Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Turner and Julie Viers opened a line of credit with Wells Fargo Bank and granted Wells Fargo a deed of trust on property they owned as security for the line of credit. Later, John Turner, Christina Turner, and Sandy Couch (the John Turners) purchased the property. Julie and James paid off the entire outstanding balance under the credit line agreement using the proceeds from the sale of the property to the John Turners, but Julie subsequently borrowed $169,090 under the credit line agreement secured by the property. Thereafter, Wells Fargo refused to release the deed of trust. The John Turners then filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the John Turners could not enforce the terms of the credit line agreement because they were not intended beneficiaries of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the John Turners were not entitled to judgment requiring Wells Fargo to release the deed of trust the bank held on the property; and (2) the John Turners failed to establish prima facie claims of promissory or equitable estoppel. View "Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

LR-123 was enacted by the Montana Legislature in 2011. It proposed a vote in the November 2012 general election on whether to provide a tax credit and potential tax refund, or outright State payment, to individuals in years in which there is a certain level of projected surplus revenue. Plaintiffs filed a complaint contending LR-123 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully delegated legislative powers. The constitutional issue in this case turned upon whether LR-123 impermissibly delegated legislative power to an employee (the legislative fiscal analyst) of one of the Legislature's committees. The district court found that LR-123 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the legislative fiscal analyst. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LR-123 was unconstitutional on its face and therefore may not appear on the ballot in November 2012. View "MEA-MFT v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Sarah Wheeldon petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Corey Wheeldon on April 20, 2009. Following a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of dissolution that dissolved the parties' marriage and divided the remaining marital estate. Corey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) based on all the evidence, the district court acted within its discretion by granting Sarah primary residential custody of the children; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the parties' marital assets and liabilities. View "In re Parenting of Wheeldon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony partner or family member assault. The district court designated Defendant a persistent felony offender and committed him to the department of corrections (DOC) for the statutory minimum period of five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the complaining witness had a history of a felony forgery charge over a decade before Defendant's trial based on the remoteness in time of the forgery charge and the substantial evidence in the record to support the assault against the witness; and (2) the district court lawfully based its sentence upon Defendant's likelihood of reoffending and the court's desire to rehabilitate him. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After Employee made allegations about a fellow employee that Employer concluded were patently false, Employee was discharged. Employee applied to the Department of Labor and Industry Unemployment Insurance Division (UID) for unemployment benefits, and the UID determined Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. Employer appealed. The Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau reversed. The Board of Labor Appeals (BOLA) reversed, concluding that Employee's conduct was a good faith error in judgment and that Employer had presented insufficient evidence that Employee acted in willful or wanton or deliberate disregard for the interests of Employer. The District Court found substantial evidence to support BOLA's determination that Employer had not shown misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because BOLA's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, it's legal conclusion that misconduct had not been shown was correct. View "Somont Oil Co. v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a judicial resolution of an LLC in which both Plaintiffs and Defendants held ownership interests. The district court ordered judicial dissolution and appointment of a receiver after finding that the managing member of the LLC, one of the defendants, had never operated the LLC in conformity with the operating agreement and had acted in a manner that was unduly prejudicial to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there were substantial undisputed facts to support the district court's order for dissolution under Mont. Code Ann. 35-8-902(1), and the district court properly applied the statute; and (2) the district court properly denied Defendants' motion to amend their answer to add counterclaims because Defendants were required to arbitrate such claims under the operating agreement. View "Gordon v. Kuzara" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order that preliminarily enjoined parts of the Montana Marijuana Act. Montana Cannabis Industry Association, Mark Matthews, Shirley Hamp, Shelly Yeager, Jane Doe, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Michael Geci-Black, John Stowers, Point Hatfield, and Charlie Hamp (collectively, Plaintiffs) cross-appealed. The 2004 Medical Marijuana Act left in place those provisions in the Montana criminal code that make it illegal to cultivate, possess, distribute or use marijuana, while simultaneously protecting authorized users of medical marijuana from being prosecuted. The Legislature enacted Senate Bill 423, which repealed the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act and replaced it with the Montana Marijuana Act (MMA), which dramatically changed the landscape for the cultivation, distribution, and use of marijuana for medical purposes. In 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking to both temporarily and permanently enjoin the implementation of the MMA in its entirety. Based on a motion filed with the complaint, the District Court immediately entered a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of the MMA which prohibited the advertising of "marijuana or marijuana-related products" and which was scheduled to take effect that day. By stipulation, the temporary restraining order remained in effect pending the preliminary injunction hearing. The court ultimately issued its Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The issues raised on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court erred when it applied a strict scrutiny, fundamental rights analysis to preliminarily enjoin the MMA; (2) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(2), MCA; (3) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(7), MCA; and, (4) whether the court erred in declining to enjoin the MMA in its entirety. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) the MMA did not implicate the fundamental right to employment, and reversed the District Court’s holding on this issue; and in pursuing health, an individual does not have a fundamental affirmative right of access to a particular drug. The Court reversed the District Court's holding with respect to this issue. Because the Court remanded the case on the scrutiny issue, it declined to address Issues Two, Three and Four. View "Montana Cannabis v. Montana" on Justia Law

Petitioner Caryn Lewis asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of supervisory control over the Eighth Judicial District Court in Cascade County Cause No. ADV 10-895. The District Court action arose from a 2003 motor vehicle/pedestrian accident in which Lewis was the pedestrian. The vehicle that struck Lewis left the scene, and neither the vehicle nor the driver was ever located. Lewis’s complaint stated she suffered serious bodily injuries from the accident, and her medical reports showed that those injuries included a cause for a Rule 35 examination. The Court never ruled that a plaintiff's claim for general emotional distress damages is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for ordering a Rule 35 mental examination. Lewis did not claim damages for any mental or psychological disorder or injury due to the accident, nor did she claim that a pre-existing mental condition was exacerbated by the accident or assert an independent tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Rather, she made only a general claim for "emotional pain, suffering and anxiety" associated with her physical injuries from the accident. Upon review, the Court concluded that the matter involved a legal issue as to which the District Court made a mistake of law. Because Lewis did not put her mental condition in controversy, the District Court erred in granting State Farm's (her insurer) motion for an independent psychological examination of her under M. R. Civ. P. 35. "And, because Lewis's loss of privacy in submitting to a Rule 35 psychological examination would be irretrievable, the normal appeal process would be inadequate to address the District Court's error." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lewis v. 8th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Appellant Raul Sanchez appealed a district court order that denied his amended petition for postconviction relief. The issue on appeal was whether the court erred in doing so. Appellant admitted to shooting his girlfriend Alesha in 2004. He objected to the admission of a hearsay statement Alesha made in a handwritten note she addressed "to whom it may concern" and suggested that should tragedy befall her, that she suspected it was at the hands of Appellant. Appellant raised his objection as a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Montana Supreme Court concluded that while the note constituted hearsay not subject to an exception, its admission was harmless error because the State presented other admissible evidence that proved the same facts. Furthermore. the Court concluded that Appellant forfeited his constitutional right to confront Alesha when he killed her. Appellant filed his application for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to appeal the Montana Supreme Court's confrontation decision to the United States Supreme Court. The district court denied Appellant's application for relief. Finding "overwhelming" evidence to support Appellant's conviction and that there was no error by his counsel for "failing" to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of relief. View "Sanchez v. Montana" on Justia Law

The Montana Public Employees' Retirement Board (MPERB) denied death benefits to Petitioner Erene Briese (Erene) because her deceased husband, who had originally named her as his beneficiary under the Montana Sheriffs’ Retirement System (SRS), had later filed a new designation, dropping her as a beneficiary, while marital dissolution proceedings were pending. Erene appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the MPERB’s order. Erene then appealed the District Court’s order to the Supreme Court. "At a minimum," the Supreme Court agreed with those courts that have held that "a court has equitable power to order a return to the status quo when a party violating a temporary restraining order has died. Thus, in this case, the District Court should have invalidated the husband's 2006 change of beneficiaries because it was made in violation of the statutorily-mandated restraining order, and should have determined that his 2001 designation of Erene was "the most recent membership card filed with the board." View "Briese v. MPER Board" on Justia Law