Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Michael Johnson and Laura Wendlandt divorced, the couple's child, P.J., lived with Laura. Montana Child Protective Services later began investigating allegations that Michael sexually abused P.J. Laura filed an ex parte motion in the district court, requesting temporary emergency jurisdiction, assumption of continuing jurisdiction, and an order of protection. The district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for P.J. and awarded full custody to Laura until the GAL issued her report and recommendations. The district court eventually issued an order adopting the GAL's recommendations and ordered that full custody of P.J. would remain with Laura. No hearing was held. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in adopting and implementing the recommendations of the GAL without first holding a hearing. View "Wendlandt v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Prior to the marriage of Todd Feeley and Anne Nang Loi, Anne inherited or was gifted money from the sale of her family's business. Anne filed for dissoluion of the parties' marriage in 2009. At trial, Anne alleged that approximately $180,000 of the parties' $198,000 down payment on the marital home came from her inherited funds. The district court found that there was no evidence other than the testimony of Anne and her mother to establish that $180,000 of the inherited money had been applied to the down payment. Instead, the court found that Anne was entitled to an additional $79,982 in equity from the marital home because this amount could be traced to the down payment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Anne failed to show the district court's equitable distribution of the marital estate lacked credible support in the evidence or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. View "Loi v. Feeley" on Justia Law

Oliver Arlington was employed by Miller's Trucking as a log truck driver and loader operator pursuant to an oral employment agreement. For his work, Miller's paid Arlington twenty-five percent of the "load rate" as calculated by Miller's. Arlington, however, asserted that according to the parties' oral agreement, he should have been paid a salary in the form of annual wages. Arlington filed a wage claim, seeking the pay he alleged he was owed in regular and overtime wages. The Department of Labor and Industry's bureau dismissed Arlington's claim for lack of merit and lack of sufficient evidence. On appeal, a bureau hearing officer dismissed Arlington's claim. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to require Miller's to produce material requested by Arlington and in refusing to admit tendered evidence, prejudicing the substantial rights of Arlington, and the district court erred in affirming the hearing officer's judgment; and (2) the hearing officer and district court incorrectly determined that Arlington engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of the operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce and thus was exempt from overtime requirements. Remanded. View "Arlington v. Miller's Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between two neighboring property owners regarding a workshop addition to the home of Appellants, Neil and Seth Milner (Milner). The addition violated the city's setback requirement, and Appellee Gary Olsen reached an agreement with Milner to sell strip of his property so the building would be in compliance. The parties disagreed, however, about the terms of the agreement. Milner filed suit, and the district court rescinded and set aside the agreement. Olsen was ordered to return Milner's money and costs, and Milner was required to deed the land back to Olsen. After Olsen discovered that Milner's addition encroached past the boundary line of his property, Olsen filed suit alleging trespass and nuisance. The district court found in favor of Olsen and ordered Milner to remove the addition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) Olsen's claims were not barred by res judicata; (2) Olsen's claims were not barred by equitable estoppel or waiver; and (3) Milner was liable to Olsen for trespass. View "Olsen v. Milner" on Justia Law

David Green pled guilty to felony aggravated assault and was sentenced to twenty years, with fifteen years suspended upon conditions. The conditions included the requirement that Green not use or possess illegal drugs. Defense counsel objected to the conditions on the basis that Green had no history of alcohol use and that the incident resulting in Green's charges did not involve alcohol. The district court overruled defense counsel's objection, finding that Green's refraining from alcohol use, considering his violent history, was necessary for his total rehabilitation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's imposition of green's alcohol-related sentencing conditions, holding that a sufficient nexus existed between the alcohol-related conditions and Green as an offender, and therefore, the district court did not err in imposing the conditions. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

The Town filed an application with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) seeking approval for proposed changes to its municipal well water rights. The DNRC notified the Town that its application was deficient because it did not contain information on the Town's historical use of its rights. The Town did not provide the information, contending that the information was irrelevant to its application. The DNRC then determined that the Town's application was not correct and complete as required by Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-302 and informed the Town that its application was terminated. The district court upheld the DNRC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on established Montana law and the applicable regulations, the DNRC was within its lawful authority to request that the Town provide information on its historical use of water as part of its application for approval of its proposed changes. View "Town of Manhattan v. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Richard Melton pleaded guilty of failing to comply with the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act. The district court committed Melton to the Department of Corrections for two years, all suspended. As a condition of his suspended sentence, the district court prohibited Melton from frequenting places where children congregate or are reasonably expected to be present unless accompanied by an approved adult and granted permission from his probation officer beforehand. Melton objected to the condition, contending that the condition was indiscriminately imposed and unnecessarily burdened his constitutionally protected relationship with his children and his right to freedom of travel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the condition was reasonably related to the objectives to rehabilitation and the protection of society and was not overbroad or unduly punitive. View "State v. Melton" on Justia Law

A jury unanimously found Defendant Joel St. Germain guilty of four counts of incest and four counts of sexual intercourse without consent for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. Defendant then filed a petition for postconviction relief, setting forth nine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against his defense counsel at trial and one claim against his original appellate counsel. The district court dismissed Defendant's petition, finding that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it (1) denied Defendant's petition based on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) denied Defendant postconviction relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. View "St. Germain v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants, three licensed clinic psychologists, were former partners of Great Falls Clinic, LLP, a general limited liability partnership comprised of medical professionals. The Clinic partners, including Appellants, signed a partnership agreement stating that a partner who separates from the partnership in compliance with the agreement's terms will receive a partnership interest subject to reduction for competing after withdrawal or retirement. Appellants subsequently separated from the Clinic and filed a declaratory judgment action when the Clinic refused to pay them their full partnership interest payments. At issue was whether the agreement's restriction, which applied to those engaged in the "practice of medicine," included partners who practiced psychology after separating from the Clinic. The district court granted summary judgment for the Clinic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) holding that the Appellants engage in the "practice of medicine" as used in the partnership agreement; and (2) concluding that the parties' intention regarding the term "practice of medicine" in the language of the agreement was to include the psychologists. View "Krajacich v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP" on Justia Law

After a dispute over the purchase of a motor coach, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, a used car salesman, a used car dealership, and a bank, asserting claims of, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery, which the district court granted. Defendants did not meet their discovery deadlines, and Defendants' counsel failed to attend several status conferences. The district court then entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction and later and awarded Plaintiff $74,154 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction under Mont. R. Civ. P. 37(b); (2) did not abuse its discretion when it refused to set aside the sanction orders; (3) did not err as a matter of law in calculating damages; but (4) failed to property calculate and award prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "Kraft v. High Country Motors Inc." on Justia Law