Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and her minor daughter were injured when their vehicle was involved in a collision with a pickup truck driven by Michael Morris, Jr. (Son), a Glacier County resident. The pickup truck was owned by Michael Morris, Sr. (Father), a Teton County resident. The collision occurred in Teton County but Plaintiff's vehicle was propelled across the county line and came to rest in Cascade County. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Cascade County against both men, claiming Son was negligent in his operation of the vehicle and Father negligently entrusted Son with the pickup truck. Son moved to change the venue to either Glacier or Teton county. The district court granted the motion and moved the proceeding to Glacier County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Cascade County was an improper place for trial, as the tort was not committed in Cascade County and Defendants lived in Teton and Glacier counties. View "Yeager v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of landowners who owned properties abutting South Avenue in the City of Missoula. This lawsuit arose out of dispute between Plaintiffs and the City concerning the width of a public right-of-way constituting South Avenue. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the right-of-way was sixty feet wide. Because the City's recent improvements to South Avenue extended beyond this sixty-foot parameter, the district court concluded that the City had effected a taking of property and awarded Plaintiffs compensation for the taking as well as their requested costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all but two issues, holding that the district court (1) applied an incorrect measure of compensation; and (2) erroneously barred Plaintiffs' counsel from passing on to his clients the costs and fees incurred in proving underlying litigation expenses other than attorney's fees. Remanded. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a gun fight between Defendant and Michael Peters. Defendant was convicted of attempted deliberate homicide with a weapon. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial upon finding that prosecutorial comments regarding Defendant's post-Miranda silence constituted plain error. After the Court remanded the case, the district court held several pre-trial hearings and ruled on various motions. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for negligent destruction of exculpatory evidence; and (2) did not err in limiting Defendant's cross-examination of a State's witness. View "State v. Wagner" on Justia Law

A peace officer stopped a vehicle Defendant was driving due to the vehicle's excessive speed and a report of drug trafficking. During the stop, the officer had Defendant exit the vehicle so the officer could detect whether the odor of marijuana was present. A large quantity of marijuana was ultimately discovered in the vehicle. The State charged Defendant with felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Defendant unsuccessfully filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer had unlawfully extended the scope of the stop by requiring Defendant to exit the vehicle. Defendant pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress, as the officer's requirement that Defendant exit the vehicle during the traffic stop did not violate Defendant's constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. View "State v. Roy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide and solicitation to tamper with physical evidence. The convictions were based on an incident in which a three-year-old died after Defendant shoved her into a wall. For the deliberate homicide conviction, the district court sentenced Defendant to one hundred years incarceration with a twenty-five year parole restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly concluded that assault on a minor is a forcible felony under the deliberate homicide statute; and (2) properly denied Defendant's motion in limine to exclude from evidence a portion of the police's videotaped interrogation of Defendant. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Appellant owned 5,400 contiguous acres of mostly undeveloped farmland in Chouteu County. Appellant filed a claim seeking declaratory relief regarding whether the entire length of a road that ran through Appellant's property, Lippard Road, constituted a public roadway. The district court determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constituted a public roadway. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly viewed the record as a whole, pursuant to the principles of Reid v. Park, to determine whether the County had established a public road; and (2) the district court properly determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constitutes a public roadway. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

Bostwick Properties (Bostwick) sought a water use permit from the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), which was denied. The district court (1) agreed with DNRC that Bostwick failed to prove no net depletion of surface water and lack of adverse effect, and therefore Bostwick was required to mitigate its water usage in order to receive a water use permit; (2) determined that Bostwick had submitted an adequate mitigation proposal, and therefore, ruled that DNRC improperly had denied Bostwick's permit application; and (3) determined that DNRC exhibited bias toward BNRC, but any bias did not prejudice Bostwick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DNRC and the district court properly required Bostwick to mitigate its water usage; (2) the district court properly determined Bostwick's mitigation proposal was adequate as a matter of law; and (3) DNRC bias did not substantially prejudice Bostwick. View "Bostwick Props., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating the Privacy in Communications statute by using obscene, lewd, and profane language. The charges arose from an incident in which Defendant called an employee of the county Victim Assistance Program a "fucking cunt" over the telephone. Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge. Defendant appealed and filed a motion to dismiss in the district court. The district court denied the motion, finding (1) Defendant's utterance constituted unprotected speech in the form of "fighting words," and (2) the Privacy in Communications statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's conclusion that Defendant's speech constituted "fighting words," as the interaction was not face-to-face or in a circumstance likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace; and (2) struck the prima facie portion of the Privacy in Communications statute as unconstitutionally overbroad. Remanded to the district court to allow Defendant to withdraw his nolo contendere plea and proceed to trial. View "State v. Dugan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and partner/family member assault. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his due process rights were violated when a portion of the trial was not recorded during the State's case in chief and effective appellate review was now unavailable, and (2) the district court erred by admitting evidence of his prior assault on the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the record was of sufficient completeness to afford effective appellate review, Defendant's right to due process was not compromised by the failure to record a portion of the State's case in chief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this was an appropriate case for introduction of evidence of a previous assault on the issue of consent and that the relevance of the evidence was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. View "State v. Caswell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two misdemeanor sexual assaults following pleas of guilty to both offenses. In sentencing Defendant, the municipal court imposed a condition of probation that required Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation and to follow through with a minimum of six months of therapy unless sooner released by a counselor or therapist. The district court upheld the requirement that Defendant undergo a psychosexual evaluation and receive counseling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court (1) acted within its authority by requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation as a condition of probation; and (2) imposed a releasable condition of probation by requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation following his conviction. View "City v. Cantu" on Justia Law