Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Whealon was employed by the Anaconda School District pursuant to a series of employment contracts. Upon retirement, Whealon filed a formal grievance, asserting that, under the terms of his contract, he was entitled to payment of his health insurance premiums by the District until he reached the age of sixty-five. The District denied his claim. The County Superintendent granted summary judgment to the District, holding that the language of the contract was unambiguous and that Whealon was not entitled to the claimed benefits beyond the date of his retirement. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the language of the contract was ambiguous. The district court reversed and reinstated the County Superintendent's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the district court did not err in holding that a county superintendent has authority to grant summary judgment; and (2) the district court did not err in reinstating summary judgment in favor of the district where the language of the agreement was unambiguous and the District was entitled to judgment. View "Anaconda Public Schools v. Whealon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Blaine Fadness was convicted of three counts of attempted deliberate homicide. One of the conditions of Defendant's suspended sentence was that he not own, possess, or be in control of any firearms of deadly weapons. The county attorney subsequently filed a petition for order of disposing of evidence, seeking an order giving him authority to sell Defendant's firearms, dangerous weapons, ammunition, and other equipment that the government had seized for use in the investigation and trial. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in permitting the State to sell items that were not firearms, ammunition, or deadly weapons, as Defendant was entitled to have those items returned; (2) did not err in denying Defendant possession of the firearms, ammunition, and deadly weapons; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to sell Defendant's firearms, ammunition, with the proceeds to go to Defendant's father as an agent for Defendant, rather than releasing the items to Defendant's parents, who had no plan for selling them and little or no knowledge about how to do so. Remanded. View "State v. Fadness" on Justia Law

T.M.L. was seventeen when he pled guilty to felony burglary and misdemeanor criminal trespass to vehicles. The youth court entered a dispositional order providing that T.M.L. be placed on probation until he reached age eighteen, after which supervision was to be transferred to the district court and adult probation and parole department. After T.M.L. turned eighteen, the youth court transferred T.M.L.'s matter to district court and transferred T.M.L.'s supervision to adult supervision under the department of corrections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the youth court's denial of T.M.L.'s motion to dismiss where the youth court had jurisdiction over T.M.L.; and (2) remanded the matter for the limited purpose of striking the condition that T.M.L. register as a sexual offender as a condition of T.M.L.'s sentence, as the youth court did not have the power to require T.M.L. to register as a sexual offender. View "In re T.M.L." on Justia Law

Husband appealed from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution entered by the district court, which dissolved the marriage of Husband and Wife, determined Husband's child support obligation, and adopted a parenting plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) imputed $90,000 in annual disposable income to Husband for purposes of calculating his child support obligation, and (2) did not follow the recommendation of the parenting evaluator that Husband be allowed "make up" visitation days for those days he missed visitation while working out of town. View "In re Marriage of Everett" on Justia Law

Hobble Diamond Ranch, Robert and Susan Burch, and James Lowe, (collectively, Neighbors), appealed the district court's judgment affirming the Montana Department of Transportation's (DOT) decision to issue billboard sign permits under the Montana Outdoor Advertising Act. Neighbors sought removal of two billboards, arguing that the billboards were not in compliance with MOAA, DOT's granting of the permits was unlawful, and the billboards were a public nuisance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's ruling upholding the DOT decision was not arbitrary capricious, or unlawful, as the permit applications were in conformance with MOAA and DOT based its decision on sufficient evidence. View "Hobble Diamond Ranch v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Edna Banco filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for an occupational disease (OD) in her right shoulder. Banco worked concurrently at 4B's Restaurant and the Child Development Center on Malmstrom Air Force Base (CDC). 4B's was insured by Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation (Liberty). Liberty denied Banco's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) found (1) Banco was last exposed to work of the same type and kind that gave rise to her shoulder condition while she was working at CDC; and (2) thus, since Banco was not last exposed at 4B's, Liberty was not liable under the "last injurious exposure" rule set forth in In re Mitchell. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC had substantial credible evidence upon which to find Banco was last injuriously exposed at CDC to working conditions of the type and kind that led to her OD, and thus, Liberty was not liable for Banco's OD. View "Banco v. Liberty Nw. Ins." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Charles Branham was found guilty of mitigated deliberate homicide for the fatal stabbing of Miachel Kinross-Wright and was sentenced to forty years' incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence offered by Branham to show Kinross-Wright's propensity for violence where the evidence was unknown to Branham at the time of the stabbing; (2) Branham failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor made improper comments during trial and that he was denied a fair trial; and (3) the district court provided sufficient reasons for limiting parole eligibility. View "State v. Branham" on Justia Law