Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked as the manager of Defendant's automotive services and repair facility for more than one year. During his tenure, Plaintiff worked 819 hours in overtime but did not receive overtime pay under his employment contract. After Plaintiff resigned his employment, he filed a claim for overtime pay with the Department of Labor and Industry. The Department denied the claim. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by concluding that Defendant did not waive its argument that Plaintiff was exempt from overtime pay as a "salesman" under 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(10); and (2) did not err by concluding that Plaintiff was not entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Montana Wage Protection Act. View "Thompson v. J.C. Billion, Inc." on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with felony driving under the influence of alcohol and careless driving. The State filed notice that it intended to seek persistent felony offender status for Defendant due to Defendant's previous conviction for felony DUI. Defendant's attorney objected to the proposed designation, and the district court denied the objection. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the felony DUI charge. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted on the careless driving charge. The district court sentenced Defendant to ten years in prison as a persistent felony offender based on the felony DUI and to thirty days in jail on the careless driving conviction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the sentence for felony DUI as a persistent felony offender, holding that the sentence was lawful; but (2) reversed the jail time sentence for the careless driving conviction and remanded with instructions to strike the jail time because the district court exceeded its authority when it imposed the sentence. View "State v. Kime" on Justia Law

Tamara Lucas and her husband James brought a legal malpractice claim against attorney Mat Stevenson after they hired Stevenson to defend James against criminal charges and to represent them in a civil suit against the city police department, the city, and individual police officers that arrested James for disturbing the peace and felony assault on a peace officer. However, Stevenson later learned that the Lucases had previously filed for bankruptcy. The civil suit was determined to an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and Stevenson was reassigned to pursue the case on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. After a settlement agreement was reached, the Lucases brought this action against Stevenson. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stevenson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined (1) the Lucases' civil claims were properly determined to be an asset of the bankruptcy estate; and (2) Stevenson did not represent the Lucases at the time the claims were settled, and therefore, the Lucases had no standing to bring a legal malpractice claim against him. View "Lucas v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

Without entering a plea bargain agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to a felony DUI charge and admitted he violated the terms of the suspended sentence he was serving for a previous DUI conviction. The district court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and revoked Defendant's sentence. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the proceedings because his court-appointed attorney allegedly told him "just prior to sentencing" that the State had made a more favorable plea offer before he changed his plea to guilty that would have resulted in a shorter sentence. The district court dismissed Defendant's petition for failing to provide factual support for his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing Defendant's postconviction relief petition as insufficiently pled, as there was no record evidence of a formal plea offer or of Defendant's lawyer's failure to inform him of a plea offer, other than an insufficient affidavit submitted by Defendant. View "Kelly v. State" on Justia Law

After Mother filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Father, the parties entered a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan providing that the parties would share alternate two weeks of parenting with the minor children. Mother subsequently filed a motion to modify the parenting plan, stating that she and Father had not followed the plan due to Father's business activities and personal trips. The district court ultimately amended the prior parenting plan and granted primary custody of the children to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in determining that Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-219 did not apply in its case and did not abuse its discretion in relying on the factors listed in Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-212 when deciding the best interest of the children; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the wishes of the children, continuity of and stability of care, and other factors weighed in favor of modifying the parenting plan. View "In re Marriage of Klatt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as a correctional officer at the Montana State Prison. After a taser training was held at the DOC Center, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State, the DOC, and several fictitious defendants (collectively, Defendants), alleging that he suffered an intentional infliction of personal injury by his fellow employee when he was tased at the training. Plaintiff also raised a spoliation of evidence claim for the alleged loss or destruction of the DOC's video recording of the training session. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for Defendant's injuries; and (2) there was no independent cause of action for Defendant's spoliation of evidence claim. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law

After a justice court bench trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for partner or family member assault. The district court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the justice court jury was properly called pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-15-313; (2) the court's determination that the charging documents in this case were sufficient under the law was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) the district court correctly affirmed the decision of the justice court to reject Defendant's proposed jury instructions on disorderly conduct as a lesser-included offense, which would have allowed the jury to convict Defendant of disturbing the peace instead of partner or family member assault. View "State v. Fehringer" on Justia Law

Brandon Davis was killed when the vehicle that he was driving collided with a small bus, owned by Defendant, that was parked in the middle of the interstate. Defendant was convicted of felony criminal endangerment, failing to use a lamp on a parked vehicle, failure to display warning devices on a disabled vehicle, and failure to park as close as practicable to the edge of the shoulder, among other things. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's criminal endangerment conviction; (2) Defendant was not denied her right to be personally present at all critical stages of the trial; (3) Defendant was given effective assistance of counsel during trial; (4) the district court did not impose a greater sentence based on Defendant's refusal to admit guilt; but (5) the district court exceeded its authority when it restricted Defendant's eligibility for parole because it did not sentence Defendant to incarceration in a state prison. View "State v. Bekemans" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with violating a permanent order of protection. While incarcerated, Defendant was charged with tampering with a witness. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on both counts. Defendant's written sentence contained terms and conditions that were not expressly stated during oral pronouncement of sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming his attorney was ineffective in offering erroneous jury instructions and in failing to file a motion to conform the written sentence to the orally-pronounced sentence. The Supreme Court held that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, as (1) Defendant was not prejudiced in the giving of the disputed instructions; and (2) the cause was remanded for another sentencing hearing in which Defendant would be presented with and allowed to respond to the additional terms and conditions contained in his written sentence that were not listed by the court during the sentencing hearing. View "State v. Andress" on Justia Law