Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in May, 2011
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Appellant, a Montana limited partnership which owned an electrical generating plant in Rosebud County, appealed the district court's order denying its motion to vacate the arbitration award ("Final Award") in its dispute with appellee, a Delaware corporation and a regulated public utility conducting business in Montana. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when if failed to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion where Montana's Uniform Arbitration Act, 27-5-311 MCA, did not permit a court to vacate an arbitration award in part; where Montana law was clear that a non-breaching party was still required to prove its damages; where the district court correctly noted in its order confirming the Final Award that the legal precedent on which appellant relied for its request to modify or correct the Final Award applied only to motions to vacate an award; and where the district court correctly determined that it lacked the authority to vacate the Final Award.

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This case concerns two competing wills made slightly over one month apart near the end of decedent's life. The district court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment in favor of the probate of a will executed by decedent in January 2009 and dismissed appellant's formal petition to probate a handwritten document he claimed was a valid holographic will executed by decedent in December 2008 and denied appellant's motion to vacate, alter, or amend the order granting summary judgment. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee; erred in denying appellant's motion to vacate, alter, or amend; and erred in denying appellant's M.R.Civ.P. 56(f) motion. Also at issue was whether appellee was entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The court held that summary judgment was properly granted to appellee where the district court's evidentiary rulings were correct, appellant failed to present any genuine issues of fact, and the court correctly analyzed appellant's claim of undue influence. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion based on alleged discovery abuses where the district court's ruling was made irrespective of any information contained in appellee's affidavits that appellant would have been better prepared to rebut. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion where nothing in counsel's affidavit explained what additional facts appellant would obtain through additional discovery that would effectively oppose the motion for summary judgment. The court finally held that appellant's appeal was now no longer pending and appellee had defended a contested will that was later confirmed, entitling him to fees and costs as provided in 72-12-206, MCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the issue of attorney's fees and costs for further proceedings.

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Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs who received Medicaid assistance and were subject to a Medicaid lien pursuant to 53-2-612, MCA, sued defendant alleging that defendant had collected a greater amount than it was entitled from plaintiffs' recoveries from other sources. The parties raised several issues on appeal. The court held that Ark. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn applied retroactively to all class members' claims and that defendant must raise affirmative defenses with respect to individual class members to avoid Ahlborn's effect. The court held that the applicable statute of limitations to be 27-2-231, MCA, which provided for a five-year limitations period. The court declined to disturb the district court's order requiring defendant to compile data on individual class members' claims. The court reversed the district court's determination as to interest assessed against defendant, and concluded that no interest could be assessed until two years after any judgment had been entered, under 2-9-317, MCA. The court concluded that the term "third party" in the Medicaid reimbursement statutes included all other sources of medical assistance available to Medicaid recipients, including private health or automobile insurance obtained by the Medicaid recipient. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the class on its proffered distinction between "first party" and "third party" sources. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' "made whole" claim was immaterial in light of Ahlborn.

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Defendant was found guilty of deliberate homicide, DUI, violation of an order of protection, criminal endangerment, driving while the privilege to do so was suspended or revoked, and tampering with physical evidence. At issue was whether defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was violated and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error when defendant was not allowed to be present at his omnibus hearing where, based on the facts, the court found that defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of his absence from the hearing. The court also held that the record did not demonstrate the reasoning behind any of the alleged errors committed by defendant's counsel and therefore, a postconviction proceeding would better address defendant's claims where the record could be fully developed.

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Appellants appealed the order of the district court denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate of their father, the decedent. At issue was whether the district court erred when it assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of the estate when the decedent was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and all of his estate property was located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation at the time of his death. The court overruled State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court and held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of the decedent's estate and assumption of subject matter jurisdiction by the district court was impermissible because Montana and the Blackfeet Tribe had not taken the necessary steps for Montana to assume civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reservation.

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Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking recognition and enforcement of their easement over Prairie Drive in Park County, Montana, near the City of Livingston. The parties raised several issues regarding the district court's findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order dated August 4, 2010. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the relief ordered by the district court, if properly implemented, would not allow them to use their easement essentially as they did and therefore, the district court both recognized and upheld plaintiffs' easement rights and ordered relief specifically designed to address their complaints. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees and costs where there was no factual support for defendants' argument that they were actually the prevailing party and plaintiffs prevailed on all substantive issues. The court held that the Prairie Drive Subdivision Homeowner's Association ("HOA") had standing to participate in the case where the HOA cured a defect with the Secretary of State when it had been involuntarily dissolved for failure to file its annual report. The court held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs' property right in the easement had been taken or extinguished and the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' private easements existed independently of any public right to use the right of way. The court held that there was no merit in the argument that plaintiffs' settlement with the City of Livingston absolved defendants of any liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court except as to the matter of plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees and costs and that matter was remanded for further proceedings.

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Respondent entered a true plea and was adjudged delinquent in the district court in 2005 for knowingly engaging in sexual acts with a person under 12 years of age, which would have been a crime under 18 U.S.C. 2241(c) and 1153(a) if committed by an adult. At issue, in a certified question, was whether respondent's duty to remain registered as a sex offender under Montana law was contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal juvenile-supervision order that required him to register as a sex offender or was the duty an independent requirement of Montana law that was unaffected by the validity or invalidity of the federal juvenile-supervision conditions. The court held that respondent's state law duty to remain registered as a sex offender was not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal supervision order, but was an independent requirement of Montana law. Therefore, the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act ("SVORA"), 46-23-501 through 502, directly applied to respondent and he had a continuing duty to register under SVORA, which was entirely independent from the registration conditions imposed by his federal supervision order.

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Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court denying his petition for post-conviction relief after he was convicted with two counts of sexual assault for touching the vaginal areas of his co-worker's two stepdaughters. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and on direct appeal, and whether prosecutorial misconduct violated petitioner's due process rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying petitioner post conviction relief and held that petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel relating to counsel's pretrial investigation, use of expert testimony, decisions regarding objections to vouching and prosecutorial misconduct, admissibility of evidence, and other objections to trial irregularities, as well as on appeal, where petitioner failed to demonstrate the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington. The court also held that petitioner failed to raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal and could not raise them in post-conviction relief.

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Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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The State brought a complaint against BNSF Railway Co. ("BNSF") in November 2009 seeking a declaratory judgment requiring BNSF to abide by the terms of a 1984 agreement between them and a declaration that BNSF was in violation of that agreement; specific performance by BNSF of the agreement, and damages for BNSF's alleged breach of the agreement. The State subsequently filed an application for a preliminary injunction in June 2010 to prohibit BNSF from terminating the payment to the State and its short line operator per loaded car for each car handled in interchanges as required by Section 9 of the agreement. At issue was whether the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction where it went beyond the State's requested relief and effectively ordered specific performance on the agreement under new terms substantially different than the prior agreed upon terms which severely limited termination of the new interchange agreement and was never part of the 1984 or 1986 agreements. Accordingly, the court reversed the order and resolved the injunction, remanding for further proceedings.