because he had foregone earlier opportunities to challenge the two orders on the bases he asserted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine to deny Edwin's motion; and (2) because Edwin's appeal was vexatious and filed for the purposes of delay, costs and fees assessed should be solely levied against Edwin. Remanded. View "Jonas v. Jonas" on Justia Law

Mother was the biological parent of four children, including J.W. Before J.W. was born, a Colorado court terminated Mother's rights to two of her children. After Mother gave birth to J.W. and J.W. was removed from Mother's custody, a Montana district court found it was in the best interests of J.W. to terminate Mother's parental rights. The district court reasoned that reunification efforts were unnecessary because Mother had her parental rights to her other children terminated, and the circumstances related to those terminations were "identical" to mother's unfit parenting of J.W. Mother appealed, arguing that her previously unfit parenting in Colorado should not provide a basis for terminating her parental rights to J.W. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by failing to conduct a permanency plan hearing; and (2) did not err by concluding that the circumstances surrounding Mother's prior terminations in Colorado were relevant to her parenting of J.W. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to forty years imprisonment. The district court imposed a restitution obligation of $1,583 with an ongoing obligation to the extent the victim required additional or ongoing treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's for-cause challenge of a prospective juror; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a forensic interviewer's opinion testimony; (3) the district court properly admitted the victim's prior consistent statements; and (4) the district court erred in imposing a restitution obligation that was not for a "specified amount." Remanded to the district court to set a specified amount for restitution for future costs. View "State v. Champagne" on Justia Law