Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Donald and Lora Wyrick filed for dissolution of their marriage, the district court struggled to resolve a convoluted child support arrangement that festered for nearly twenty years. Donald filed a motion for modification of child support in April 2009. Donald apparently signed an affidavit for his lawyer in October 2008 in support of the motion to modify child support, but Donald's lawyer failed to file the motion until April 2009. In December 2011, the district court determined it could not modify the amount of Donald's payments back to 2008 because Donald had failed to file his motion for modification until April 2009. The court ultimately ordered that Donald pay arrearages and concluded that he continued to owe child support. However, in an earlier order, the court declared that Donald owed no future obligation of child support to Lora and that Donald had overpaid child support. The Supreme Court (1) held that the district court lacked authority to extend the modification date to any date before April 2009, but (2) remanded the case because the district court offered no new finding of fact in its latter finding to support the change from its earlier finding. View "Wyrick v. Wyrick" on Justia Law

This was Defendant's second appeal to the Supreme Court. In the prior appeal, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of felony sexual assault and remanded the case for resentencing. The district court subsequently granted Defendant's petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss the criminal charges for which the State intended to re-prosecute him on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy did not prohibit the State from re-prosecuting him after his conviction was overturned by the postconviction court's determination of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated burglary and sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant argued on appeal that his convictions should be reversed because his standby counsel had a conflict of interest, the district court erred by modifying the jury instructions regarding aggravated burglary during jury deliberations, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an independent medical expert. The State conceded reversible error on the instruction issue and requested that Defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary be vacated on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary and affirmed Defendant's conviction for sexual intercourse without consent, holding (1) Defendant's standby counsel did not have an active conflict of interest that required reversal of Defendant's sexual intercourse without consent conviction; and (2) because the record did not fully explain why an independent medical examination or expert was not ultimately obtained by Defendant's counsel, Defendant's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a medical expert could not be reviewed on appeal. View "Longjaw v. State" on Justia Law

After a five-day trial, a jury decided that Appellee Bull River Country Store Properties, LLC was not negligent in connection with Appellants' claim that it sold water-contaminated diesel fuel. Appellants appealed the district court's order denying their motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, Plaintiff could not demonstrate prejudice from Bull River's reliance on the settled-party defense authorized by 27-1-703 MCA, and therefore, the Court did not need to address the constitutionality of the statute; (2) Appellant waived his right to argue on appeal that the district court erred when it allowed Bull River to question Appellant about his unrelated insurance claims; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for a new trial based on Bull River's insurance-related arguments; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. View "Horn v. Bull River Country Store Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of Defendant Kalispell Regional Medical Center (KRMC). Defendant Northwest Healthcare Corporation (NWHC) was the parent corporation of the remaining defendant entities. This case arose out of a dispute over the discontinuation of a sick leave buy-back program. Defendants appealed the order of the district court granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that the named Plaintiffs had standing to bring claims against defendants they did not directly work for because the juridically linked Defendants were operating under a common scheme; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b). View "Chipman v. Nw. Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated a ranch with an 18,000 square-foot lodge. Defendant was a custom manufacturer of high-end wood flooring from whom Plaintiff brought wood flooring while building the lodge. After it was installed, the wood flooring began buckling and had to be replaced. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligent misrepresentation, breach of an implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose, and violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The jury returned a verdict in Defendant's favor on all of Plaintiff's claims. The district court then granted Defendant attorney fees as the prevailing party under the MCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it found good cause to amend the scheduling order to allow Defendant's late disclosure of an expert witness; and (2) did not err when it awarded Defendant attorney fees under the MCPA. View "B Bar J Ranch, LLC v. Carlisle Wide Plank Floors, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in anticipation of Revett Silver Company and RC Resources, Inc. (collectively, "Revett") seeking approval for mine-related construction under a general permit, filed this action against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) seeking a declaratory judgment that use of general permits to approve stormwater runoff from the Rock Creek Mine would violate Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.1341(4)(e) because Rock Creek is an area of "unique ecological significance" based on considerations of impacts on fishery resource and local conditions at proposed discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and declared the general permit void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEQ's approval of the use of the general permit to allow storm water discharges was arbitrary and capricious because DEQ failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in the law prior to its decision, and as a result, committed a clear error of judgment. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

After a bench trial in justice court, Defendant was convicted for DUI per se. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant moved the justice court to dismiss the charge on grounds of insufficient evidence, arguing that the margin of error in the Intoxilyzer breath test's result created reasonable doubt that Defendant's alcohol concentration had, in fact, reached the statutorily prohibited level. The district court affirmed the justice court's denial of Defendant's motion, concluding that Defendant had forfeited his right to challenge the veracity of his breath test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant had an evidentiary right to challenge the veracity of his Intoxilyzer breath test at trial, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise; but (2) the district court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction, as a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's alcohol concentration was over the statutorily proscribed limit. View "State v. Gai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application for a 119-lot subdivision, which the Board of Missoula County Commissioners denied. Plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of the Board's action and alternatively claimed that the Board's actions constituted a regulatory taking that entitled him to just compensation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all of Richard's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Plaintiff to conduct further discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment to the County on the Board's decision to deny the subdivision; and (3) the County was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's regulatory taking claim. View "Richards v. County of Missoula" on Justia Law

At issue on review in this case was whether the State Board of Land Commissioners properly issued leases to Ark Land Co., a subsidiary of Arch Coal, Inc., without first conducting environmental review under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The State Land Board did not conduct environmental review prior to entering the leases, relying on Mont. Code Ann. 77-1-121(2). The district court granted summary judgment to the State Land Board, Ark Land Co., and Arch Coal (Defendants), determining that the State retained sufficient ability to require adequate environmental protections sufficient to meet its constitutional and trust responsibilities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the leases did not allow for any degradation of the environment and specifically required full environmental review and full compliance with applicable State environmental laws, the act of issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the right to a clean and healthful environment in Mont. Const. art II, 3; and (2) therefore, section 77-1-121(2) was not subject to strict or "middle-tier" scrutiny. View "N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs" on Justia Law