Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Montana appealed an order of the district court reversing defendant's conviction for partner or family member assault where his wife called 911 while fleeing from the family home afraid that he would harm her. At issue was whether the evidence presented to establish reasonable apprehension of bodily injury was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where his wife testified at trial that many of her statements provided to the police were lies. Also at issue was whether the state's appeal was precluded by law because it sought to reinstate defendant's guilty verdict. The court first held that the state's appeal was not precluded by law where defendant was not subjected to impermissible retrial, further prosecution, or double punishment for the same offense. The court also held that the evidence presented by the prosecution could have allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude that the "reasonable apprehension of bodily injury" element was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt where the 911 recording clearly demonstrated the wife's outright fear, she was scared enough to flee her home into a cold, snowy night wearing only pajamas and socks, her fear was so great that the dispatcher had to coax her out of hiding, and three officers testified to her distraught appearance.

Appellants, 30 Civil Engineering Technician IV employees, sought reclassification of their positions as Civil Engineering Specialist III from the State Department of Transportation ("DOT"). The State Human Resources Division ("SHRD") determined that Technician IV's were correctly classified as pay band five and DOT changed the classification of Civil Engineering Specialist III from band six to band five, although it did not lower the rate of pay. At issue was whether the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence when it concluded that the Technician IV and Specialist III positions were not required to receive equal pay. The court held that the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence where the positions' non-predominant duties were different, education requirements were different, minimum professional experience for the positions was different, and there were also differing market demands for each position, as well as collective-bargaining effects for Technician IV positions.

This case involves two competing wills made slightly over one month apart near the end of the decedent's life. The district court granted the estate's personal representative Roger Harmon's motion for summary judgment in favor of the probate of a will executed by the decedent Cecilia Harmon in January, 2009. The court dismissed Appellant Dennis Waitt' s formal petition to probate a handwritten document Waitt claimed was a valid holographic will executed by the decedent in December, 2008, and denied Waitt's motion to vacate, alter or amend the order granting summary judgment in favor of Harmon. Waitt produced affidavits alleged to have contained the decedent's wishes in drafting the holographic will, but the affidavits were excluded as hearsay. On review of the record, the Supreme Court held that Waitt did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact required to defeat the summary judgment, and affirmed the lower court's decision.

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services removed I.B. from his parents' care in June, 2008, when he was about five months old. The parents neglected to provide I.B. with necessary medical care. I.B. was taken to the hospital after suffering a blistering facial sunburn and second degree burns on 20-30% of his body. The Department of Human Services received an abuse or neglect referral and investigated. Due to the nature of his injury, doctors recommended a special feeding technique and schedule be followed once I.B. was released back to his parents' care. Social workers arrived at I.B.'s home unannounced to find that none of the hospital's instructions were being followed. The Department removed I.B. from his home and into foster care, and filed a petition seeking emergency protective services. The court adjudicated I.B. a youth in need of care, and the parents stipulated to treatment plans in July, 2008. Seeing no compliance with the treatment plan, and seeing that the parents' condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, the district court terminated the parental rights of I.B.'s parents, B.K and C.B. The parents challenged this termination. Finding that the record supported the decision, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's termination of parental rights.

In November, 2009, Plaintiff-Appellee Mick Grant was convicted of felonious aggravated assault. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court's limiting voir dire prevented him from obtaining an impartial jury, and seeks reversal of his conviction. A key issue in the State's case for aggravated assault against Appellant was whether the victim's injuries could be considered "protracted." "Protracted" is part of the definition of "serious bodily injury" applicable in this case. The State planned on calling two doctors as expert witnessed to testify to the "protracted impairment" caused by the victim's injuries. During voir dire, Appellant's counsel sought to explore the juror's concepts of the word "protracted," which he alleged was necessary to evaluate potential juror bias as to the doctors' testimony. After questioning potential jurors in succession, the trial judge interjected during the examination, cutting it short. Over objection from counsel, the court did not modify its directive. The eventual jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault. Appellant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court's actions in cutting short his counsel's juror-by-juror inquiry of their understanding of "protracted" deprived him of a right to an impartial jury. On review, the Supreme Court noted its duty in balancing Appellant's "essential right to an impartial jury with the broad discretion a trial court has to oversee the administration of trial." The Court held that it was within the trial court's discretion to limit counsel's insistent focus on one word in the statutory elements of the offense and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellee Anthony Otten appeals his misdemeanor conviction for operating a motor vehicle while declared a habitual traffic offender. Officers observed Appellee on a four-wheeler vehicle on the highway, and issued a citation. At trial, Appellee stipulated he was a habitual traffic offender whose license was revoked on the date of the offense. However, Appellee disputed the that the State could prove that the four-wheeler he was driving fit the definition of a "motor vehicle" according to state law. Appellee moved for a directed verdict; the court rejected the motion. On appeal, Appellee challenged the trial court's ruling on his motion. On review, the Supreme Court held that the definition of a quadricycle (or "four-wheeler") is clearly and unambiguously meets the definition of a motor vehicle within state law. The Court concluded that the lower court correctly denied Appellee's motions and affirmed the conviction.