Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cassadie and Chris Parish were injured in a motor vehicle accident when their vehicle was struck by an uninsured driver. United Financial Casualty Insurance Company (UFC) provided insurance coverage to the Parishes, including uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The Parishes, who had two vehicles insured on their UFC policy at the time of the accident, argued they should be permitted to stack the UM benefits provided in their policy. UFC refused, stating that the Parishes' policy did not allow stacking. The Parishes sued seeking declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UFC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting UFC's motion for summary judgment, as, inter alia, the policy was unambiguous and UFC's insurance agreement did not create a reasonable expectation of stacked UM coverage. View "Parish v. Morris" on Justia Law

In 1976 Cecilia Kincaid Bates, grantor, and co-trustees George Kincaid and Richard Peterson entered into a trust agreement establishing the Cecilia Kincaid Gift Trust for George. George was Cecilia's son and died in 2009. In 2010 the co-trustees filed a final account, petition for settlement, distribution, and termination of the trust. When distributing the proceeds of the trust, the district court determined that Jennifer, George's child who was born and given up for adoption after the trust was established, should be included in the trust distribution. The trustees appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the trust, Jennifer was not a descendant of George because she was adopted and was therefore regarded as the lawful blood descendant of the adopting parent or parents. Remanded. View "In re Kincaid Gift Trust" on Justia Law

Thomas Evans pleaded guilty to felony issuance of bad checks and received a suspended sentence. Evans was subsequently charged with misdemeanor partner or family member assault. As a result, the district court revoked Evans' suspended sentence after revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Evans received due process of the law; (3) the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; but (4) the district court erred in failing to award Evans credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

While driving his motorcycle, William Cleary struck a deer. Cleary was transported to the hospital, where a consensual blood alcohol content test revealed a BAC of .18. The State filed an information charging Cleary with felony driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). The felony charges were based upon Cleary's Montana driving record, which reported three previous DUIs, two in Montana and one in South Dakota. Cleary moved to have the felony dismissed, arguing that he should not be subject to the enhanced felony charges because the DUI issued in South Dakota was not a "prior conviction." The district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleary's South Dakota offense was neither a conviction nor a sentence for Montana purposes, and the expungement of the charge precluded it from being counted as a previous conviction for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded. View "State v. Cleary" on Justia Law

Appellee Dawn Lewton filed a petition for separation in the district court from Appellant John Lewton. The petition for separation was converted into a petition for dissolution. Following a trial, the district court distributed the marital property, awarded Dawn attorney fees, and awarded Dawn back child support owed by John. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) by failing to make a finding of the net worth of the marital estate and when apportioning the marital estate; (2) by awarding attorney fees to Dawn; (3) by awarding maintenance to Dawn; and (4) in awarding back support to Dawn. View "In re Marriage of Lewton" on Justia Law

The Montana Legislature enacted Senate Bill 268 (SB 268), which submitted to the electorate the question whether certain statutory changes should be made regarding the election of justices to the Montana Supreme Court. SB 268 was to be submitted to the voters at a special election and was to appear on the ballot as Legislative Referendum No. 119 (LR-119). Plaintiffs, Montana citizens, taxpayers, and electors, sought a declaratory judgment that LR-119 was constitutionally defective. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and ordered the Secretary of State to decertify LR-119 and enjoined the Secretary from presenting LR-119 on the election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the non-retiring justices on the Court were not required to recuse themselves from participating in the decision of this appeal; (2) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to LR-119 was justiciable; (3) LR-119's proposed amendments to the qualifications and structure of the Supreme Court were facially unconstitutional; and (4) the constitutionally infirm provisions of LR-119 were not severable from the remainder of the referendum. View "Reichert v. State" on Justia Law

The child abuse and neglect proceedings (DN cases) at issue here commenced with the filing of a petition for emergency protective services, adjudication as youth in need of care and temporary legal custody. Parent was served with a show cause order on February 5, 2012. On February 7, the office of public defender filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Parent. The court continued the show cause hearing until February 22. On February 21, Parent filed a motion to substitute judge. The district court concluded that Parent's initial appearance under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804(1)(b) was February 7, the date of appearance of counsel, and therefore the motion for substitution was untimely and must be denied. Parent subsequently sought supervisory control. The Supreme Court granted Parent's petition, holding that the district court erred in determining that it was the date of appearance of counsel that started the clock running for purposes of a motion for substitution of judge in a DN proceeding, as it is the date upon which a parent first appears in court to answer the allegations of a DN petition that constitutes her initial appearance for purposes of the substitution statute. Remanded. View "A.C. v. Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

Appellees, Kristine Kittleson and James Kurtzenacker, purchased property pursuant to a warranty deed that referenced surveys conducted by Davis Surveying. Appellants, Davis Surveying and Kenneth Davis claimed they had nothing to do with Appellees until after they had purchased their property. Appellees sued Appellants, alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of contract based on a third-party beneficiary theory and claiming that because of Clark's incorrect flagging, they trespassed on neighboring property and needed to remove part of their landscaping and construction work. The district court held that Appellants were liable for breach of contract under a third-party beneficiary theory and for negligent misrepresentation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that Appellees were third-party beneficiaries of a contract for a prior survey, but while the court erred in this reasoning, it reached the right result under Appellees' negligent misrepresentation claim; (2) the court did not err in determining that Appellees were entitled to damages based on negligent misrepresentation; and (3) there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the court's determination that Davis was personally liable to Appellees for work done by Davis Surveying. View "Krutzenacker v. Davis Surveying, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district judge in youth court and on an appeal from justice court. Petitioners, two youths who appeared in court or detention hearings and a defendant who pled guilty in justice court to driving under the influence, petitioned for writ of supervisory control, claiming that the district court incorrectly denied as untimely their motions for substitution of district court judge in those cases. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district court on the appeal from justice court. View "Bledsoe v. Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Tristeana Johnson was found guilty of the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor. Johnson appealed the court's order denying her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana and the court's subsequent judgment and order convicting her of that charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, as the Montana's Medical Marijuana Act (MMA) is clear and unambiguous on its face, and the district court's interpretation harmonized the statutes within the MMA; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the district court to convict Johnson of the charge. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law