Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) signed an employment agreement with Plaintiff containing a clause to compel arbitration for any disputes regarding the employment agreement. After Plaintiff's employment was terminated, Plaintiff brought an action against BCBS claiming that BCBS violated the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). Plaintiff, however, could bring a WDEA claim only if she did not have a written contract of employment for a specific term. The district court compelled arbitration to allow the arbitrator to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiff had a term employment contract. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order to compel arbitration, holding that because the instant dispute implicated the terms or provisions of the employment agreement, the district court correctly determined that an arbitrator should decide, in the first instance, whether Plaintiff was an at-will employee or whether she had a term contract. View "Marsden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant's vehicle collided with Plaintiff's vehicle as Plaintiff was driving through an intersection. The collision damaged both vehicles and injured Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Plaintiff, alleging negligence. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendant was not negligent nor did she proximately cause the accident, as the collision would not have occurred without Plaintiff's violation of the right-of-way statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as (1) the evidence established factual issues concerning the parties' comparative negligence; and (2) the district court erred by concluding that the issue of whether Defendant was maintaining a proper lookout was not a genuine issue of material fact. View "Tonner v. Cirian" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of incest. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to law enforcement's warrantless monitoring and recording of his telephone conversations with his daughter, the victim, where (i) the recordings of Defendant's conversations with his daughter violated his rights under the Montana Constitution as interpreted by the Court in State v. Allen, but (ii) the admission of the recordings at trial was harmless error; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting sexually oriented photographs that Defendant took of his daughter. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with DUI, fourth or subsequent offense. The information provided that Defendant was previously convicted of qualifying DUI offenses in 2009, 1999, and 1992. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss due to invalidity of prior DUI convictions, challenging his 1992 DUI conviction on the basis of constitutional infirmity. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that Defendant failed to meet his burden to come forward with affirmative evidence establishing that his 1992 conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution. Defendant subsequently entered a no contest plea to the DUI charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the court correctly concluded that Defendant failed to meet his burden to persuade the court that his 1992 conviction was constitutionally infirm. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of children pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced Defendant to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for seven years, with two years suspended upon several terms and conditions. The district court later revoked Defendant's suspended sentence after an evidentiary hearing at which it found Defendant in violation of the conditions of his sentence. The court then imposed a two-year commitment to the DOC and ordered that Defendant be designated a Level 3 sexual offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by elevating Defendant's sexual offender level designation from Level 1 to Level 3 upon revocation. View "State v. Claassen" on Justia Law

This appeal was the third in the course of this litigation. Plaintiffs were a group of landowners with properties on the shores of Flathead Lake and a portion of the upper Flathead River. Plaintiffs commenced this action in 1999 against Montana Power Company (MPC) and MPC's successor, PPL Montana, LLC, asserting claims of trespass, nuisance, a taking of property, and breach of easements. In Mattson II, Plaintiffs filed motions to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The district court granted the motions as to both Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's orders concerning class certification. On remand, the district court denied Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of Mattson II to the class-certification question under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23; and (2) the six criteria for certification of a class action under Rule 23 were satisfied in this case. Remanded with instructions to certify the class. View "Mattson v. Mont. Power Co." on Justia Law

The Labairs lost their newborn baby after an early delivery by C-section. The Labairs retained Steve Carey and Carey Law Firm (Carey) to pursue their medical malpractice claim against their obstetrician. More than two and a half years later, Carey filed a complaint against the obstetrician. However, Carey failed to file an application with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP) before filing a complaint with the district court as required by statute and further failed to file an MMLP application within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims. The district court later dismissed the Labairs' medical malpractice case with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Labairs subsequently filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Casey. The district court entered summary judgment for Carey, concluding that Carey's conduct of failing to file the application with the MMLP did not cause the Labairs injury or damages because the Labairs failed to show that the underlying medical malpractice claims would have succeeded but for the error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Labairs' loss of their medical malpractice case was an injury; and (2) the damages associated with that injury remained unproven. View "Labair v. Carey " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of incest and attempted incest involving his daughter, incest and sexual intercourse without consent involving his step-daughter, and sexual intercourse without consent involving his sister-in-law. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not conduct a hearing on Defendant's posttrial allegation that some jurors slept through critical portions of the trial testimony; (2) Defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy when he was convicted of both incest and attempted incest, as the State charged and proved two separate and distinct transactions between Defendant and his daughter; and (3) the district court did not commit structural error when it failed to arraign Defendant on the amended charge of attempted sexual intercourse without consent. View "State v. Geren" on Justia Law

In 2000, Decedent executed a will that devised his estate to his niece Dana Fink and her brother, Dustin Badgett. In 2009, approximately seven weeks before his death, Decedent signed a quitclaim deed conveying substantial real property to himself and Roberta Williams, Decedent's employee, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. After Decedent's death, Fink challenged the validity of the quitclaim deed, claiming her uncle was not competent to execute the deed. After a bench trial, the district court held that the quitclaim deed was void and had no legal effect. In addition, the court denied Williams' request for reimbursement for the mortgage and tax payments she had paid on the property for the period she held the property under the deed. Williams appealed the reimbursement ruling only. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Williams' request for reimbursement of the monies she paid toward the mortgage and taxes on the subject property because Williams failed within the time allotted to present evidence in support of her request for such reimbursement. View "Fink v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by partially denying his motion in limine to exclude video footage depicting administration of the Preliminary Alcohol Screening Test (PAST) administration without sound over Defendant's objection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admission of the PAST evidence by video was prejudicial error, as (1) the video was impermissibly used as substantive evidence of Defendant's intoxication without the State satisfying the requirement of State v. Damon and Mont. R. Evid. 702 to call an expert to testify regarding the reliability and accuracy of the PAST; (2) the potential of unfair prejudice in admitting the evidence outweighed its probative value, as it prompted the inference that Defendant failed the PAST; and (3) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Lozon" on Justia Law